Ford Motor Co. v. Miles
| Decision Date | 23 June 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-0545,96-0545 |
| Citation | 41 Tex. Sup.Ct. J. 562,967 S.W.2d 377 |
| Parties | Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 15,205, 41 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 562 FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Petitioner, v. Susan Renae MILES, individually and a/n/f of Willie Searcy and Jermaine Searcy, minors, and Kenneth Miles, Respondents. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Joe R. Greenhill, Bob E. Shannon, Joseph R. Knight, Austin, Claudia Wilson Frost, Michael S. Goldberg, David Gregory Patent, Houston, for Petitioner.
T. Randall Sandifer, Dallas, J. Mark Mann, Henderson, John R. Mercy, Texarkana, Rex Houston, Henderson, R. Jack Ayres, Jr., Dallas, for Respondents.
OWEN, Justice, delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, in which PHILLIPS, Chief Justice, GONZALEZ, HECHT and ABBOTT, Justices, join, and with respect to Part III, in which PHILLIPS, Chief Justice, GONZALEZ, HECHT, ENOCH, BAKER, ABBOTT and HANKINSON, Justices, join; and issued a concurring opinion with respect to Part IV, in which HECHT and ABBOTT, Justices, join, and with respect to Part V, in which HECHT, Justice, joins.
In this crashworthiness case, the Mileses contend that the tension eliminator in the seatbelt system of a Ford Ranger pickup truck was defectively designed and failed to prevent severe injuries to Willie Searcy. Because venue was improper in the county in which this case was tried, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals in part and remand this case to the trial court for transfer to Dallas County and a new trial. We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals to the extent that it holds that neither a stepparent nor a sibling may recover for loss of consortium. 922 S.W.2d 572.
Fourteen-year-old Willie Searcy, his younger brother Jermaine Searcy, and his stepfather Kenneth Miles were passengers in a 1988 Ford Ranger pickup truck when it was involved in a collision in Dallas County. The accident occurred on IH-35 when a Mercury Cougar traveling in the opposite direction on the other side of the interstate veered across the median into oncoming traffic and struck the Ranger. Willie Searcy is a quadriplegic as a result. He breathes only with the assistance of a ventilator and requires continuous care. Jermaine Searcy and Kenneth Miles suffered less severe injuries from which they substantially recovered.
Kenneth Miles was driving the Ranger and when the collision occurred was wearing a three-point lap and shoulder belt restraint system. Jermaine Searcy was in the middle seat and wore a lap belt. Willie Searcy occupied the right passenger seat and wore a three-point restraint identical to that worn by his stepfather. Expert witnesses for the plaintiffs testified that Willie Searcy's injuries were more severe than they otherwise would have been because Ford defectively designed a "tension eliminator" that was part of the seat belt assembly. There was evidence that Willie Searcy had leaned forward to retrieve some trash from the floor of the pickup, and the Mileses' experts theorized that when he did so, six to eight inches of slack were introduced into the shoulder harness and remained when Willie Searcy settled back into his seat. The Mileses contended that this caused his severe injuries either because the slack prevented the belt from adequately restraining Willie Searcy or because the belt caught his head and neck and tore his head from his spinal cord.
Susan Miles, who is Willie and Jermaine Searcy's mother, and her husband Kenneth Miles brought suit against Ford Motor Company and Doug Stanley doing business as Doug Stanley Ford, the Dallas dealership from which Kenneth Miles had purchased the Ranger. The suit was instituted in Rusk County, although the collision occurred in Dallas County, the Ranger was purchased in Dallas County, and the Mileses and the Searcys all resided in Dallas County. The Mileses contend that venue was proper in Rusk County because a Ford dealership is located there, although the Mileses concede that the Rusk County dealership has no connection with the collision or to the Ranger. Ford requested the trial court to transfer venue to Dallas County, and that motion was denied.
