Giers v. Hudson

• Decision Date: 18 December 1911
• Citation: 143 S.W. 916,102 Ark. 232
• Parties: GIERS v. HUDSON
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

143 S.W. 916

102 Ark. 232

GIERS v. HUDSON

Supreme Court of Arkansas

December 18, 1911

Appeal from Ouachita Chancery Court; Zachariah T. Wood, Chancellor affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

Thornton & Thornton and Powell & Taylor, for appellant.

1. The demurrer to the answer was properly sustained, as the claims of appellee Hudson against his deceased wife's estate were not legal, valid claims; and if they were, equity had no jurisdiction to allow judgments for them. 33 Ark. 727; 48 Ark. 544; 90 Id. 444.

2. If there was any consideration, it was grossly inadequate. If Hudson advanced or expended money, it was an advancement which the law presumes to be a gift. 36 Ark. 566, 586; 40 Ark. 67; 45 Id. 484; 48 Id. 17; 52 Id. 188; 63 Id. 374; 68 Id. 405; 70 Id. 145; 76 Id. 389; 86 Id 448; 71 Id. 373.

3. Hudson's claims were barred by laches. 37 Ark. 155; 47 Id. 475; 56 Id. 663; 73 Id. 440.

4. A life tenant should not be allowed for permanent improvements except out of the rents and profits. 23 Pa.St. 305; 2 Swan. (Tenn.) 362; 50 S.W. 33; 98 S.W. 1031; Tiedeman on Real Prop., 68.

5. Deeds should be cancelled for fraud, imposition, deceit concealment, inadequacy of consideration and mistake of their purport and effect. Appellant was overreached, at least, by one who stood in a confidential relation. 74 Ark. 68 and 71 Ark. 185 are not applicable to this case. 32 N.J.Eq. 594; 13 P. 434; 31 Ban. (N. Y.) 9; 6 N.Y. 268; 62 P. 714; 27 Id. 940; Story, Eq. Jur., 309-317; Kerr, Fraud & Mistake, 150-3, 177-9; Bigelow, Fraud, 250-264; 43 N.E. 336; 18 N.W. 918; 4 Mylne & C. 277; 57 Ill. 186; 8 DeG., M. & G 133; 7 Id. 597; 31 Barb. 9; 8 How. 183; Pom. Eq. Jur., par. 961; 2 Ves. 547; 9 Id. 292, note; Hoff. Ch. 267; 15 Beav. 299; 7 Id. 551; 1 Ired. Eq. 460; 34 Beav. 457; 44 Mo. 465; 2 Lead. Cases Eq. 556 and notes; 46 Iowa 684; 122 N.W. 444; 90 Id. 583; 88 Id. 452; 81 Ala. 530; 9 Id. 662; 23 Id. 690; 69 Ala. 555; 75 Id. 555; 63 Md. 371; S. R. 10 Eq. 10; Adams, Eq. 184; 74 Ark. 231; 58 N.E. 480; 142 Ill. 160; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., par. 953, (3 ed.) 951, 961, 927, 928; Id. par. 948-955-6, 962; 38 Ark. 428; 40 Id. 28.

6. Because of the fiduciary relations existing, the deeds are voidable at her option. 23 Ark. 622; 26 Ark. 446; 54 Ark. 632; 55 Id. 85; 78 Ark. 111; 89 Id. 169 Id. 169; k. S. R. 142.

Warren & Smith and Gaughan & Sifford, for appellee.

1. No fraud was practiced; nor was there any concealment, nor deceit. The consideration was adequate. There was no undue influence; the act was voluntary and free after a clear explanation. The presumption is that a benefit was intended the child in discharge of a moral and parental duty. 173 U.S. 20; 31 Fed. Cases, 598; 74 Ala. 619; 81 Id. 541; 60 Am. Rep. 175; 1 So. 217; 8 App. D. C. 284; 109 Ill. 73; 211 Id. 607; 98 Ky. 114; 50 N.H. 498; 9 W. N. C. 259; 1 Chester Co. Rep. 425; 54 Pa. 484; 16 Tex. 583; 19 Tex. Civ. App. 335; 47 S.W. 61; 2 Wash. 632; 27 P. 456; 21 W.Va. 479; 8 How. 201; 9 Otto 210; 2 Cliff. 154-5.

2. A conveyance to a parent by a child is prima facie valid, and the proof of undue influence is on the party attacking. 173 U.S. 17; 13 Fed. Cases, 598; 160 Ill. 73-4; 12 Pet. 24; 109 Ill. S.Ct. 198; 74 Ala. 619; 1 Perry on Trusts, § 201; 12 Pet. 253; 98 Ky. 115; 8 How. 183; 24 Tex. 427; 21 W.Va. 469; 32 N.J.Eq. 594; 120 Mo. 253; Eaton Eq. 328; Bisp. Eq. (7 ed.) § 235; 173 U.S. 21; 118 Id. 127, 134; 135 Id. 167, 172-3.

3. A careful review of the following cases show they all stand upon incontestable proof of fraud, misrepresentation and overreaching on part of defendant. 32 N. J. E. 723; 72 Mo. 669; 65 Mo. 378; 70 Id. 580; 62 Id. 226; 46 How. Pr. 389; 26 Beav. 594; 2 Wash. C. C. 397; 1 Edw. 338; 7 DeG., McN. & G. 597; 1 Jurist (N S.) 932; 2 Dr. & W. 470; 7 Beavan, 557; 15 Id. 278; 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 268; 13 P. 434; 5 Mo.App. 33; 7 Beav. 557; 31 Barb. 9; 6 Hun 80; 62 P. 714.

