Upson v. State
| Citation | 461 A.2d 991,190 Conn. 622 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Connecticut |
| Decision Date | 12 July 1983 |
| Parties | Gail UPSON v. STATE of Connecticut. |
Richard P. Weinstein, Hartford, for appellant (plaintiff).
Robert A. Whitehead, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, was Joseph I. Lieberman, Atty. Gen., for appellee (defendant).
Before SPEZIALE, C.J., and PETERS, ARTHUR H. HEALEY, PARSKEY and GRILLO, JJ.
The sequence of events culminating in the present appeal is not in dispute. The plaintiff initiated suit against the defendant in April, 1980, alleging a wrongful taking of certain cattle carcasses. Subsequently the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the state, not having consented to be sued, was immune from suit and that the "proper forum" for the plaintiff's action was before the claims commissioner pursuant to General Statutes § 4-141 et seq. The motion to dismiss was granted, and this appeal followed.
The complaint to which the defendant's motion to dismiss is addressed recites the following: The plaintiff, in July, 1979, owned certain cows which the commissioner of agriculture, acting pursuant to his statutory authority and as the agent of the defendant, found to be infected with brucellosis and therefore ordered destroyed after removing the animals from the plaintiff's farm. 1 The commissioner sold the carcasses for salvage value and the proceeds were retained by the defendant. The plaintiff was paid for "the destruction of said animals." 2 The plaintiff is entitled to the profits of the carcasses, but has been deprived of such profits. Thus the action by the defendant violates article first, § 9 of the constitution of the state of Connecticut, and the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution. 3
On appeal the plaintiff presents the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in deciding the plaintiff's complaint on its merits rather than addressing solely the jurisdictional issue raised by the defendant's motion to dismiss; (2) whether the trial court erred in determining that the defendant's sovereign immunity bars the plaintiff's complaint; (3) whether the trial court erred in refusing to accept evidence on a motion to dismiss as to the alleged duplicity of the plaintiff's action.
The first two claims advanced by the plaintiff misconstrue the function of the defendant's motion to dismiss by reading into the trial court's decision both too much and too little. A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction. 4 Pearson v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., 141 Conn. 646, 648, 109 A.2d 260 (1954). The defendant, which admitted all factual allegations of the complaint, took the position before the trial court that the plaintiff had failed to plead sufficient facts to show an unconstitutional taking, and that the mere allegation of such a wrongful taking, in the form of a legal conclusion, was insufficient to overcome the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The trial court was met by the defense, in the form of the plaintiff's argument to the motion to dismiss, that sovereign immunity is not a shield when an unconstitutional taking is alleged. Thus the issues were joined.
Lack of jurisdiction, once raised, must be disposed of. Baldwin Piano & Organ Co. v. Blake, 186 Conn. 295, 297, 441 A.2d 183 (1982).
The plaintiff's claim that the trial court decided the case on its merits is groundless. The memorandum of the court shows clearly that it considered the complaint and exhibits A and B, the condemnation agreements for compensation between the parties which were annexed to and made part of the complaint. The court then considered the statute; General Statutes § 22-288; and ultimately concluded that there was no unconstitutional taking. Noting that the state had not consented to the plaintiff's action and was therefore immune from suit, the court entered judgment dismissing the plaintiff's suit for lack of jurisdiction. We agree.
"The complaint, to survive the defense of sovereign immunity, must allege sufficient facts to support a finding of a taking of [property] in a constitutional sense ...." Horak v. State, 171 Conn. 257, 261, 368 A.2d 155 (1976). Where "the complaint is insufficient to establish an unconstitutional taking ... the doctrine of sovereign immunity is a sufficient bar to the jurisdiction of the court." Id. at 262, 368 A.2d 155. In the present case the trial court took no evidence. It was, however, required to determine the sufficiency of the claim of an unconstitutional taking, as alleged by the plaintiff, in order to determine the validity of the sovereign immunity averment which was the basis of the defendant's motion to dismiss.
Alternatively, the plaintiff contends that the court should have reviewed the allegations of paragraphs eight and nine 5 of the complaint and that due consideration of those paragraphs would have allowed the complaint to withstand the jurisdictional attack of the motion to dismiss. Were we to adopt the plaintiff's argument, the mere allegation of a wrongful taking coupled with an allegation of constitutional violation would be sufficient to preclude an inquiry concerning a claimed jurisdictional defect (sovereign immunity). Regardless of the phraseology in the nature of a conclusion employed by the pleader, if the face of the record indicates that the court is without jurisdiction, the complaint must be dismissed. Horak v. State, supra, 171 Conn. at 260, 368 A.2d 155. A reading of the trial court's decision demonstrates conclusively that the court analyzed the facts alleged in the complaint and concluded that those facts did not amount to an unconstitutional taking, and that therefore the court lacked jurisdiction. We concur in the conclusion of the trial court that the record on its face discloses that the plaintiff was fully compensated, that there was no unconstitutional taking, and that the defendant's motion to dismiss was correctly granted.
In view of our decision as to lack of...
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