Rudberg v. State of Nev.

• Decision Date: 28 August 1995
• Docket Number: No. CV-S-93-113-PMP (LRL).,CV-S-93-113-PMP (LRL).
• Citation: 896 F. Supp. 1017
• Parties: Joan RUDBERG, Paul Rudberg, Anita Hopkins, Karen Carder, Maria Lopez, Dorothy Duvall, and Beverly Charlotte Rowe, Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF NEVADA, ex rel. SOUTHERN NEVADA CHILDREN'S HOME, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Nevada

896 F. Supp. 1017

Joan RUDBERG, Paul Rudberg, Anita Hopkins, Karen Carder, Maria Lopez, Dorothy Duvall, and Beverly Charlotte Rowe, Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF NEVADA, ex rel. SOUTHERN NEVADA CHILDREN'S HOME, Defendant.

No. CV-S-93-113-PMP (LRL).

United States District Court, D. Nevada.

August 28, 1995.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Michael E. Langton, Langton & Kilburn, Reno, NV, for plaintiffs.

Nancy Ford Angres, Chief Deputy Attorney General and Cynthia A. Pyzel, Senior Deputy Attorney General, Human Resources Division, Carson City, NV, for defendant.

ORDER

PRO, District Judge.

Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (# 26) filed by Defendant State of Nevada, ex rel. Southern Nevada Children's Home (the "State") on June 15, 1995. Plaintiffs filed an Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (# 27) on July 3, 1995. The State filed its Reply in Favor of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (# 28) on July 12, 1995. The State also filed an Addendum to Defendant's Reply (# 29) on July 31, 1995.

Also before the Court is the Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (# 27) filed on July 3, 1995. Defendant filed no Response.

I. Background

This is an action under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. Plaintiffs were employees of Defendant and seek back pay and other damages for the alleged wilful failure of Defendant to pay overtime compensation to Plaintiffs.

In April 1990, former and present employees of the State brought an action similar to the one in the instant case. In that action, Haworth v. State, No. CV-N-90-162-HDM (PHA), persons employed as Cottage Parents and Cottage Parent Reliefs by the State in the Northern and Southern Nevada Children's Homes alleged the State had violated the FLSA terms with regard to overtime compensation required in a 24-hour residential program for children. Haworth went to trial in March and May of 1993, and the Honorable Howard D. McKibben entered his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in that case in June 1993.

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint (# 1) in this case in February 1993, just prior to the trial in Haworth. On September 21, 1993, the parties filed a Stipulation for Stay (# 12), seeking to stay all further proceedings in this case until entry of a final judgment and exhaustion of appeals concluded in Haworth. This was based on the fact that some of the few Cottage Parents who had not entered the Haworth case filed suit against their employer in the instant matter, alleging the same violations, raising the same issues, and using the same counsel. The parties in this case asserted that this matter should be stayed in the interest of judicial economy, since Haworth would control this matter. The Court approved the Stipulation for Stay by Order (# 11) on September 21, 1993, until a final judgment was entered and all appeals were concluded in the Haworth matter. The Court later lifted the stay in this matter by Order (# 19) filed February 6, 1995, due to the unusually slow appeal process. The Court further ordered that all dispositive motions in this case be filed by June 16, 1995. The State's Motion for Summary Judgment (# 26) is now properly before the Court.

In the meantime, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Haworth trial court in a Memorandum opinion. See Haworth v. State of Nevada, Case No. 93-16972, 1995 WL 317024 (D.C. No. CV-90-162-HDM). On July 24, 1995, the Ninth Circuit by Order denied the Plaintiff-Appellant's Petition for Rehearing.

II. Summary Judgment

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."

The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Zoslaw v. MCA Distributing Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1085, 103 S.Ct. 1777, 76 L.Ed.2d 349 (1983). Once the movant's burden is met by presenting evidence which, if uncontroverted, would entitle the movant to a directed verdict at trial, the burden then shifts to the respondent to set forth specific facts demonstrating that there is a genuine issue for trial Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If the factual context makes the respondent's claim implausible, that party must come forward with more persuasive evidence than would otherwise be necessary to show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); California Architectural Bldg. Prods, Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1006, 108 S.Ct. 698, 98 L.Ed.2d 650 (1988).

