Ruiz v. McCotter

• Citation: 661 F. Supp. 112
• Decision Date: 31 December 1986
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. H-78-987-CA.
• Parties: David RUIZ, et al., Plaintiffs, United States of America, Plaintiff-Intervenor, v. O.L. McCOTTER, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

661 F. Supp. 112

David RUIZ, et al., Plaintiffs, United States of America, Plaintiff-Intervenor, v. O.L. McCOTTER, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. H-78-987-CA.

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division.

December 31, 1986.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

William Bennett Turner, San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiffs.

Dan Jacobs, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civil Rights, Div., Washington, D.C., for intervenor.

Jim Mattox, Atty. Gen. of Texas, F. Scott McCown, Melinda Hoyle Bozarth, Nancy Juren, Cynthia N. Milne, and Mary Keller, Asst. Attys. Gen., Austin, Tex., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JUSTICE, Chief Judge.

Introduction

The present phase of the Ruiz litigation¹ concerns civil contempt proceedings arising from several of the prison reforms previously ordered in this action. The particular reforms at issue were based upon certain agreements and stipulations of the parties. After hearings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23, the agreements and stipulations were each approved by the court, and orders were issued to effectuate them.

By a motion filed January 8, 1986, the plaintiff class of prisoners demanded that the defendants, including defendant O.L. McCotter, Director of the Texas Department of Corrections (TDC),² and defendant Alfred D. Hughes, Chairman of the Texas Board of Corrections, be ordered to show cause why they should not be held in contempt for acts or omissions in violation of such court orders. Generally, plaintiffs' claims included TDC's alleged failure to: 1) provide single-occupancy cells ("single-celling") to prisoners requiring such housing; 2) assign housing to prisoners according to their respective custody classifications, so as to preclude the presence of dissimilar classifications in the same housing areas; 3) post correctional officers inside the cell-blocks and dormitories; 4) hire health care professionals; 5) furnish to physically handicapped prisoners adequate medical care, living facilities, working conditions, and equal access to prison programs; 6) afford to prisoners in administrative segregation appropriate housing facilities, lighting, shelves, daily showers, out-of-cell recreation, and case-by-case determinations of personal property restrictions;³ and 7) construct specified recreational facilities. The plaintiffs seek monetary and other relief for TDC's purported violations of the stipulated reforms. A show cause order was entered on March 17, 1986.

TDC filed what was denominated as Defendants' Return to the Show Cause Order on March 28, 1986, and a Supplement to the Return on June 13, 1986. These responses consist of: 1) admissions of noncompliance accompanied by explanations; 2) denials of contempt; and 3) numerous contentions regarding the alleged inappropriateness of the requested relief. Additionally, TDC solicited modification of court orders regarding four areas: cell housing for certain female inmates; staff deployment; scheduling of recreation, property restrictions, and shelf requirements regarding prisoners in administrative segregation; and the construction of recreational facilities conforming to the stipulations of the parties.

The show cause hearing, conducted between June 23 and July 1, 1986, produced nearly 200 exhibits and the testimony of thirty-one witnesses, including several experts and prisoners. In late July, post-hearing and reply briefs were filed, which detailed supporting evidence relevant to the alleged violations and proposed relief.⁴

Because of the grossly unconstitutional conditions extant in TDC at the commencement of this action, the reforms ultimately ordered to correct them were necessarily extensive. See Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir.1982). But, questions concerning the constitutionality of the Texas prison system are not under consideration at the present juncture; rather, the matters in dispute relate to allegations of contumacy by TDC with respect to specific provisions of prior orders (all issued in conformance with the agreements and stipulations of the parties), and the need, if any, for their modification.

The judicial sanction of civil contempt is designed to enforce the rights and administer the remedies which a court has found a party entitled to in an order or decree. A sanction may issue only if the relevant court decree is clear and unambiguous, International Longshoremen's Association, Local 1291 v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Association, 389 U.S. 64, 76, 88 S.Ct. 201, 208, 19 L.Ed.2d 236 (1967); North Shore Laboratories Corp. v. Cohen, 721 F.2d 514, 521 (5th Cir.1983), the proof is "clear and convincing" (a standard higher than "preponderance" though not commensurate with "beyond a reasonable doubt"), Neely v. City of Grenada, 799 F.2d 203, 207 (5th Cir.1986); United States v. Rizzo, 539 F.2d 458, 465 (5th Cir.1976), and it is established that the violation was occasioned by reason of failures amounting to a want of diligence, ineffective control, and lack of steadfast purpose to effectuate the prescribed goals. Aspira of New York, Inc. v. Board of Education of City of New York, 423 F.Supp. 647 (S.D.N.Y.1976). Contempt represents more than a delay in performance or lack of perfection; it is, instead, the failure to accomplish what was ordered in meaningful respects.⁵ Moreover, good faith alone is no defense to this charge, since there is no intent requirement in respect of a determination of civil contempt. McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191, 69 S.Ct. 497, 499, 93 L.Ed. 599 (1949); Newman v. Graddick, 740 F.2d 1513, 1528 (11th Cir.1984).⁶

