Rudolph v. Babinec

Decision Date20 September 2019
Docket NumberNo. 18-1901,18-1901
Citation939 F.3d 742
Parties Leticia RUDOLPH, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daniel T. BABINEC and Robert A. Atkinson, in their individual and official capacities, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

PER CURIAM.

There are two sides to every story. Here, the two sides read like they come from different books. What really happened on the night Officers Daniel Babinec and Robert Atkinson seized Leticia Rudolph in her home for a psychiatric evaluation depends on whom you ask. As Rudolph tells it, the officers violated her rights by seizing and injuring her. As the officers tell it, they did what any reasonable officer would have done. Because this is a limited appeal from summary judgment, we must accept Rudolph’s version and thus affirm the district court’s denial of summary judgment on three of Rudolph’s four claims.

I. BACKGROUND

Late one night, Leticia Rudolph’s ex-husband, Kyle Rudolph, decided to pay her a visit. Kyle1 went to check on her after their son had texted him: "[S]he has the .22 out[,] will you go over there[?]" R. 53-3 (Incident Rep.) (Pg. ID 182). Rudolph, a single mother, slept with her .22 gun out every night to feel safe. When Kyle arrived at Rudolph’s home, the two spoke for close to an hour about their daughters and their relationship. Kyle decided to take Rudolph’s gun with him as he left, which Rudolph let him do. After Kyle left, Rudolph went to sleep. But the night did not end there.

Later, around 3:00 A.M., Officer James Hodges stopped Kyle for speeding. Kyle admitted he was carrying a gun. He explained that he took it from his ex-wife earlier that night because he was worried about her. And Kyle showed Officer Hodges the text message from his son saying Rudolph had her gun out, as well as a text message from Rudolph saying "good bye." R. 53-3 (Incident Rep.) (Pg. ID 182). Meanwhile, Officer Daniel Babinec arrived at the traffic stop to assist and secure the gun. Ultimately, the officers let Kyle go with a warning, but they felt obligated to do a wellness check on Rudolph.

Officer Babinec, accompanied by Officer Robert Atkinson, went to Rudolph’s home and banged on her doors and windows. She was asleep, so she did not answer. After Officers Babinec and Atkinson informed Officer Hodges that they could not get a response, Officer Hodges followed Kyle into his driveway and told him to call Rudolph. Rudolph answered and stated on speakerphone that she was sleeping, and Officer Hodges told her that his officers were at the door. Rudolph then got up and opened the door. The officers entered without her permission and asked her whether she felt suicidal. Rudolph replied that she was not and felt fine. Rudolph generally cooperated with the officers, but the officers, without much further inquiry, gave her the option of going voluntarily to the hospital or being taken into custody involuntarily for a mental-health check.

Then, according to Rudolph, things took a turn. Rudolph says that Officer Babinec grabbed her by the arm without warning, slammed her body and face into the wall, and handcuffed her. She told the officers that the handcuffs were "really tight," and that the officers were hurting her. R. 54-2 (Leticia Rudolph Dep.) (Pg. ID 570). They responded that she was suicidal. The officers then "manhandled" her out of the house, without giving her a chance to put shoes on, and dragged her across her forty-foot driveway. Id. (Pg. ID 570–72). Rudolph could not keep up with the officers and asked them to slow down. They did not. Rudolph stumbled and hurt her right ankle—so badly that she would later need two surgeries to treat that injury. She complained repeatedly to Officers Babinec and Atkinson that the handcuffs were too tight, but they did not respond.

Once in the car, Officers Babinec and Atkinson drove Rudolph to the hospital about ten minutes away. The hospital measured her blood alcohol level at .153. The doctor had to wait a few hours for Rudolph’s blood alcohol level to go down so he could perform a psychiatric evaluation. When it did go down, the doctor performed the psychiatric evaluation and determined that "[Rudolph] is at extremely low risk of self harm as she does not appear to want to harm herself, has not tried to here and is sober and denies any sort of homicidal or suicidal thought or desire." R. 54-7 (ER Record) (Pg. ID 718); see also id. (noting that Rudolph "appears completely sober frankly."). Rudolph was released. She then sued Officers Babinec and Atkinson and Fruitport Township, alleging various constitutional violations.

II. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

This case comes to us after the district court denied Officers Babinec and Atkinson’s motion for summary judgment. In this limited appeal, we consider only whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. Mitchell v. Forsyth , 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). Qualified immunity shields government officials from individual liability if they did not violate a clearly established right "of which a reasonable person" in the same situation would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). At this stage, we decide questions of law, not questions of fact. The parties continue to disagree over what really happened. But "we must ignore the defendant[s’] attempts to dispute the facts and nonetheless resolve the legal issue[s] ...." Bunkley v. City of Detroit , 902 F.3d 552, 560 (6th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). In doing so, we accept Rudolph’s "version of the facts" and draw all inferences in her favor. Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007).

A. Mental-Health Seizure

Rudolph alleges that the officers violated her Fourth Amendment rights when they executed a mental-health seizure. In denying qualified immunity to Officers Babinec and Atkinson, the district court reasoned that "[t]he general level of uncertainty surrounding the veracity of [Kyle’s] account as well as the disparate testimony about Plaintiff’s subsequent interaction with the officers are questions of fact bearing on the probable cause issue ...." R. 57 (Dist. Ct. Op.) (Pg. ID 1039).

We agree. Although the officers had a reason to show up at Rudolph’s door for a wellness check, a jury could reasonably find that the officers lacked probable cause when they executed this mental-health seizure.

It is clearly established law "that in the context of a mental health seizure an officer must have probable cause to believe that the person seized poses a danger to [her]self or others." Fisher v. Harden , 398 F.3d 837, 842 (6th Cir. 2005). "A showing of probable cause in the mental health seizure context requires only a ‘probability or substantial chance’ of dangerous behavior, not an actual showing of such behavior." Id. at 843 (quoting Monday v. Oullette , 118 F.3d 1099, 1102 (6th Cir. 1997) ). If probable cause exists, a person’s denial that they are at risk of suicide does not by itself eliminate that probable cause. See Ziegler v. Aukerman , 512 F.3d 777, 779 nn.1–3, 784 (6th Cir. 2008) (granting qualified immunity even though plaintiff denied making any suicidal comments, and "plaintiff allegedly suffer[ed] from a mental illness that prevent[ed] her from realizing her own need for treatment."). Further discussion of Fisher and Monday reveals another significant point in the analysis for mental-health seizures: whether a reasonable officer would question the veracity of a suicide report based on the facts at the scene of the wellness check that is done in response to the suicide report.

The Fisher court held that the officers lacked probable cause to believe that the plaintiff was a danger to himself or others. 398 F.3d at 843. In that case, an unrelated third party reported that a man had tied himself to railroad tracks and might be attempting to commit suicide. Id. When the officers arrived at the scene, however, the facts "would have caused a reasonable officer to question the veracity of the attempted suicide report." Id. Among these were the fact that the plaintiff readily complied with the officers’ commands to walk toward them, indicating that he was not tied to the railroad tracks; the plaintiff had a hunting rifle, and he complied with the officers’ command to drop the gun; the plaintiff was dressed in hunting attire; and the plaintiff exhibited no other suspicious or threatening behavior. See id. at 843–44. The officers, meanwhile, "never questioned [the plaintiff] to determine if he might be depressed and attempting to commit suicide." Id. at 843. Therefore, although the officers had reason to arrive at the scene based on the attempted-suicide report, once they arrived the facts did not give rise to probable cause to execute a mental-health seizure.

By contrast, in Monday , the facts at the scene aligned with the suicide report, and the court held that the officer had probable cause to believe that the plaintiff would harm himself. 118 F.3d at 1102. There, an officer responded to a report from a third-party mental-health professional that the plaintiff may have been at risk of injuring or killing himself. Id. at 1101–02. The report indicated that the plaintiff "was upset over a divorce and had ingested some pills and was drinking alcohol in an effort to commit suicide." Id. at 1102. Then, upon arrival, the officer observed that "plaintiff in fact was drinking alcohol and appeared intoxicated and depressed. A count of his Xanax pills by the officer[ ] revealed that at least twenty were missing." Id. Based on these facts at the scene, the officer could reasonably conclude that "an unacceptable risk remained that plaintiff was deceiving him in order to attain his apparently declared goal of committing suicide." Id. at 1103 (collecting cases).

This case falls more on the Fisher side of the line. A review of the facts provides a basis for the officers to have...

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