The damages sought from Ford and Stanley included loss of consortium by Willie Searcy's brother and stepfather because of Willie's severe injuries. Ford and Stanley moved for partial summary judgment on these claims, contending that the common law of Texas does not recognize a right of recovery by siblings and stepparents. The trial court granted that motion prior to trial. The remaining claims were submitted to a jury which found against Ford on all theories of liability and awarded $30 million in actual and $10 million in punitive damages. However, the jury refused to find against Doug Stanley Ford on any theory. The trial court entered judgment against Ford alone in accordance with those findings. Both Ford and the Mileses appealed. The court of appeals reversed the punitive damages award, holding that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's findings of gross negligence and malice. The court of appeals then remanded the gross negligence and malice issues for retrial, but refused to order a retrial of the negligence issue. The trial court's judgment was affirmed in all other respects.
Ford challenges the judgment of the court of appeals on numerous grounds, including the remand of only gross negligence for another trial. Because the entire case must be retried, we do not reach that issue, which is considered by JUSTICE GONZALEZ in his concurring opinion. The judgment of the court of appeals must be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial because venue did not lie in Rusk County.
With regard to the conditional cross-application filed by the Mileses, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals that the stepfather and brother of Willie Searcy cannot recover for loss of consortium. Our disposition of the case moots a second issue the Mileses raised, which is whether the court of appeals applied the correct legal standard in determining the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's findings of gross negligence and malice. With regard to the Mileses' third point of error, this Court does not have jurisdiction to determine whether the jury's failure to find Doug Stanley liable was so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that a new trial was required.
The first question that we must resolve is whether the trial court erred in failing to grant Ford's motion to transfer venue to Dallas County. The collision occurred in Dallas County, and the dealership from which Kenneth Miles purchased the Ford pickup is located in Dallas County. Ford, a foreign corporation, has its regional headquarters in Dallas, and its principal place of business in Texas is in Dallas County.
The sole basis for venue in Rusk County is that Premier Ford Mercury, Inc., a Ford dealership unrelated to the purchase of the truck by Kenneth Miles or to the collision, is located in Rusk County. The Mileses assert that venue is sustainable pursuant to former section 15.037 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which was in effect at the time this suit was filed. Act of June 3, 1987, 70th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 4, § 1, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 52, 53 , repealed by Act of May 8, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 138, § 10, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 978, 981. 1 Section 15.037 provided that a plaintiff could sue an out-of-state corporation doing business in this state "in any county in which the company may have an agency or representative." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE § 15.037, Act of June 3, 1987, 70th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 4, § 1, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 52, 53 (repealed 1995).
If there is any probative evidence in the entire record that Ford maintained an agency or had a representative in Rusk County, even if the preponderance of the evidence is to the contrary, we must defer to the trial court's determination that venue was proper in the county of suit. Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc., 868 S.W.2d 752, 758 (Tex.1993). If there is no such evidence, venue did not lie in Rusk County, and the case must be transferred to Dallas County where it is undisputed that venue is proper. Id.
This Court has long held that the terms "agency" and "representative" as used in the former venue statutes are not to be interpreted in light of the law of respondeat superior. Milligan v. Southern Express, Inc., 151 Tex. 315, 250 S.W.2d 194, 197 (1952). Rather, as we held in Ruiz, "venue against a corporation may be predicated upon the presence in a county of either an agency--a more or less regular and permanent business operation--or a representative with broad powers to act for the corporation." 868 S.W.2d at 759. Possession of broad power and discretion to act for the corporation is essential for both an agency and a representative under the former venue statutes. See id.
The Mileses argue that the Premier dealership in Rusk County was an agency of Ford Motor Company because Ford owned 77% of Premier's stock and by virtue of that stock ownership, Ford ultimately received 78.08% of any profits generated by the dealership. The ownership of some or even all of the stock of a corporation does not establish that the corporation is an "agency" or "representative" of its stockholders within the meaning of former section 15.037. We held in Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Stevens, 109 Tex. 262, 206 S.W. 921, 922 (1918), that a domestic subsidiary of a foreign corporation was not an agent of the parent company for venue purposes under a statute similar to section 15.037, even though the parent owned the subsidiary. See also Milligan, 250 S.W.2d at 196-97 (). The Premier dealership was a separate corporate entity irrespective of Ford's ownership of stock.
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