Ruffin v. Department of Public Works, CV-05 4012081S.
| Decision Date | 15 March 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. CV-05 4012081S.,CV-05 4012081S. |
| Citation | 914 A.2d 617,50 Conn.Sup. 98 |
| Court | Connecticut Superior Court |
| Parties | Sherri RUFFIN v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS et al. |
Anderson, Reynolds & Lynch, LLP, New Britain, for the plaintiff.
Thadd A. Gnocchi, assistant attorney general, with whom was Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the defendants.
The plaintiff, Sherri Ruffin, brings the present action against four defendants. The first, and named defendant, is the state department of public works (public works). The second defendant is the state department of administrative services (administrative services). The third is an administrative services manager, Keith Anderson, and the fourth and final defendant is William R. Andrews, a public works human resources administrator. The plaintiff was a classified state employee in the position of assistant accountant in public works' financial management unit for five years before she was separated from service as a state employee on June 1, 2003. This separation followed her submission of a medical certificate which stated that she would not be able to return to work as an assistant accountant for the financial management unit in the same department. The plaintiff was terminated from state service upon the expiration of a medical leave without position held due to her inability to return to work in the same unit and the state's inability to place her elsewhere in state service.
The plaintiff maintains in the first count of her complaint that the defendants acted in excess of their statutory authority by violating her rights under the State Personnel Act. The plaintiff alleges that her separation from state service violated General Statutes § 5-244 regarding transfer or separation from service because of infirmities due to the defendants' failure to investigate her condition and availability to work and a failure to demonstrate just cause for the application of this statute. The plaintiff also alleges that the defendants did not comply with § 5-244-1 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies regarding separation from state service or transfer to less arduous duties. The plaintiff further alleges that General Statutes § 5-241 was violated due to their failure to place her name on a reemployment list for those laid off from state service and to hire her from that list.
In the second count of the complaint, the plaintiff primarily alleges that she had a property interest in her position and that she was denied the right to due process and a hearing prior to termination. The plaintiff also alleges that the defendants' actions "were illegal, ultra vires and/or in excess of [their] authority and were in direct conflict with the State Personnel Act."
The plaintiff, in her claim for relief, asks the court to enter a declaratory judgment essentially declaring that the defendants' actions in terminating the plaintiff's employment were illegal and in excess of statutory authority and also asks for injunctive relief in the form of an order to reinstate the plaintiff to her former position as assistant accountant with all back pay and benefits.
The defendants move to dismiss the entire complaint on the grounds of common-law sovereign immunity and statutory immunity pursuant to General Statutes § 4-165. The defendants maintain that sovereign immunity prohibits the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction because there has been no waiver of sovereign immunity and because there is no substantial claim that the defendants either have acted in excess of their statutory authority or violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff. Sovereign immunity, they claim, also bars the plaintiff's claim for money damages. Finally, the defendants claim that the court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction over any claims against defendants Andrews and Anderson if they are sued in their individual rather than official capacities because they are immune from liability pursuant to § 4-165. In support of their motion, the defendants filed a memorandum of law with supporting affidavits and documentation. The plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in objection to the motion to dismiss and states that the motion is factually and legally unwarranted. The plaintiff did not file any affidavits or documentation in support of her position, but cites a number of the defendants' exhibits in her opposing memorandum. The defendants filed a reply and a supplemental reply to the plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss.
"A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 544, 590 A.2d 914 (1991). "A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." Upson v. State, 190 Conn. 622, 624, 461 A.2d 991 (1983). "The issue of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagnon v. Planning Commission, 222 Conn. 294, 297, 608 A.2d 1181 (1992). "[O]nce the question of lack of jurisdiction of a court is raised . . . the court must fully resolve it before proceeding further with the case . . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Figueroa v. C & S Ball Bearing, 237 Conn. 1, 4, 675 A.2d 845 (1996). "[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Peabody, N.E., Inc., 239 Conn. 93, 99, 680 A.2d 1321 (1996).
In deciding a motion to dismiss, a trial court must consider the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Antinerella v. Rioux, 229 Conn. 479, 489, 642 A.2d 699 (1994), overruled in part on other grounds, Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 828 A.2d 549 (2003). When a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is "accompanied by supporting affidavits containing undisputed facts, the court may look to their content for determination of the jurisdictional issue and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint." Barde v. Board of Trustees, 207 Conn. 59, 62, 539 A.2d 1000 (1988). "The plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised." Fink v. Golenbock, 238 Conn. 183, 199 n. 13, 680 A.2d 1243 (1996).
For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss is granted.
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the state cannot be sued without its consent, and any suit against a state agent or officer in a matter where the agent or officer represents the state is a suit against the state. Canning v. Lensink, 221 Conn. 346, 349, 603 A.2d 1155 (1992); Fetterman v. University of Connecticut, 192 Conn. 539, 550-51, 473 A.2d 1176 (1984); Sentner v. Board of Trustees, 184 Conn. 339, 342, 439 A.2d 1033 (1981); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 623, 376 A.2d 359 (1977).
"In its pristine form, the doctrine of sovereign immunity would exempt the state from suit entirely, because the sovereign could not be sued in its own courts and there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Heintz, 204 Conn. 17, 31, 526 A.2d 1318 (1987). "This absolute bar of actions against the state has been greatly modified both by statutes effectively consenting to suit in some instances as well as by judicial decision in others." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 134, 168, 749 A.2d 1147 (2000), overruled in part on other grounds, Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. at 301, 828 A.2d 549. Consequently, our Supreme Court has recognized three narrow exceptions in which a suit against the state or its officials may be maintained. They are: (1) where the state has expressly waived sovereign immunity through the enactment of legislation, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, and has consented to suit under the specific circumstances prescribed in the legislation; Martinez v. Dept. of Public Safety, 263 Conn. 74, 85-86, 818 A.2d 758 (2003); White v. Burns, 213 Conn. 307, 312-13, 567 A.2d 1195 (1990); (2) where an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief based on a substantial claim that the state or an official of the state has violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff; Doe v Heintz, supra, at 31, 526 A.2d 1318, Horton v. Meskill, supra, 172 Conn. at 624, 376 A.2d 359; or (3) where a plaintiff seeks declaratory or injunctive relief based on a substantial claim that a state official has acted in excess of his statutory authority and has thereby violated a right of the plaintiff. Miller v. Egan, supra, at 314, 828 A.2d 549; Doe v. Heintz, supra, at 31, 526 A.2d 1318.
The plaintiff cites, in support of her claim of waiver of sovereign immunity, General Statutes §§ 5-267 and 5-268 with respect to count one and the State Employee Relations Act (the act), General Statutes § 5-270 et seq., with respect to count two.
General Statutes §§ 5-267 and 5-268 provide no express or implied waiver to civil suit against the state. Section 5-267 requires all officers, appointing authorities and other state employees to conform with the act and § 5-268 authorizes the state's attorney to prosecute for certain violations of the act and imposes criminal penalties. Neither statute expressly nor impliedly authorizes civil lawsuits against the state.
The act also does not authorize a civil action. It only declares a limited waiver of sovereign immunity in which the state, as an employer, is held...
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