Rozier v. Director of Revenue, State, ED 84103.

• Decision Date: 17 May 2005
• Docket Number: No. ED 84103.,ED 84103.
• Citation: 164 S.W.3d 108
• Parties: Stephen C. ROZIER, Respondent, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, STATE OF MISSOURI, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

164 S.W.3d 108

Stephen C. ROZIER, Respondent, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, STATE OF MISSOURI, Appellant.

No. ED 84103.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Two.

May 17, 2005.

James A. Chenault, III, Special Asst. Attorney General, Missouri Department of Revenue, Jefferson City, MO, for appellant.

Craig D. Brewer, Perryville, MO, for respondent.

ROBERT G. DOWD, JR., Judge.

The Director of Revenue (the Director) appeals from the judgment in an expungement action brought by Stephen C. Rozier (Rozier). The circuit court ordered the Director to expunge Rozier's administrative alcohol suspension pursuant to Section 577.054, RSMo 2000.¹ On appeal, the Director contends the circuit court lacked the authority to expunge Rozier's administrative alcohol suspension, because the administrative suspension is not subject to expungement under the statute. We reverse.

On September 23, 2003, Rozier filed a "Motion for Expungement" with the circuit court seeking to be "restored to the status he occupied prior to" his arrest for driving while intoxicated (DWI) on February 27, 1993, and to have the court "expunge from all records all recordations of [Rozier's] arrest, plea, trial, and/or convictions." Records filed by Rozier indicated that he was arrested on February 27, 1993 and subsequently issued a summons for DWI. On May 3, 1993, Rozier pleaded guilty to the charge of DWI, for which Rozier received a suspended imposition of sentence and was placed on two years unsupervised probation. The Director filed an answer to Rozier's motion asserting that Rozier was not eligible to receive an expungement of the administrative alcohol suspension.

The circuit court heard the motion. At the hearing, Rozier testified he had completed his two years of probation and was seeking to have the administrative alcohol suspension arising from his arrest expunged. Thereafter, the circuit court entered a judgment finding that Rozier had satisfied the requirements of Section 577.054 and ordered the Director to expunge the record of Rozier's administrative suspension. The Director now appeals.

In her sole point, the Director contends the circuit court erred in ordering the expungement of Rozier's administrative alcohol suspension because the administrative suspension is not subject to expungement under Section 577.054. We agree.

In reviewing a court tried case, we will affirm the judgment unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). Here, the Director asserts and we agree that the circuit court erroneously applied the law in Section 577.054 in granting expungement to Rozier.

Section 577.054 provides:

After a period of not less than ten years, an individual who has pleaded guilty or has been convicted for a first alcohol-related driving offense which is a misdemeanor or a county or city ordinance violation and which is not a conviction for driving a commercial motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and who since such date has not been convicted of any other alcohol-related driving offense may apply to the court in which he pled guilty or was sentenced for an order to expunge from all official records all recordations of his arrest, plea, trial or conviction. If the court determines, after hearing, that such person has not been convicted of any alcohol-related driving offense in the ten years prior to the date of the application for expungement, and has no other alcohol-related enforcement contacts as defined in section 302.525, RSMo, during that ten-year period, the court shall enter an order of expungement. The effect of such order shall be to restore such person to the status he occupied prior to such arrest, plea or conviction and as if such event had never taken place. No person as to whom such order has been entered shall be held thereafter under any provision of any law to be guilty of perjury or otherwise giving a false statement by reason of his failure to recite or acknowledge such arrest, plea, trial, conviction or expungement in response to any inquiry made...