Rubloff Cb Machesney v. World Novelties

• Decision Date: 03 March 2006
• Docket Number: No. 2-05-0673.,2-05-0673.
• Citation: 844 N.E.2d 462
• Parties: RUBLOFF CB MACHESNEY, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WORLD NOVELTIES, INC., d/b/a Pantera Coffee and Crumbs, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

844 N.E.2d 462

RUBLOFF CB MACHESNEY, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WORLD NOVELTIES, INC., d/b/a Pantera Coffee and Crumbs, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 2-05-0673.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

March 3, 2006.

Schirger, Monteleone & Hampilos, P.C., George P. Hampilos, Stephen M. Langley, Rockford, for World Novelties, Inc. d/b/a Pantera Coffee and Crumbs.

Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Thomas J. Lester, James M. Allen, Timothy J. Leake, Rockford, for Rubloff CB Machesney, LLC.

Justice BYRNE delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Rubloff CB Machesney, LLC, leased space in a shopping mall to defendant, World Novelties, Inc., d/b/a Pantera Coffee and Crumbs, which set up a coffee shop there.¹ The parties began to have disagreements, and plaintiff demanded that defendant strictly comply with the terms of the lease. Defendant agreed to do so. Then defendant paid its rent late. At that point, plaintiff demanded that defendant leave, but defendant refused to do so. Plaintiff filed a complaint for possession, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The relevant facts are few. In November 2002, defendant entered into a five-year lease with plaintiff. Under the terms of the agreement, defendant leased commercial space in the Machesney Park Mall. In return for use of this space, defendant was required to comply with the terms of the lease. These terms required defendant to operate its business "in a dignified * * * manner consistent with the general high standard of merchandising in the [mall] and not in a disreputable * * * manner." They also required defendant to pay rent "in advance upon the first day of each and every month."

Defendant opened up a coffee shop in the mall. Apparently, problems quickly arose, and in September 2004 — less than two years after entering into the lease — defendant received from plaintiff a letter detailing numerous alleged lease violations and demanding strict compliance with the lease terms. Several of the more serious violations were based on reports received from mall security. For example, in one instance, defendant's owner, Ahmed Abatorab, allegedly told a minor girl who came into the coffee shop that she "would look good naked in that window and [she] should come back later for a special treat." In another instance, Abatorab allegedly imprisoned a family member in the back of his coffee shop. That time, mall security had responded to a report of someone yelling in the back of the coffee shop and had found Brenda Abatorab screaming at Ahmed Abatorab to "let [her] out of" the coffee shop because she "just want[ed] to go home."² In still other instances, Abatorab allegedly yelled that defendant's competitors did not serve real meat, harangued mall patrons to buy from defendant's coffee shop, and harassed mall employees if they either bought food from defendant's competitors instead of defendant or bought from defendant's competitors more often than they bought from defendant. Finally, in addition to many other problems, defendant allegedly failed to pay its rent on time.

All of this drove plaintiff to demand that defendant strictly comply with the lease terms, including the terms requiring that rent be paid on time and that defendant's business be operated in a reputable manner. Plaintiff stated: "[it would] accept the late rent payments through September [2004]. No further late payments, however, [would] be accepted and [defendant would be] required to strictly comply with all of the provisions of the Lease, including, without limitation, with the deadlines for all subsequent rent payments."

Defendant agreed to strictly comply with the lease. But in January 2005, barely three months after agreeing to strictly comply with the lease, defendant again paid its rent after the first of the month. Specifically, although defendant was required to pay rent by the first of January, defendant did not attempt to do so until the third. At that point, defendant's payment was refused, and a complaint for possession of the leased premises was filed.

Both defendant and plaintiff moved for summary judgment. In support of its motion, defendant cited the Illinois time computation statute (5 ILCS 70/1.11 (West 2002)), which excludes Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays from the calculation of the time for doing an act.³ Defendant argued that, based on the time computation statute, its payment of rent was timely. For its part, plaintiff, in its motion for summary judgment, argued that the parties had agreed to exclude the time computation statute from the lease. Thus, plaintiff argued, defendant's payment of rent was late, this was a breach of the lease, and this breach permitted termination of the lease. The trial court granted plaintiff's motion and denied defendant's. Defendant appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

