Rule v. Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co., 04-145.

• Decision Date: 25 January 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04-145.,04-145.
• Citation: 2005 MT 6,106 P.3d 533,325 Mont. 329
• Parties: Lloyd E. RULE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BURLINGTON NORTHERN AND SANTA FE RAILWAY CO., Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

106 P.3d 533

2005 MT 6

325 Mont. 329

Lloyd E. RULE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BURLINGTON NORTHERN AND SANTA FE RAILWAY CO., Defendant and Respondent.

No. 04-145.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs August 25, 2004.

Decided January 25, 2005.

For Appellants: Alexander (Zander) Blewett, III, Kurt M. Jackson; Hoyt & Blewett, Great Falls, Montana.

For Respondent: Jon M. Moyers; Hedger Moyers, Billings, Montana.

Chief Justice KARLA M. GRAY delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 In this Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) action, the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, granted the motion of Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company (BNSF) for a change of venue. Lloyd E. Rule appeals. We affirm.

¶ 2 The issue is whether the District Court erred in granting BNSF's motion to change venue pursuant to §§ 25-2-122(2) and -201(1), MCA.

BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Rule filed this action in Cascade County District Court, seeking damages from BNSF for personal injury arising out of his railroad employment in Dawson County, where he resides. After Rule served BNSF through its registered agent in Yellowstone County, BNSF timely moved to change venue from Cascade County to either Yellowstone County or Dawson County, pursuant to §§ 25-2-122(2) and -201(1), MCA.

¶ 4 Relying on the referenced statutes, the District Court granted BNSF's motion to change venue and ordered the case transferred to either Dawson or Yellowstone County, at Rule's option. Rule appeals.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶ 5 Proper venue is a question of law involving the application of venue statutes to pleaded facts. Our review of a district court's venue ruling is plenary; we simply determine whether the district court's ruling was legally correct. Sprinkle v. Burton (1996), 280 Mont. 358, 361, 935 P.2d 1094, 1096 (citations omitted).

¶ 6 Similarly, we review a conclusion that a statute is constitutional for correctness. See Powell v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 2000 MT 321, ¶ 13, 302 Mont. 518, ¶ 13, 15 P.3d 877, ¶ 13 (citations omitted). The constitutionality of a legislative enactment is presumed, and the party challenging a statute bears the burden of proving it unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Powell, ¶ 13 (citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

¶ 7 Did the District Court err in granting BNSF's motion to change venue pursuant to §§ 25-2-122(2) and -201(1), MCA?

¶ 8 Venue issues relate to determining the proper place for trial of a legal action. The venue statutes at issue in the present case are § 25-2-122(2), MCA, and § 25-2-201(1), MCA. Subsections (a), (b) and (c), respectively, of § 25-2-122(2), MCA, provide that the proper place of trial for a tort action against a corporation incorporated in a state other than Montana is the county in which the tort was committed, the county in which the plaintiff resides or the county in which the corporation's resident agent is located. Section 25-2-201(1), MCA, provides that, upon motion and when the county designated in the complaint is not the proper county, a district court must change the place of trial.

¶ 9 In granting BNSF's motion, the District Court determined that venue was proper in either Dawson County or Yellowstone County. The apparent basis for that determination is that the alleged tort was committed — and Rule resided — in Dawson County, and BNSF's resident agent is located in Yellowstone County. The District Court implicitly concluded that, because Cascade County was not a proper venue under the plain meaning of § 25-2-122(2), MCA, § 25-2-201(1), MCA, required it to change the place of trial to a proper county.

¶ 10 Rule sets forth three arguments in support of his overall contention that the District Court erred in applying the terms of Montana's general tort venue statutes to his FELA action: (1) that the Legislature did not intend § 25-2-122(2), MCA, to apply to FELA cases; (2) that § 25-2-122(2), MCA, cannot coexist with the liberal forum selection policy under FELA; and (3) that § 25-2-122(2), MCA, is unconstitutional because it constitutes an arbitrary and capricious limitation on FELA venue practice in Montana. We address each argument in turn.

¶ 11 Rule contends the Montana Legislature did not intend § 25-2-122(2), MCA, to apply to FELA cases. In this regard, he relies on Senator Bruce Crippen's comments during legislative hearings on the 1995 and the 1997 amendments to § 25-2-122, MCA. Specifically, he cites Crippen's remarks in response to criticism of the bill by railroad worker and union opponents. Crippen stated that "the provisions of this bill would not restrict their [FELA claimants'] options at all" and "[t]his has nothing to do with FELA. They can still file under the federal forum if they choose." See Hearing on Senate Bill 63 before the House Judiciary Committee, 1995 Montana Legislature, March 10, 1995, p. 2; Hearing on Senate Bill 314 before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 1997 Montana Legislature, February 13, 1997, p. 12.

