Royer v. Rasmussen

• Decision Date: 15 June 1916
• Docket Number: 1915
• Citation: 158 N.W. 988,34 N.D. 428
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

158 N.W. 988

34 N.D. 428

AGNES ROYER v. M. RASMUSSEN and Minnie Rasmussen

No. 1915

Supreme Court of North Dakota

June 15, 1916

Appeal from the District Court of Grand Forks County, C. M. Cooley Judge.

Action to recover for personal injuries arising from alleged negligence in the operation of an automobile. From orders overruling demurrers to the complaint, defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

Bangs & Robbins, for appellants.

The complaint is void of any allegation showing negligence on the part of M. Rasmussen, or in anywise connecting him with the commission of the alleged negligent or wrongful act. His liability is predicated upon the relationship of the defendants. The master is liable for the acts of the servant only while such servant is acting within the scope of his employment. Warax v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R Co. 72 F. 643.

At common law the action against the servant was in trespass and on the case against the master. They could not be joined. 1 Chitty, Pl. 12th ed. 1828; Pom. Code Rem. §§ 307, 308; Bliss, Code Pl. §§ 82, and 83; 26 Cyc. 1545; 5 Thomp. Neg. § 5776; Parsons v. Winchell, 5 Cush. 592, 52 Am. Dec. 745; Mulchey v. Methodist Religious Soc. 125 Mass. 487; Western U. Teleg. Co v. Olsson, 40 Colo. 264, 90 P. 841; French v Central Constr. Co. 76 Ohio St. 509, 12 L.R.A.(N.S.) 669, 81 N.E. 751; Clark v. Fry, 8 Ohio St. 358, 72 Am. Dec. 590; Herman Berghoff Brewing Co. v. Przbylski, 82 Ill.App. 361; McNemar v. Cohn, 115 Ill.App. 31; Campbell v. Portland Sugar Co. 62 Me. 552, 16 Am. Rep. 503; Page v. Parker, 40 N.H. 47.

"Although there are authorities to the contrary, the better rule, and the one supported by the weight of authority, is that where the master is liable for the negligent or wrongful act of his servant solely upon the ground of relationship between them under the doctrine of respondeat superior, and not by reason of any personal share in the negligent or wrongful act, by his presence or express direction, he is not liable jointly with the servant, and a joint action cannot be maintained against them." Warax v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. 72 F. 637; Hukill v. Maysville & B. S. R. Co. 72 F. 745; Helms v. Northern P. R. Co. 120 F. 389; Davenport v. Southern R. Co. 124 F. 983; Shaffer v. Union Brick Co. 128 F. 97; Gustafson v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 128 F. 85; McIntyre v. Southern R. Co. 131 F. 985; Henry v. Illinois C. R. Co. 132 F. 715; Sessions v. Southern P. Co. 134 F. 313.

The measure of their liability varying, and being different in degree, they cannot be joined as defendants in the same action. Davenport v. Southern R. Co. 124 F. 983; Gustafson v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 128 F. 85.

O'Connor & Johnson, for respondent.

The demurrer is made upon the ground that two causes of action have been improperly united in the same complaint,--separately stated. The weight of authority and the better reasons seem to support the view that the remedy in such a case is not by demurrer in the first instance, but by a motion to make more definite and certain. Lewis v. Hinson, 64 S.C. 571, 43 S.E. 15; Cargar v. Fee, 140 Ind. 572, 39 N.E. 93; Times Pub. Co. v. Everett, 9 Wash. 518, 43 Am. St. Rep. 865, 37 P. 695.

This court, in passing on the questions raised by the demurrer, can consider nothing excepting that which appears from the face of the complaint. Hartland v. Windsor, 29 Vt. 354.

The complaint shows that the two defendants joined in the commission of the tort, and co-operated in the acts of negligence that caused the injury of which complaint is made. Pom. Code. Rem. 4th ed. § 307.