If the party seeking summary judgment meets this burden, then summary judgment will be granted unless there is significant probative evidence tending to support the opponent's legal theory. First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1593, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968), reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 901, 89 S.Ct. 63, 21 L.Ed.2d 188 (1968); Commodity Futures Trading Com. v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270 (9th Cir.1979). Parties seeking to defeat summary judgment cannot stand on their pleadings once the movant has submitted affidavits or other similar materials. Affidavits that do not affirmatively demonstrate personal knowledge are insufficient. British Airways Board v. Boeing Co., 585 F.2d 946, 952 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981, 99 S.Ct. 1790, 60 L.Ed.2d 241 (1979), reh'g denied, 441 U.S. 968, 99 S.Ct. 2420, 60 L.Ed.2d 1074 (1979). Likewise, "legal memoranda and oral argument are not evidence and do not create issues of fact capable of defeating an otherwise valid motion for summary judgment." Id.

A material issue of fact is one that affects the outcome of the litigation and requires a trial to resolve the differing versions of the truth. See Admiralty Fund v. Hugh Johnson & Co., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir.1982); Admiralty Fund v. Jones, 677 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir.1982).

All facts and inferences drawn must be viewed in the light most favorable to the responding party when determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists for summary judgment purposes. Poller v. CBS, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962). After drawing inferences favorable to the respondent, summary judgment will be granted only if all reasonable inferences defeat the respondent's claims. Admiralty Fund v. Tabor, 677 F.2d 1297, 1298 (9th Cir.1982).

The trilogy of Supreme Court cases cited above establishes that "summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed `to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. at 2554 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 1). See also Avia Group International, Inc. v. L.A. Gear California, Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1560 (Fed.Cir.1988).

III. Stipulation

Defendant asserts that the stipulation approved by the Court is a dispositive stipulation approved by all counsel in writing and acted upon by the Court pursuant to former LR 145(c), and in which the parties agreed they would be bound in this case by the outcome of Haworth.

The Ninth Circuit has not addressed the enforceability of a stipulation which would bind all parties to the judgment of an action between others. However, both the Fourth Circuit and the Second Circuit have considered this issue.

In Balkissoon v. Commissioner, 995 F.2d 525 (4th Cir.1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ____, 114 S.Ct. 473, 126 L.Ed.2d 424 (1993), the Fourth Circuit considered the enforceability of a stipulation entered into by certain taxpayers with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Balkissoon v. Commissioner, 995 F.2d 525, 529 (4th Cir.1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ____, 114 S.Ct. 473, 126 L.Ed.2d 424 (1993). Under the terms of that stipulation, the parties agreed to be bound by the outcome of a factually identical case already before the tax court. Id. at 526. The Fourth Circuit held that the tax court did not abuse its discretion in binding the taxpayers to the stipulation, when the nature and content of the evidence presented by the taxpayers was either repetitive of that presented in the earlier tax court case or irrelevant. Id. at 529 ("taxpayers' contentions are meritless. They are unhappy with the fact that Zimmerman lost and that they are bound by that outcome"); see id. at 529 n. 7.

Similarly, in Sampson v. Sony Corp. of America, 434 F.2d 312 (2d Cir.1970), the Second Circuit considered the enforceability and effect of two stipulations entered into by the appellant Sampson, a patent holder, with Sony Corporation of America. Sampson v. Sony Corp. of America, 434 F.2d 312, 313-15 (2d Cir.1970). Under the terms of the first stipulation, not filed with the district court, the parties agreed to be bound by the outcome of a pending summary judgment motion with regard to a similar patent infringement case. Id. at 313-14. When the district court judge granted summary judgment in favor of the corporate defendant, the patent holder moved for reargument, and Sampson and Sony entered into a second stipulation. Id. at 314. This second stipulation was filed with the district court, referenced the first stipulation, and indicated the parties' agreement to be bound by the decision in the...