We begin with the standard of review. Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file establish that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Chatham Foot Specialists, P.C. v. Health Care Service Corp., 216 Ill.2d 366, 376, 297 Ill.Dec. 268, 837 N.E.2d 48 (2005). We review de novo the trial court's decision on a motion for summary judgment. Progressive Universal Insurance Co. of Illinois v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 215 Ill.2d 121, 128, 293 Ill.Dec. 677, 828 N.E.2d 1175 (2005). In doing so, we must keep in mind that the reasons given by the court for its decision and the findings on which its decision is based are not determinative if the judgment is correct. See Northern Illinois Emergency Physicians v. Landau, Omahana & Kopka, Ltd., 216 Ill.2d 294, 305, 297 Ill.Dec. 319, 837 N.E.2d 99 (2005). Accordingly, we may affirm the granting of summary judgment on any basis appearing in the record, regardless of whether the trial court relied upon that ground. Home Insurance Co. v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., 213 Ill.2d 307, 315, 290 Ill.Dec. 218, 821 N.E.2d 269 (2004).

Defendant argues that the trial court erred in finding that (1) the Illinois time computation statute (5 ILCS 70/1.11 (West 2002)) did not apply to the parties' lease; and (2) assuming the statute applies, and assuming defendant breached the lease, that breach was material. We take these arguments in turn.

Defendant first argues that the time computation statute applied to the parties' lease and, therefore, defendant's payment of rent was timely. In discussing this issue, the parties spend a great deal of time arguing about whether they agreed to exclude the time computation statute from the lease. For its part, the trial court apparently based its decision, in part, on the conclusion that the parties had excluded the statute. However, we think this puts the cart before the horse. As we see it, before determining whether the parties excluded the statute, we must determine whether the statute applies in the first place. Only if we determine that it does, do we have to consider whether the parties excluded it.

The applicability of the time computation statute is an issue of statutory construction. The primary goal of statutory construction is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature. In re Detention of Powell, 217 Ill.2d 123, 135, 298 Ill.Dec. 361, 839 N.E.2d 1008 (2005). The best indicator of legislative intent is the statutory language, which must be given its ordinary meaning. People ex rel. Birkett v. Jorgensen, 216 Ill.2d 358, 363, 297 Ill.Dec. 289, 837 N.E.2d 69 (2005). When the statutory language is clear, it must be given effect without resort to other tools of construction. Village of Chatham v. County of Sangamon, 216 Ill.2d 402, 429, 297 Ill.Dec. 249, 837 N.E.2d 29 (2005). Put another way, when the language of the statute is clear, basic principles of statutory construction prohibit us from looking beyond that language. See Andrews v. Kowa Printing Corp., 217 Ill.2d 101, 106, 298 Ill.Dec. 1, 838 N.E.2d 894 (2005).

Here, we must determine whether the time computation statute applies to a lease provision that requires a tenant to pay rent by the first of every month. The time computation statute reads, in relevant part, as follows:

"The time within which any act provided by law is to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last, unless the last day is Saturday or Sunday * * * and then it shall also be excluded. If the day succeeding such Saturday, Sunday or holiday is also a holiday or a Saturday or Sunday then such succeeding day shall also be excluded." (Emphasis added.) 5 ILCS 70/1.11 (West 2002).

By its plain terms the statute does not apply to the payment of rent on the first of every month. The statute speaks of computing time. 5 ILCS 70/1.11 (West 2002) ("The time * * * shall be computed * * *") (emphasis added)). Paying rent by the first of every month does not require the computing of the time for doing an act. To the contrary, the time has already been computed: the rent must be paid by the first of the month. Thus, because the statute is addressed to situations in which time must be computed, it does not apply in this case.

The parties cite no cases applying the time computation statute under facts similar to those presented here. Nor has our research uncovered such a case. That said, many cases have considered the applicability of the time computation statute. And all of these cases have one thing in common: they all deal with the "computation" of time periods. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Greene, 47 Ill.2d 30, 264 N.E.2d 163 (1970) (time period for filing posttrial motion); Scribner v. Sachs, 18 Ill.2d 400, 164 N.E.2d 481 (1960) (time period for filing contest of election results); People v. Ribar, 336 Ill.App.3d 462, 270 Ill.Dec. 798, 783 N.E.2d 1098 (2003) (time period for holding hearing on petition...