Rubenstein v. Rubenstein
Decision Date | 06 May 2008 |
Docket Number | No. 27634.,No. 28298.,27634.,28298. |
Citation | 107 Conn.App. 488,945 A.2d 1043 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | Jeffrey RUBENSTEIN v. Bonnie RUBENSTEIN. |
Bonnie Rubenstein, pro se, the appellant (defendant).
Jeffrey Rubenstein, pro se, the appellee (plaintiff).
John T. Asselin-Connolly, New London, for the guardian ad litem.
BISHOP, GRUENDEL and BEACH, Js.
These two appeals arise from the 1997 dissolution of the parties' marriage. The substantial gap in time between the dissolution judgment and the rendering of the judgments that are the subject of this appeal was caused when the pro se defendant, Bonnie Rubenstein, removed herself and the parties' minor son from this jurisdiction from 1997 until 2002. In AC 28298, the defendant claims that the trial court (1) improperly entered an award of lifetime alimony because it (a) failed to consider and to apply the statutory factors set forth in General Statutes § 46b-82 and (b) erroneously found that she was at fault for causing the debt of the pro se plaintiff, Jeffrey Rubenstein, and (2) was biased against her. In AC 27634, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) awarded guardian ad litem fees that were excessive and unreasonable, and (2) precluded evidence of fault during the apportionment hearing as to those fees.1 We affirm the judgments of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our discussion. In March, 1996, the plaintiff filed an action seeking to dissolve the parties' three and one-half year marriage. In September, 1997, while the dissolution action was pending, the defendant removed the parties' minor son from Connecticut in derogation of the court's orders. Shortly thereafter, the court appointed attorney Susan M. Asselin-Connolly guardian ad litem for the child. A few months after the disappearance of the defendant, on December 5, 1997, the court, Hon. Hadley W. Austin, judge trial referee, dissolved the parties' marriage and, after finding that the plaintiff had accumulated considerable debt in the search for his son, ordered the defendant to pay alimony and child support to the plaintiff. The alimony order stated specifically that "[t]he defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the amount of $50 per week as alimony, without prejudice." The whereabouts of the defendant and the child were not known until 2002, when they were discovered by federal law enforcement officers and returned to Connecticut.
Following the defendant's return to the jurisdiction, both parties filed motions to modify the December, 1997 alimony and child support award. Following a July 11, 2006 hearing at which both parties testified, the court, Gordon, J., on November 16, 2006, filed a memorandum of decision construing the parties' motions to modify as motions for de novo review of the alimony order.2 The court concluded that The defendant thereafter filed an appeal of the court's de novo alimony order.
Prior to the parties' motions to modify, the guardian ad litem had filed a motion seeking costs and fees and an affidavit of debt detailing an outstanding sum of $78,542.30 yet to be paid. On January 6, 2006, the court, Boland, J., filed interlocutory orders on fees for the attorney for the minor child and of the guardian ad litem in which it concluded that the guardian ad litem was entitled to fees totaling $77,208.30 but expressly left the allocation of the fees between the parties for a later determination in light of the plaintiff's bankruptcy proceedings. On March 28, 2006, an allocation hearing was held at which the court, Gordon, J., rendered an oral decision in which the court, inter alia, "[divided] responsibility for both the attorney's fees and guardian ad litem's fees, two-thirds attributable to [the defendant], one-third attributable to [the plaintiff]." The defendant subsequently filed an appeal challenging the allocation and reasonableness of the award of fees to the guardian ad litem.
AC 28298
The defendant first challenges the de novo lifetime alimony order rendered by the court as well as the factual basis underlying that order. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding alimony and that its findings are supported by the record.
We begin by setting forth the standard of review. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rivnak v. Rivnak, 99 Conn.App. 326, 328-29, 913 A.2d 1096 (2007).
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kunajukr v. Kunajukr, 83 Conn.App. 478, 481, 850 A.2d 227, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 903, 859 A.2d 562 (2004).
The defendant first claims that the court abused its discretion when it failed to consider and to apply the statutory factors set forth in § 46b-82. The defendant argues that several factors were ignored and that "the factors that were considered took place after the divorce proceedings and are irrelevant and not in accordance with the alimony guidelines." The defendant also asserts that the court's consideration of the plaintiff's debt in crafting its orders was improper under the guidelines.3 We are not persuaded.
"Trial courts are vested with broad and liberal discretion in fashioning orders concerning the type, duration and amount of alimony and support, applying in each case the guidelines of the General Statutes." Hartney v. Hartney, 83 Conn.App. 553, 559, 850 A.2d 1098, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 920, 859 A.2d 578 (2004). General Statutes § 46b-824 describes factors a court should consider in its decisions regarding alimony. (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dombrowski v. Noyes-Dombrowski, 273 Conn. 127, 137, 869 A.2d 164 (2005).
In its memorandum of decision, the court stated that it "considered all the evidence and statutory criteria contained in General Statutes § 46b-82. . . ." It found that The court also emphasized that it was not retroactively modifying the alimony order to take into account subsequent changes in the plaintiff's financial circumstances, which would be "contrary to law," but rather reviewing the order de novo, as "provided for in the [original] judgment."
The court is not required to make explicit reference to the statutory criteria that it considered in making its decision or to make express findings as to each statutory factor. Dombrowski v. Noyes-Dombrowski, supra, 273 Conn. at 137, 869 A.2d 164. Here, the court expressly noted its consideration of the statutory criteria set forth in § 46b-82 and mentioned its findings as to several of those criteria in its memorandum of decision. Therefore, the defendant's argument that the court ignored several factors is unavailing. The defendant's assertion that the court impermissibly considered the debt the plaintiff incurred in the search for his child also is without merit. The court's finding in that regard is a reflection of the court's previous December 5, 1997 finding, which it communicated at a hearing held on the same day that the original alimony order was issued.5 As to any debt the plaintiff incurred after the original December, 1997 alimony order, the court specifically underscored that it was not retroactively modifying the judgment due to any substantial change in the financial circumstances of the plaintiff. The court specifically noted that its "review must take the place of the original proceeding." Accordingly,...
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