Ruler v. York County
| Decision Date | 25 June 1927 |
| Docket Number | 160 |
| Citation | 290 Pa. 427,139 A. 136 |
| Parties | Ruler, Appellant, v. York County et al |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued May 16, 1927
Appeal, No. 160, Jan. T., 1927, by Irvin I. Ruler, Sr., from order of Q.S. York Co., approving issue and sale of bonds in case of Petition of County Commissioners of York Co. Affirmed.
Appeal No. 173, Jan. T., 1927, by Irvin I. Ruler, Sr., from decree of C.P. York Co., dismissing bill in equity for injunction in case of Irvin I. Ruler, Sr., v. York County et al. Affirmed.
Petition for approval of bonds for construction of bridge across Susquehanna River. Before NILES, P.J.
Bill for injunction. Before NILES, P.J. and STOCK, J.
The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.
Petition granted and bill dismissed. Irvin I. Ruler, Sr., appealed in each proceeding.
Errors assigned, inter alia, were order and decree, quoting records.
The decree of the court of common pleas dismissing plaintiff's bill and of the court of quarter sessions approving the issue and sale of bonds are affirmed at appellant's cost.
Bernard J. Myers and George Hay Kain, with them Richard E. Cochran, for appellant. -- The proposed bonds cannot be legally issued: Rainsburg Boro. v. Fyan, 127 Pa. 74; Bruce v. Pittsburgh, 166 Pa. 152; Myers v. Lancaster Co., 40 York Leg. Rec. 85; Maginnis v. Schlottman, 76 Pa.Super. 124; Com. v. Bell, 145 Pa. 375; Keller v. Scranton, 200 Pa. 130; Major v. Boro., 209 Pa. 247; Raff v. Phila., 256 Pa. 312; Halpin v. Rochester, 281 Pa. 109; McAnulty v. Pittsburgh, 284 Pa. 304; Jackson v. School Dist., 280 Pa. 601; Campbell v. Twp., 273 Pa. 204; Chester Co. v. Brower, 117 Pa. 647; Davis v. Clark, 106 Pa. 377; Seiber v. Co., 79 Pa.Super. 247; Seabolt v. Co., 187 Pa. 318.
The proposed bridge cannot be legally built: Union Co. v. Co., 281 Pa. 62; York Haven W. & P. Co.'s App., 212 Pa. 622; York Haven W. & P. Co's Assessment, 218 Pa. 578; Kittanning Academy v. Brown, 41 Pa. 269; Bucher v. Co., 209 Pa. 619; Com. v. Baker, 212 Pa. 230; Roaring Creek Road, 11 Pa. 356.
The proposed tolls cannot be collected: Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U.S. 289; Covington v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204; R.R. v. Maryland, 21 Wall. 456; Huse v. Glover, 119 U.S. 543; Sands v. Imp. Co., 123 U.S. 288; Monongahela, etc., Co. v. U.S. 148 U.S. 312; Boyle v. R.R., 54 Pa. 310; Penna. R.R. v. Sly, 65 Pa. 205.
Walter B. Hays, County Solicitor, with him V. K. Keesey and Allen C. Wiest, for appellees. -- The proposed bond issue is legal: Major v. Boro., 209 Pa. 247; Raff v. Phila., 256 Pa. 312; Lumberman's Exchange v. Lutz, 2 Pa. Superior Ct. 91; Reber's Petition, 235 Pa. 622; Com. v. Friebertshauser, 263 Pa. 211; Williamsport v. Com., 84 Pa. 487; Garr v. Fuls, 286 Pa. 137; Com. v. Rothermel, 27 Pa.Super. 648; Com. v. Immel, 33 Pa.Super. 388; Com. v. Sellers, 130 Pa. 32; Hays v. Cumberland Co., 5 Pa. Superior Ct. 159; Com. v. Wert, 282 Pa. 575; Mahon v. Coal Co., 274 Pa. 489; Seabolt v. Co., 187 Pa. 318.
The bridge can be legally built: Searight's Est., 163 Pa. 210; Keiser v. Co., 156 Pa. 315; Seabolt v. Com., 187 Pa. 318.
The proposed tolls can be collected: Com. v. Sellers, 130 Pa. 32; Hays v. Cumberland Co., 5 Pa. Superior Ct. 159; Sands v. Imp. Co., 123 U.S. 288.
Before MOSCHZISKER, C.J., FRAZER, WALLING, SIMPSON, KEPHART, SADLER and SCHAFFER, JJ.
