Rueschemeyer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 01 April 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-133-A,95-133-A
• Citation: 673 A.2d 448
• Parties: Simone M. RUESCHEMEYER et al. v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY. ppeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 448

673 A.2d 448

Simone M. RUESCHEMEYER et al. v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.

No. 95-133-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

April 1, 1996.

Jeffrey Michaelson, Julius Michaelson, Elizabeth Colt, Providence, for Plaintiff.

Patricia K. Asquith, Harry W. Asquith, Jr., Providence, for Defendant.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

This matter came before the Supreme Court for oral argument pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised by this appeal should not be summarily decided. After hearing the arguments of counsel and examining the memoranda submitted by the parties, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown and that this matter should be summarily decided.

The defendant, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (defendant), appeals from an order entered by a Superior Court motion justice concerning an insurance policy it issued which covered a vehicle operated by plaintiff Simone M. Rueschemeyer (plaintiff).

On May 28, 1992 a motor vehicle owned by plaintiff Dietrich Reuschemeyer and operated by plaintiff was involved in a collision with a Providence police cruiser. At the time of the collision, the automobile operated by plaintiff was covered by an insurance policy issued by defendant. The city of Providence, a self-insured municipality, owned the Providence police cruiser.

The plaintiffs filed a claim with defendant under the uninsured-motorist provision of the insurance policy issued by defendant. In a letter dated June 29, 1993, from a claims supervisor to plaintiffs' counsel, defendant denied coverage. The letter specifically quoted language from the insurance policy's uninsured-motorist-coverage section which provided that:

"Under Part C of the uninsured motorist coverage:

Uninsured motorist vehicle does not include any vehicle or equipment:

1. Owned or furnished or available for the regular use by you or any family member.

2. Owned or operated by a self-insurer under any applicable motor vehicle law.

3. Owned or operated by any governmental unit or agency.

4. Operated on rails or crawler trends.

5. Designed mainly for the use off public roads .... not on public roads.

6. Well located for use as a residential premises." (Emphasis added.)

The letter concluded as follows:

"COVERAGE INTERPRETATION

There is no coverage under your client's auto policy as the police vehicle was owned by a governmental unit or agency.

For at least the reasons cited here, Liberty Mutual cannot indemnify your client for the alleged injuries sustained as a result of the accident on 5/23/92." (Emphasis added.)

On March 21, 1994, plaintiffs filed a complaint for declaratory relief in the Superior Court against defendant. The plaintiffs claimed that the exclusion of government-owned vehicles from the definition of "uninsured motorist" is contrary to this state's uninsured-motorist statute, G.L.1956 § 27-7-2.1, and is therefore void and unenforceable. It was plaintiffs' contention that the definition of "uninsured motorist" contained in § 27-7-2.1 is all-inclusive.

The defendant filed an answer to plaintiffs' complaint and raised the government-owned-vehicle exclusion as an affirmative defense. Subsequently, defendant filed a written brief wherein it contended that the government-owned-vehicle exclusion was not void. The defendant further argued that the policy excluded vehicles owned by self-insurers and that the city of Providence is a self-insurer.

Following a hearing in the Superior Court, a motion justice concluded that the exclusion from the definition of "uninsured motor vehicle" of any vehicle or equipment owned by a governmental unit or an agency contained in the policy issued by defendant violates § 27-7-2.1 and is therefore void and unenforceable as a matter of law. He also found that the exclusion from the definition of "uninsured motor vehicle" of any vehicle owned or operated by a solvent and statutory self-insurer contained in the policy issued by defendant does not violate the uninsured-motorist statute but that defendant had waived its right to rely on this exclusion. The motion justice found that in defendant's June 29, 1993 letter to plaintiffs' counsel, defendant specifically relied on the government-owned-vehicle exclusion and failed to rely specifically upon or to assert the self-insured-vehicle exclusion. An order was subsequently entered on February 10, 1995, containing these findings from which defendant has filed the instant appeal.

On appeal defendant argues that the motion justice erred in finding that the government-owned-vehicle exclusion was void as a matter of law. Moreover, defendant contends that the motion justice erred in finding that it waived its right to enforce the self-insurer exclusion.

This court has held that in enacting § 27-7-2.1 the Legislature intended that as a matter of public policy, protection should be given to the named insured against economic loss resulting from injuries sustained by reason of the negligent operation of an uninsured vehicle. Malo v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 459 A.2d 954, 956 (R.I.1983) (citing Aldcroft v. Fidelity Casualty Co., 106 R.I. 311, 318, 259 A.2d 408, 413 (1969)). "This statute was premised on the concept...