Rudd v. Hayden

• Decision Date: 09 October 1936
• Parties: RUDD v. HAYDEN et al.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

97 S.W.2d 35

265 Ky. 495

RUDD v. HAYDEN et al.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky

October 9, 1936

Appeal from Circuit Court, Livingston County.

Suit for injunction by John L. Hayden and others against Mrs Pearl Rudd. From a judgment granting the injunction, the defendant appeals, and the plaintiffs cross-appeal.

Affirmed.

Charles Ferguson and J. R. Wells, both of Smithland, for appellant.

C. C Grassham, of Paducah, for appellees.

STITES Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Livingston circuit court sitting in equity. The appellant, Mrs. Pearl Rudd, is the owner of the surface rights in a tract of land containing 125 acres located on the bank of the Cumberland river in Livingston county. She concedes that the appellees are the owners of mineral rights in this property but insists that their rights do not include title to a limestone bluff from which stone has been quarried by the surface owners, or under the permission of the surface owners, for several years.

The property in question was owned by Mrs. C. A. Lemen in 1900. Under date of July 28, 1900, Mrs. Lemen conveyed the mineral rights in the property to J. V. Hayden & Co., a partnership. By the terms of the deed, the conveyance included: "All minerals, coal, clays, spars, oilgases and every other kind and character of mineral cement, oil, gases, &c not included in the above general description, in on and under the after described land, together with the exclusive right to mine same and a right of way across said premises and ingress and egress over said land, for the purpose of operating any mine or mines and privilege of using water in their operation and in fact the full mining right and privilege in and to the following described land, viz.:"

Some years after the conveyance to J. V. Hayden & Co., Mrs. Lemen conveyed the property to G. W. Southern, making no reference to the previous deed of the mineral rights. Southern conveyed the property to G. C. Rudd, reserving all minerals and mineral rights. After the death of G. C. Rudd, his heirs conveyed their interest in the property to his widow, the appellant, Mrs. Pearl Rudd. Thereafter Mrs. Rudd purchased the purported mineral rights theretofore reserved by G. W. Southern. A quarry was opened on the tract, and limestone was being taken from the property by Mrs. Rudd or her grantees and carried away in barges on the Cumberland river when this suit was filed by the present successors to the title of J. V. Hayden & Co. to enjoin further operations. The chancellor found that limestone was intended to be included under the deed from Mrs. C. A. Lemen to J. V. Hayden & Co., and granted the injunction as prayed. Mrs. Rudd has appealed, and the only serious question presented for our consideration is whether or not limestone is included within the terms of the portion of the deed from Mrs. Lemen to J. V. Hayden & Co. quoted above. The parties are in practical agreement as to the principles of law involved, but disagree as to the application of these principles to the facts before us.

In seeking to determine what substances are included in a deed or lease of minerals, the ordinary rules of construction are applied, and the grant is construed most strongly against the grantor. McKinney's Heirs v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., 134 Ky. 239, 120 S.W. 314, 20 Ann.Cas. 934. All matter may be classed as animal, vegetable, or mineral, but the mere fact that a substance is inorganic does not bring it within the category of a mineral as that term is used in a deed or lease. Hudson & Collins v. McGuire, 188 Ky 712, 223 S.W. 1101, 17 A.L.R. 148. The question is, after all, purely one of intention, to be decided upon the language of the grant or reservation, unless the grant or reservation is so ambiguous as to leave the mind in doubt as to its proper construction, in which event extrinsic evidence may be resorted to as an aid in determining the true meaning of the instrument. The authorities agree that the word "minerals," as used in a deed, does not ordinarily include limestone. Campbell v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co., 150 Tenn. 423, 265 S.W. 674; Brady v. Smith, 181 N.Y. 178, 73 N.E. 963, 106 Am.St.Rep. 531, 2 Ann. Cas. 636; Beury v. Shelton, 151 Va. 28, 144 S.E. 629, 632. The cases cited, together with several others of similar import, are collected in general annotations on the question contained in 17 A.L.R. 156 and 86 A.L.R. 983. Although the question was presented in a...