Rucks v. Pushman, 88-1262
| Decision Date | 16 March 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 88-1262,88-1262 |
| Parties | 14 Fla. L. Weekly 695 Carol Ann RUCKS and Harold Rucks, her husband, Appellants, v. Wayne PUSHMAN, Roger Gailey, individually and d/b/a Kelley's Bar, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Edward J. Richardson of Saxon & Richardson, P.A., Melbourne, for appellants.
Armando R. Payas of Parker, Johnson, Owen, McGuire & Michaud, P.A., Orlando, for appellees D.W. McMillan, M.D., and D.W. McMillan, M.D., P.A.
Andrew A. Graham of Reinman, Harrell, Silberhorn, Moule & Graham, Melbourne, for appellees Scott Gettings, M.D., and Scott Gettings, M.D., P.A.
Michael A. Miller of Anderson & Miller, P.A., Orlando, for appellee Brevard Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., d/b/a James E. Holmes Regional Holmes Medical Center.
Charles W. Sell of Gray, Harris & Robinson, Orlando, for appellee Florida Patients Compensation Fund.
No appearance for appellees Wayne Pushman, Roger Gailey, individually and d/b/a Kelley's Bar.
Appellant Mrs. Rucks was injured by appellee Pushman outside a bar owned by appellee Gailey. When taken to a hospital for treatment, she was allegedly further injured by the alleged negligence of the hospital and her treating physicians. Mrs. Rucks and her husband brought a multi-count complaint against Pushman, Gailey, the hospital, the treating doctors, and the Florida Patients Compensation Fund (FPCF). During the pendency of the action, Mrs. Rucks and her husband settled with Pushman and Gailey, giving those individuals a release. Thereafter, the hospital and the treating physicians filed motions for summary judgment alleging that the releases to Pushman and Gailey were without qualification and represented settlement in full for all damages suffered by Mrs. Rucks and her husband on account of injury sustained by Mrs. Rucks in consequence of "an accident [incident] that occurred on or about the 13th day of February, 1982, at or near Kelley's Bar in Melbourne, Brevard County, Florida." Mrs. Rucks and her husband filed a motion to reform their release to Gailey to show that it did not release Mr. and Mrs. Rucks' claim against anyone except Gailey. Apparently no order was entered on that motion. The trial court ultimately entered summary judgment in favor of the hospital and treating physicians based on McCutcheon v. Hertz Corp., 463 So.2d 1226 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985), rev. denied, 476 So.2d 674 (Fla.1985). Mr. and Mrs. Rucks appeal.
When a tortfeasor negligently or intentionally injures a victim and the victim, in obtaining necessary medical treatment for those injuries, is further injured (or her existing injuries are aggravated) by the negligence of the health care providers, the law is now clear that the original (initial or primary) tortfeasor is liable to the victim not only for the original injuries received as a result of the initial tort, but also for the additional (or aggravated) injuries resulting from the subsequent negligence of the health care providers. 1 This is true although the original tortfeasor and the subsequently negligent health care providers are independent tortfeasors and not joint tortfeasors jointly and severally liable for one common injury. The initial tortfeasor is liable for the injuries caused by his tort and for the injuries caused by the negligent health care providers, but, ordinarily, the negligent health care providers are liable only for injuries resulting from their own negligence and not for injuries attributable solely to the original tort. 2 If the injuries from the two torts are distinguishable, the doubly injured victim can recover from the initial tortfeasor for injuries caused by the original tort AND the victim can recover from the subsequently negligent health care providers for the injuries caused, or aggravated by, their negligence OR the victim can recover from the initial tortfeasor for all injuries resulting from both torts but, of course, the victim cannot recover from the initial tortfeasor for injury caused by the negligent health care providers and also recover for the same injuries from the health care providers.
A doubly injured victim can first settle with, and release, the health care providers as to the injuries suffered as a result of their negligence and then sue the initial tortfeasor as to injuries resulting from the initial tort and there is ordinarily no problem about the release from the health care providers constituting a release from the initial tortfeasor because the tortfeasors are independent and not joint tortfeasors. Likewise and for the same reasons, a victim can first settle with the initial tortfeasor as to only the injuries suffered as a result of the initial tort and then sue the health care providers for injuries suffered as a result of their negligence but in this situation, the...
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