4. Compromises and family arrangements or settlements are always favored. 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. (3 ed.), § 962, note 3, 928; 1 Perry, Trusts (6 ed.) § 201, 189, note (a).

5. The influence which invalidates such deeds must be of such nature as to deprive the grantor of his free agency. 173 Ill. 539; 147 Id. 370; 168 Mass. 107; 118 Pa.St. 359; 120 Mo. 252; 11 Wash. 79; 33 Ore. 486; 81 Ky. 10. Some good substantial reason must be shown where a person of full age and sound mind executes even a voluntary deed, and then seeks to set it aside. Godefroi, Law of Trusts, (2 ed.) 109; 31 Beav. 629, 244; 3 D. J. & S. 487; 19 C. D. 403; 173 Ill. 550; 147 Ill. 370. Especially is his true of family settlements. 98 Ark. 93; 84 Ark. 610.

MCCULLOCH C. J. HART and KIRBY, JJ., dissent.

OPINION

MCCULLOCH, C. J.

On August 31, 1909, the plaintiff, Miss Berenice Hudson Giers, instituted this action in the chancery court of Ouachita County against her father, Dr. G. W. Hudson, of Camden, Arkansas, to cancel two deeds which she and her brother, Woodland Hudson, had, on September 24, 1907, executed to her father, conveying to him their several interests in certain real estate formerly owned by their mother, Doctor Hudson's deceased wife, and in which Doctor Hudson had an interest as tenant by the curtesy. In his answer Doctor Hudson stated that one of the deeds was intended as a conveyance to him in trust for his said children for certain purposes and upon the prayer of plaintiff's complaint, without objection on the part of the defendant, the court canceled that deed So that feature of the case has passed out, leaving only the issue as to the deed conveying the lot which is known as the "home" place. At the time of her death in the year 1900, Mrs. Hudson owned the "home" place, which had been conveyed to her some years before that time by her mother, Mrs. Woodland. She also owned another improved lot, known as the "Thal" place, which Doctor Hudson had purchased and paid for and caused to be conveyed to her. Both of these places are situated in the city of Camden. She also owned an undivided third of certain other property embraced in the other deed which the court canceled. Doctor Hudson had, of course, a curtesy estate in the "Thal" place, and also in the "home" place, subject to the homestead right of his children during minority. He married again in 1902, and had another child, the issue of the last marriage. Mrs. Hudson left surviving two other daughters, who subsequently married and died childless, leaving plaintiff and her brother Woodland as their heirs at law. So, at the time of the execution of the deed in controversy, plaintiff and her brother owned the "home" place and the "Thal' place, subject to the father's estate as tenant by the curtesy. The plaintiff was at that time twenty-two years of age and unmarried. She married shortly afterwards, and up to that time lived with her father. Her brother was about nineteen years of age, but his disabilities had been removed. He refused to join his sister in this action to cancel the deed to his father. The plaintiff bases her prayer for relief on two grounds: first, that the execution of said deed was procured by fraud and deception on the part of the defendant in falsely representing to her that the effect of the deed was to convey only a life estate in the property, and in asserting false claims against the property, and, second, that the consideration therefor was inadequate, which on account of the confidential relation she asserts is sufficient to call for rescission. The defendant denied the allegations of fraud, and pleaded the adequacy of the consideration for the execution of the deed. The chancellor found in favor of the defendant on both issues, and rendered a decree dismissing the complaint for want of equity as to that transaction.

The witnesses to the transaction which constitutes the subject-matter of this controversy were the plaintiff herself and the defendant and Woodland Hudson, the brother who joined in the conveyance, and E. B. McCall, an attorney-at-law, who, as notary, took the acknowledgments to the execution of the deed. The plaintiff and defendant were equally interested in the result of the controversy. Woodland Hudson was entirely disinterested pecuniarily, though he could not have been indifferent to such a controversy between his father and sister, and his sympathy would naturally be with one or the other. Mr. McCall had no interest whatever in the result of the suit, and he appears to be unbiased, either by sympathy or prejudice. The plaintiff was, as before stated, living with her father at the time the deed was executed, and they were living in the house on the lot in controversy which had constituted the family residence for many years. She was a highly intelligent young woman, her father having given her the best of educational advantages, but she had had no business experience. She was absent from home for two years while attending school at Holly Springs, Mississippi, and at St. Louis, and returned home a few months before the execution of this deed.

She testified that the first that was ever said to her about signing any paper was on September 23, 1907, the evening before the deed was executed, when her father said "Now, you are going to get married, and your brother is going away, and I want you to sign a paper giving me the use of the 'home' place for my lifetime, but at my death to come back to you and your brother." She testified that very little was said by her father at that time, and no explanation was given, but that he renewed the request the next morning, and said that he would bring Mr. McCall to the house in a short time for the purpose of having the paper signed, and that she replied, "I don't want to sign it," and he said, "If you don't, I will disinherit you." She states that soon afterwards her father returned with Mr. McCall, and...