The voters of Lancaster and York Counties have expressed their approval of the project of building an inter-county bridge across the Susquehanna River between Columbia and Wrightsville to carry the Lincoln Highway and to cost $3,000,000. This is not only one of the most important river crossings within the bounds of the Commonwealth but of the Nation. It is manifest from the enormous traffic which naturally flows to this point that a new bridge there is a matter of first importance. The citizens of the two counties have so considered it by voting a large amount of their public funds to the project. We should not stand in the way of the accomplishment of their purpose unless there is no legal warrant for what they have undertaken to do. In the case of Lancaster County the favoring popular vote was only advisory to its county commissioners as the amount to be expended will not increase that county's indebtedness beyond the two per cent limit, whereas in York County the mandate of the voters was essential, as the debt increase there will exceed two per cent of the county's assessed valuation. This appeal is by a taxpayer of York County challenging its right to issue the necessary bonds to raise its share of the required money and to proceed with the work.
The grounds of challenge are (1) that as the line between the two counties is low water mark on the west (York County) side of the Susquehanna River, the whole bridge, with the exception of a few hundred feet thereof from low water mark to the west end of the bridge, will be in Lancaster County, and, as the entire river where it flows between the two counties is in the latter, the bridge will not be on the boundary line between the two counties as required by the Act of May 13, 1925, P.L. 667, nor over a river or stream upon the line as required by the Act of June 28, 1923, P.L. 875; (2) that York County may not finance such a bridge by bonds issued under the Act of April 20, 1874, P.L. 65, because under the electoral authority to increase its debt the question which was submitted to the voters was "Shall the bonded indebtedness of the County of York be increased by the additional sum of $1,500,000 for the purpose of the construction and erection jointly and in equal proportions with the County of Lancaster, Pennsylvania, of a joint county toll bridge across the Susquehanna River between Wrightsville, in the County of York, and Columbia, in the County of Lancaster, agreeably to the provisions of the Act of Assembly approved June 28, 1923, P.L. 875"; (3) York County may not collect tolls for traffic on such bridge, and apply them in ease of the tax securing such bonds.
We will take these questions up in their order, including in the disposition of them the subsidiary ones which arise out of each, as in appellant's brief much emphasis is laid on some of these subsidiary propositions.
We think it would be a narrow view, sticking much too close to the bark, to hold that because in the erection of York County out of Lancaster it was provided that the boundary of the latter should extend to low water mark on the west side of the Susquehanna River, as we have determined it does (York Haven Water & Power Co.'s App., 212 Pa. 622; York Haven Water & Power Co.'s Assessment, 218 Pa. 578), the legislation providing for the erection of inter-county bridges spanning the streams of the State which geographically separate the counties does not apply to these two or others similarly situated. The legislative purpose was that the rivers of the State should be bridged where the demands of travel call for it to be done and the fact that the boundary line between two counties may not be the center of the stream is of no real consequence. Here the bridge will be partly within the territorial limits of each of the counties, more of its extent in Lancaster than in York, but its benefits will accrue to the people of both in the same measure precisely as though the boundary between them were the thread of the stream. The same question arose under an almost similar state of facts in Keiser v. Union Co., 156 Pa. 315, and it was determined that the bridge could be built at the expense of the two counties which it would connect. We are of opinion that the location of the boundary line between the two counties does not render inoperative the legislation providing for the construction of an inter-county bridge.
The second ground of challenge is in substance that the bridge may not be financed by a bond issue under the Act of April 20, 1874, P.L. 65, as the question upon which the vote was taken was whether the indebtedness should be increased for the erection of a joint county toll bridge "agreeably to the provisions of the" Act of June 28, 1923, P.L. 875; in other words, that the submission to the voters was misleading and that they were misled. In their printed brief appellant's counsel say that this question involved will be discussed under two heads: whether the issue was properly authorized and whether the Act of June 28, 1923, P.L. 875, is constitutional. As to the first, the argument is that the reference in the question submitted to the voters to the 1923 Act negatived any thought of issuing bonds under the Act of 1874 and its amendments to pay for the construction of the bridge and led the voters to believe that the cost of the construction would be paid for entirely by tolls. This position supposes that the voters thought the Act of 1923 authorizes the issue of bonds in payment of the construction of county bridges, payable only out of tolls collected, in other words without any basic tax, and that they were in ignorance of section 10 of article IX of the state Constitution requiring that "Any county . . . incurring any indebtedness shall, at or before the time of so doing, provide for the collection of an annual tax sufficient to pay the interest and also the principal thereof within thirty years." For reasons which are obvious we could not so conclude. The electors knew they were voting to increase their bonded indebtedness $1,500,000, as the question submitted so states, and must conclusively be presumed to have known that the increase must be constitutionally made. Tolls, as will be pointed out later, are not taxes. Furthermore, our conclusion is that it is now too late to raise the contention that the voters were misled. No one can know that they were and there is now no way to establish...
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