¶ 12 Senator Crippen's comments at the referenced hearings appear to address the rights of FELA plaintiffs to sue in federal court. In any event, Senator Crippen's remarks do not necessarily reflect the law. When a statute is plain and unambiguous on its face, we do not employ other means of interpretation in determining legislative intent. See Connery v. Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp. (1996), 280 Mont. 115, 119, 929 P.2d 222, 225 (citation omitted).

¶ 13 Pursuant to § 25-2-122(1), MCA, the general rule is that the proper place of trial for a tort action is the county in which the defendant resides or the tort was committed. Section 25-2-122(2), MCA, provides that the proper place of trial for a tort action in which the defendant is a corporation incorporated in a state other than Montana is the county in which the tort was committed, the county in which the plaintiff resides or the county in which the corporation's resident agent is located. Section 25-2-122(3), MCA, provides that if the defendant is a resident of a state other than Montana, the proper place of trial for a tort action is the county in which the tort was committed or the plaintiff resides.

¶ 14 A FELA action is a negligence action against a common carrier by railroad under federal law. See 45 U.S.C. § 51. Negligence is a type of tort. Section 25-2-122(1), MCA, plainly states that — except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) — it applies to tort actions, and subsection (2) applies to tort actions against defendant corporations incorporated in a state other than Montana. BNSF is a defendant out-of-state corporation. The Legislature did not create an exception from the provisions of § 25-2-122(2), MCA, for FELA claims. Because § 25-2-122, MCA, does not expressly exclude FELA claims, we conclude the statute applies to FELA claims.

¶ 15 Next, Rule contends § 25-2-122(2), MCA, cannot coexist with "the liberal forum selection policy under the FELA to which injured railroad workers are entitled under Montana law." He advances both federal and state cases in support of this proposition.

¶ 16 There can be no dispute that both federal law and courts, and this Court, are protective of broad venue rights for FELA plaintiffs. Pursuant to federal statute, a federal district court has jurisdiction of a FELA action, concurrent with the jurisdiction of state courts, if the defendant resides in or does business in that federal court's district or if the cause of action arose in that district. See 45 U.S.C. § 56. Venue choices for FELA actions filed in federal court are broader than the choices allowed under the general federal venue provisions, which "worked injustices to employees." Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. Kepner (1941), 314 U.S. 44, 53, 62 S.Ct. 6, 10, 86 L.Ed. 28, 33. The United States Supreme Court has stated "[t]he right to select the forum granted in [45 U.S.C. § 56] is a substantial right." Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co. (1949), 338 U.S. 263, 266, 70 S.Ct. 26, 28, 94 L.Ed. 55, 58.

¶ 17 The Supreme Court also has recognized that "the venue of state court [FELA] suits was left to the practice of the forum ... [provided,] [b]y virtue of the Constitution, [that] the courts of the several states must remain open to [FELA] litigants on the same basis that they are open to litigants with causes of action springing from a different source." See Miles v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. (1942), 315 U.S. 698, 703, 62 S.Ct. 827, 830, 86 L.Ed. 1129, 1134. Here, Rule does not dispute that the Montana venue statutes provide FELA litigants with access to Montana courts on the same basis as litigants with tort causes of action against nonresident corporations springing from different sources.

¶ 18 Rule relies on a series of Montana cases, decided over the last quarter-century, for the proposition that this Court does not recognize the doctrine of forum non conveniens in FELA actions. See State ex rel. Burlington Northern R. Co. v. District Court (1995), 270 Mont. 146, 154, 891 P.2d 493, 498; State ex rel. Burlington Northern R. Co. v. District Court (1987), 229 Mont. 325, 329, 746 P.2d 1077, 1080; Labella v. Burlington Northern, Inc. (1979), 182 Mont. 202, 595 P.2d 1184. He is correct. ¶ 19 Whether a change of venue may be allowed on the basis of forum non conveniens differs, however, from the question presented here, which is whether Rule filed his FELA action in a proper venue, in the first instance, under the applicable venue statute. Venue must be changed if the county designated in the complaint is not a proper county. Section 25-2-201(1), MCA. Forum non conveniens, which is codified in Montana at § 25-2-201(2) and (3), MCA, allows a court to decline to exercise jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized under the venue statutes, when an impartial trial cannot be had in the county designated in the complaint or the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change. In the present case, the District Court did not grant BNSF's ...