Rumford Free Catholic Library v. Town of Rumford
| Decision Date | 12 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | 2:20-cv-00066-JDL |
| Parties | THE RUMFORD FREE CATHOLIC LIBRARY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. TOWN OF RUMFORD, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maine |
The Rumford Free Catholic Library, along with its president, Father Philip M. Stark, and one of its founders, Peter Francis Tinkham (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), seek a temporary restraining order enjoining the Town of Rumford and tax collector Thomas Bourret from foreclosing on the Library's property at 347 Pine Street, Rumford, Maine (ECF No. 20).1 For the reasons that follow, I deny the motion.
The Plaintiffs assert that, on September 29, 2019, they received a notice from Bourret, acting in his capacity as tax collector for the Town, indicating that thesubject property would be sold within 30 days due to the Library's failure to pay property taxes.2 The Plaintiffs contend that the Library did not owe taxes on the property because it was entitled to a property tax exemption based on its status as a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization.
The allegations in the Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint reflect a longstanding and complicated dispute between the Library and the Town over the tax-exempt status of the property. Specifically, the Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint alleges the following facts. The Library applied for a property tax exemption from the Town in June 2014 and again in February 2015. The Library did not receive a notice of denial of either application. In September 2015, the Library received a notice of non-payment for two years of property taxes from Bourret. The Library paid the tax bill in October 2015 and then successfully sued the Town in the Maine Superior Court over its tax-exempt status. Afterward, the Town purportedly refused to reimburse the Library or to grant a tax abatement on the grounds that the Library had not made any use of the property—religious, charitable, or otherwise—since taking ownership of the property in 2014, and on the grounds that the property was derelict and unsuitable for any use.
The Library appealed the denial of the requested tax abatement to the Oxford County Board of Assessment Review, which initially granted the abatement. However, the Town appealed to the Maine Superior Court, and the matter wasremanded to the Board of Assessment Review for a determination of whether the property was in use in 2014 and 2015. On remand, the Board denied the Library's request for a tax abatement on the grounds that the Library was not entitled to a tax exemption. The amended complaint alleges that the Board justified its decision at the hearing by finding that the Library had never applied for a tax exemption. According to the amended complaint, the Board articulated a different rationale in its written decision, explaining that the Library was not entitled to a tax exemption because the property had not been in use during the specified period and was derelict.
The amended complaint alleges that, contrary to the findings of the Board of Assessment Review, the Library has applied for a tax exemption on three separate occasions and has consistently made substantial use of and improvements to the property since 2014. The Plaintiffs challenge the Board's determination for several reasons. First, they assert that several Town employees perjured themselves before the Superior Court and the Board of Assessment Review by testifying that the Library had neither applied for a tax exemption nor used the property for any charitable or other purpose. They further assert that the Library's counsel was negligent and that the Board erroneously granted the Town's request to continue the hearing on the requested tax abatement, both of which deprived the Library of the opportunity to present certain evidence to the Board.
In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence before the Board, the Plaintiffs contend that the Town employees' testimony, the Board's decision to continue the hearing, and the Board's ultimate determination that the property was derelict were motivated by "prejudice[]" and "bias[]" against the Library. ECF No. 9¶¶ 74, 82. They assert that these incidents were only the latest in a longstanding pattern of unjust treatment of the Library. In support of this contention, the amended complaint alleges that the Town has previously enforced land use ordinances against the Library in an arbitrary manner and conspired to prevent the Library from purchasing additional property in Rumford in furtherance of its religious mission. The amended complaint further alleges that Town employees and others have repeatedly made "slanderous" and "defamatory" statements about the Plaintiffs over the course of several years, both in connection with these previous alleged incidents of unfair treatment and in unrelated legal proceedings involving officers of the Library. Based on all these allegations, the Plaintiffs maintain that, contrary to the Board's determination, the Library is entitled to a tax exemption and does not owe any taxes on the property.
The allegations in the amended complaint suggest that, in addition to bringing this action, the Library has appealed the Board's decision to the Maine Superior Court. Nevertheless, the Plaintiffs assert that they made a payment to the Town in the amount necessary to avoid foreclosure, as directed by the notice they received in September 2019, in an effort to maintain the Library's title to the property pending the resolution of this action. They contend that the Town did not consider their payment sufficient and that the Library therefore remains at risk of foreclosure. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs seek a temporary restraining order enjoining the Town and Bourret from foreclosing on the property.
The Town and Bourret argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction to grant the temporary restraining order based on the Tax Injunction Act of 1937, which provides that "district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West 2020). The Act generally "deprives federal district courts of jurisdiction to enjoin the collection of state taxes." Wal-Mart P.R., Inc. v. Zaragoza-Gomez, 834 F.3d 110, 118 (1st Cir. 2016) (). However, the Act "contains an express exception under which federal district courts can assume jurisdiction where state courts do not provide a 'plain, speedy and efficient remedy.'" Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C.A. § 1341).
The jurisdictional bar created by the Tax Injunction Act applies to and is dispositive of the Plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order. The property taxes imposed on the Library by the Town are state taxes within the meaning of the Act: "Real estate taxes, although generally administered at the local level by municipal officers, are state taxes imposed to raise revenue." Belisle v. Rotondi, No. 1:16-cv-00451-JAW, 2016 WL 4919882, at *2 (D. Me. Sept. 14, 2016) (citing 36 M.R.S.A. §§ 201, 251, 551); see also Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 100 n.1. And the tax foreclosure that the Plaintiffs seek to enjoin is a method of "levying" or "collecting" taxes under the Act. See Guertin v. City of Eastport, 143 F. Supp. 2d 67, 69-74 (D. Me. 2001) (); Noone v. Town of Palmer, 2 F. Supp. 3d 1, 2-3 (D. Mass. 2014) (same); see also Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl, 575 U.S. 1, 9-10 (2015) ().
Because the Plaintiffs' motion falls within the Tax Injunction Act's prohibition, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the motion unless the Plaintiffs establish that Maine's state courts "do not provide a 'plain, speedy and efficient remedy.'" Wal-Mart P.R., 834 F.3d at 118 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1341); see also id. at 116 (). A plain, speedy, and efficient remedy exists in state court so long as the taxpayer has access to a "'full hearing and judicial determination at which [it] may raise all constitutional objections to the tax' and may therefrom seek review before the Supreme Court." Pleasures of San Patricio, 596 F.3d at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 515 n.19 (1981)).
The Plaintiffs have not shown that the Library has been deprived of adequate state-court remedies. It has previously been determined in this District that the administrative and judicial remedies available to Maine taxpayers are "plain, speedy and efficient." Belisle, 2016 WL 4919882, at *2; see also Guertin, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 70-73, 71 n.4. Most relevant here, 36 M.R.S.A. § 844-M(6) (West 2020) provides that a taxpayer may appeal the decision of a county board of assessment review to the Maine Superior Court in accordance with Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 80B. Rule 80B provides for a hearing before the Maine Superior Court and appellate review bythe Maine Law Court. These provisions indicate that the Library has access to a full hearing and judicial determination of its objections to the property taxes at issue. Indeed, according to the allegations in the Plaintiffs' filings, the Library has already partially availed itself of these remedies and continues to litigate its tax-exempt status in state court. Thus, absent any allegation that Maine's state courts have refused to hear the Library's constitutional arguments, I conclude that a plain, speedy and efficient remedy is available to the Library in Maine's state courts.
The Plaintiffs...
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