Trespass was the form of action originally for injuries caused by force, immediate and direct. But when it was desired to enforce the liability of the master for the negligent acts of his servant, it was found, there being no direct force emanating from the master, that the old writ of trespass did not meet the needs of the situation. Consequently, the statute of Westminster 2d was passed, giving authority to the clerks of chancery to issue writs where the case was similar to some of the existing actions. 13 Edw. I.; 2 Bl. Com. 51; 4 Reeves, History of English Law, 430; 1 C. J. 1064.

But under our statute all forms of pleading are expressly abolished. Comp. Laws, 1913, §§ 7355, 7439; Ed. of Blackstone 1916, p. 1643.

The fundamental provision of these Codes is the abolition of distinction between forms of actions. Under their provisions there is but one form of civil action. Grain v. Aldrich, 38 Cal. 514, 99 Am. Dec. 423; Oolitic Stone Co. v. Ridge, 169 Ind. 639, 83 N.E. 246; Conaughty v. Nichols, 42 N.Y. 83; Soule v. Weatherby, 39 Utah 580, 118 P. 833, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 75; Pom. Code Rem. p. 5 note, § 347; Hahl v. Sugo, 169 N.Y. 109, 61 L.R.A. 226, 88 Am. St. Rep. 539, 62 N.E. 135; Parsons v. Winchell, 5 Cush. 592, 52 Am. Dec. 745; Hewett v. Swift, 3 Allen, 425; Schumpert v. Southern R. Co. 65 S.C. 332, 95 Am. St. Rep. 802, 43 S.E. 813, 13 Am. Neg. Rep. 676; Comp. Laws 1913, §§ 7355, 7439.

"The rule seems to be well settled by the authorities that when the injury to the plaintiff results from the immediate force of the defendant, and is caused by his carelessness and negligence, and is not wilful, the plaintiff can maintain either trespass or case." Howard v. Tyler, 46 Vt. 688; Gates v. Miles, 3 Conn. 64; Blin v. Campbell, 14 Johns. 432; McAllister v. Hammond, 6 Cow. 342; Brennan v. Carpenter, 1 R. I. 474; Moreton v. Harden, 4 Barn. & C. 223, 107 Eng. Reprint, 1042, 4 Dowl. & R. 275; Williams v. Holland, 10 Bing. 112, 131 Eng. Reprint, 848, 6 Car. & P. 23, 3 Moore & S. 540, 2 L. J. C. P. N. S. 190; 9 Bacon, Abr. 441.

Among wilful tort feasors or intentional wrongdoers, no contribution will be allowed. Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 T. R. 186, 101 Eng. Reprint, 1337, 16 Revised Rep. 810 (1799); Peck v. Ellis, 2 Johns. Ch. 131; Arnold v. Clifford, 2 Sumn. 238, Fed. Cas. No. 555; Miller v. Fenton, 11 Paige, 18; Hunt v. Lane, 9 Ind. 248; Rhea v. White, 3 Head, 121; Spaulding v. Oakes, 42 Vt. 343, 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 399; Atkins v. Johnson, 43 Vt. 78, 5 Am. Rep. 260 (1870); Boyd v. Gill, 21 Blatchf. 543, 19 F. 145 (1886); Davis v. Gelhaus, 44 Ohio St. 69, 4 N.E. 593 (1886); Boyer v. Bolender, 129 Pa. 324, 15 Am. St. Rep. 723, 18 A. 127 (1889).

The general rule is that even where the parties are equally wrong, in pari delicto, as far as legal liability to respond in damages for injuries to their persons is concerned, contribution will be allowed for joint quasi delicto, where the wrong or tort was not wilful, malicious, intentional, unlawful, or immoral. Thweatt v. Jones, 1 Rand. (Va.) 328, 10 Am. Dec. 538 (1823); Wooley v. Batte, 2 Car. & P. 417 (1826); Horbach v. Elder, 18 Pa. 33 (1851); Acheson v. Miller, 2 Ohio St. 203, 59 Am. Dec. 663 (1849); Bailey v. Bussing, 28 Conn. 455 (1859); Selz v. Unna, 6 Wall. 327, 18 L.Ed. 799 (1867); Nickerson v. Wheeler, 118 Mass. 295 (1875); Ankeny v. Moffett, 37 Minn. 109, 33 N.W. 320; Smith v. Ayrault, 71 Mich. 475, 1 L.R.A. 311, 39 N.W. 724 (1888); Vandiver v. Pollak, 97 Ala. 467, 19 L.R.A. 628, 12 So. 473 (1893); Farwell v. Becker, 129 Ill. 261, 6 L.R.A. 400, 16 Am. St. Rep. 267, 21 N.E. 792 (1889); Cooley, Torts, 3d ed. 254; Mayberry v. Northern P. R. Co. 100 Minn. 79, 12 L.R.A.(N.S.) 675, 110 N.W. 356, 10 Ann. Cas. 754.