Defendants may defeat a finding of contempt, however, by demonstrating that they employed, in good faith, the utmost diligence in discharging their responsibilities. "Where compliance is impossible, neither the moving party nor the court has any reason to proceed with the civil contempt action." United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 757, 103 S.Ct. 1548, 1552, 75 L.Ed.2d 521, 528 (1983). In such a case, modification of the particular order would be appropriate.

The agreements and stipulations under examination amount to consent decrees.⁷ Modification of a consent decree that will alleviate or eliminate any condition designed to be affected thereby must be reviewed under the test established in United States v. Swift & Company, 286 U.S. 106, 52 S.Ct. 460, 76 L.Ed. 999 (1932). "Nothing less than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions" should lead to such a modification. United States v. Swift & Company, 286 U.S. at 119, 52 S.Ct. at 464.

Swift teaches that a consent decree may be changed upon such a showing, and it holds that it may not be changed in the interests of the defendants if the purposes of the litigation as incorporated in the decree ... have not been fully achieved.

United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 248, 88 S.Ct. 1496, 1499, 20 L.Ed.2d 562 (1968) (emphasis in original). See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 106 S.Ct. 1531, 1537, 89 L.Ed.2d 747 (1986). But the Supreme Court rejected the use of the Swift test when modification of the decree would place additional restrictions on a defendant. Thus, when it has been determined that the relief originally ordered has not produced the intended results, "the District Court should modify the decree so as to achieve the required result with all appropriate expedition." United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 391 U.S. at 252, 88 S.Ct. at 1501. See United States v. Lawrence County School District, 799 F.2d 1031, 1046 (5th Cir.1986); Neely v. City of Grenada, 799 F.2d at 211; Exxon Corporation v. Texas Motor Exchange of Houston, 628 F.2d 500, 503 (5th Cir.1980).

The findings of fact which follow delineate the seven areas in controversy and the specific issues relating to each. A review of plaintiffs' motion for contempt and further relief appropriately begins with an examination of single-occupancy cells for designated prisoners.

I.

SINGLE-CELL HOUSING

The Issues

In maintaining that TDC should be held in contempt of court with regard to the alleged failure to afford sufficient single-occupancy cells, plaintiffs allege that: 1) TDC failed to provide single-cell housing for prisoners identified as requiring it on the bases of vulnerability, assaultiveness, mental retardation, psychiatric condition, or medical problems; 2) the single-celling of vulnerable and assaultive prisoners in administrative segregation areas violates court orders; and 3) insufficient cellblock housing restricts two-thirds of the female prisoners identified as requiring single-occupancy cells to dormitory housing. The plaintiff class demands that TDC be ordered to house all prisoners in single-occupancy cells who have been identified as requiring it under the court's orders, forthwith, with a fine of $1,000.00 per prisoner, for each day that TDC is remiss in this relation.

In reply, TDC asserts that, within the past two years, it has complied substantially with the single-celling requirements. Moreover, TDC challenges plaintiffs' contention that the relevant orders or decrees prohibit the single-celling of vulnerable and assaultive inmates in administrative segregation. TDC argues, therefore, that no relief is necessary.

TDC admits that it has not provided single-occupancy cellblock housing for significant numbers of women prisoners who arguably require it. In explanation, TDC asserts that the Classification Plan permits women to be housed in dormitories, and "that before concluding that additional costly cells are needed for women, the court should allow TDC to propose an alternative plan." Defendants' Return, p. 11. Plaintiffs maintain, however, that the alternative plan submitted by defendants would permit the continued placement of women prisoners in dormitories who, under the terms of the present order, should be assigned to medium and close custody facilities.

Findings of Fact

1. Paragraph II.F of the "Stipulation...