Rozell v. Vansyckle

• Decision Date: 07 February 1895
• Citation: 11 Wash. 79,39 P. 270
• Parties: ROZELL v. VANSYCKLE ET AL.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

39 P. 270

11 Wash. 79

ROZELL v. VANSYCKLE ET AL.

Supreme Court of Washington

February 7, 1895

Appeal from superior court, Yakima county; Carroll B. Graves, Judge.

Action by Martin Rozell against Oscar Vansyckle, George J. Gardiner Cora Gardiner, and others. From a judgment for plaintiff defendants George J. Gardner and Cora Gardner appeal. Affirmed.

Jones &amp Newman, for appellants.

John G. Boyle and Reavis & Milroy, for respondent.

GORDON J.

Respondent brought this action in the superior court of Yakima county to secure the cancellation of two deeds to real property described in the complaint, one given by the respondent to the defendant Oscar Vansyckle, and the other given by said Oscar Vansyckle to the appellant George J. Gardiner. The defendants Vansyckle and the appellants Gardiner, appearing separately in the court below, interposed demurrers, which were overruled, and thereafter filed separate answers. Trial was had upon the issues joined, and judgment rendered in favor of plaintiff, from which judgment the appellants Gardiner alone appealed.

The first assignment of error urged upon our attention is the ruling of the court upon the general demurrer to the complaint in the action. The pleadings in the cause are very voluminous, and it is enough to say that the character of the complaint is sufficiently disclosed in this opinion, and, for reasons hereafter set out in disposing of the case upon the evidence, we think that the demurrer was properly overruled. The complaint alleges, substantially, and we think the evidence abundantly shows, that in May, 1890, the respondent was the owner of 80 acres of valuable land in Yakima county. He was then an old man, very ignorant, could neither read nor write, was mentally weak, and, as shown by the testimony of his immediate neighbors and persons who had been intimately acquainted with him for years, was incompetent to attend to ordinary business, and wholly incapable of managing or transacting affairs of importance. That he had theretofore had dealings with one J. H. Conrad, resulting disastrously to him in a financial sense. That he was easily alarmed, and was easily imposed upon, and that the defendant Vansyckle was greatly his superior in mental sagacity. That at and immediately prior to executing the deed to Vansyckle, in May, 1890, he feared that Conrad was seeking to establish a false claim against him, and for the purpose of protecting the land in question therefrom he sought the advice of Vansyckle. It is set out in the complaint, and fully established by the evidence, that the respondent had implicit confidence in Vansyckle, and relied upon him to advise him safely as to the best means of protecting his property against what he apparently considered the unauthorized and unjust claim of Conrad. He seemed to think that he was unequal to cope with Conrad, and there is evidence tending to show that he had theretofore been the victim of a fraud practiced upon him by Conrad. But, however that may be, the evidence is abundant to establish the fact that his mind was filled with the belief that Conrad was attempting to unjustly establish a false claim which would be asserted against the land in question, and under such circumstances he sought the advice of Vansyckle, in whom, as has been said, he appeared to have implicit confidence, and upon whose counsel he unreservedly relied. It further appears that, as a result of his conference with Vansyckle, respondent executed a deed of the premises, and delivered the same to said Vansyckle; that the respondent was induced thereto by the assurances of the said Vansyckle that he would hold the premises in trust for the plaintiff, and reconvey them to plaintiff upon his request. The testimony shows that prior to the making of the deed Vansyckle assured him that he had had experience in transactions of like character with other parties, and also encouraged the respondent to make the deed, and by his conduct and conversation added greatly to the fears, apprehensions, and excitement under which respondent then labored concerning Conrad. No consideration was paid or promised on the part of Vansyckle for this conveyance. That thereafter, sometime in March, 1891, said Oscar Vansyckle, without the consent or knowledge of the respondent, executed a mortgage upon said lands in the sum of $1,000 to the Lombard Investment Company, his wife, the defendant Elizabeth F. Vansyckle, joining with him in such mortgage. That he received from said mortgagee the full sum of $1,000, which he applied to his exclusive use, and concealed and withheld from the respondent the fact of the execution of such mortgage. That thereafter, in October, 1892, the defendants Vansyckle, without the consent of the respondent, executed a quitclaim deed to appellant George J. Gardiner, conveying said premises to him subject to the mortgage aforesaid. That thereupon said Gardiner and appellant Cora Gardiner, his wife, went into possession thereof, and thereafter, and until the commencement of this action, continued in possession. It is conceded by the appellants, and the proof upon the question is abundant to show, that, at the time appellant George J. Gardiner took the quitclaim deed last mentioned from Vansyckle, he knew of all the facts and circumstances connected with and surrounding the execution of the deed upon the part of respondent to said Vansyckle, and that for some time before receiving Vansyckle's quitclaim to the premises he was advised and familiar with all of said facts and circumstances; that he is the son-in-law of Vansyckle; that he paid no consideration whatever for said quitclaim deed.

These are substantially the facts that were established upon the trial below, and which are embraced in the record brought to this court. In their separate answer the appellants Gardiner set up two affirmative defenses to the plaintiff's cause of action, in the first of which it is asserted that the agreement made between the respondent and the defendant Oscar Vansyckle, by which said Vansyckle was to hold the premises in trust for the respondent, was a verbal agreement; that no memorandum of said agreement was made in writing at the time said deed was executed, or prior or subsequent thereto; and that the same falls within the statute of frauds. And the remaining defense is that said deed from respondent to Vansyckle was made voluntarily by the respondent, for the purpose of placing said premises beyond the reach of the creditors of the respondent, and especially for the purpose of defeating the collection of any claim or judgment that the said Conrad might have or secure against the respondent. There was a trial to the court, and a judgment rendered in favor of plaintiff, canceling the deeds from respondent to Vansyckle, and from Vansyckle to Gardiner and awarding possession of the premises to the respondent;...