This rule, however, does not apply to torts which are the result of mere negligence. Ankeny v. Moffett, 37 Minn. 109, 33 N.W. 320; Churchill v. Holt, 127 Mass. 165, 34 Am. Rep. 355; Acheson v. Miller, 2 Ohio St. 203, 59 Am. Dec. 663; Torpy v. Johnson, 43 Neb. 882, 62 N.W. 253; Adamson v. Jarvis, 4 Bing. 66, 130 Eng. Reprint, 693, 5 L. J. C. P. 68; 9 Cyc. 804; 7 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 365.

Argument that these defendants should not be joined because the master has not the right of contribution is specious and fallacious, and has no substantial support in the authorities. Bliss, Code Pl. § 89; Addison, Contr. 34, 35; Schumpert v. Southern R. Co. 65 S.C. 332, 95 Am. St. Rep. 806, 43 S.E. 813, 13 Am. Neg. Rep. 676; Lowell v. Boston & L. R. Corp. 23 Pick. 24, 34 Am. Dec. 33; Old Colony R. Co. v. Slavens, 148 Mass. 363, 12 Am. St. Rep. 558, 19 N.E. 372.

Such joinder is sanctioned by the Federal courts. Davenport v. Southern R. Co. 68 C. C. A. 444, 135 F. 960; Thomas v. Great Northern R. Co. 77 C. C. A. 255, 147 F. 83; Charman v. Lake Erie & W. R. Co. 105 F. 449; Connell v. Utica, U. & E. R. Co. 13 F. 241; Kelly v. Chicago & A. R. Co. 122 F. 286; Comitez v. Parkerson, 50 F. 170; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Martin, 59 Kan. 437, 53 P. 461, 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 266, 178 U.S. 245, 44 L.Ed. 1055, 20 S.Ct. 845; Mayberry v. Northern P. R. Co. 100 Minn. 79, 12 L.R.A.(N.S.) 675, 110 N.W. 356, 10 Ann. Cas. 754.

Respondent contends that it is proper to join the master and servant under the facts in this case, and that this view finds ample support in the authorities, and is more in harmony with the modern and reformed procedure under the Codes. Pom. Code Rem. § 312; Bailey, Personal Injuries, p. 2173; Wood, Mast. & S. 667; 2 Thomp. Neg. § 11; Cooley, Torts, 3d ed. 241 242; Charman v. Lake Erie & W. R. Co. 105 F. 449; Mayberry v. Northern P. R. Co. 100 Minn. 79, 12 L.R.A.(N.S.) 675, 110 N.W. 356, 10 Ann. Cas. 754; Wright v. Compton, 53 Ind. 337, 2 Mor. Min. Rep. 189; Howe v. Northern P. R. Co. 30 Wash. 569, 60 L.R.A. 94, 70 P. 1100; Thomas v. Great Northern R. Co. 77 C. C. A. 255, 147 F. 83; Greenberg v. Whitcomb Lumber Co. 90 Wis. 225, 28 L.R.A. 439, 48 Am. St. Rep. 911, 63 N.W. 93; Schumpert v. Southern R. Co. 65 S.C. 332, 43 S.E. 813, 13 Am. Neg. Rep. 676, 95 Am. St. Rep. 802, note p. 809; Kelly v. Chicago & A. R. Co. 122 F. 286; Henshaw v. Noble, 7 Ohio St. 226; Whalen v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 73 N.J.L. 192, 63 A. 993; Southern R. Co. v. Grizzle, 124 Ga. 735, 110 Am. St. Rep. 191, ...