Runnels v. Staunton Redevelopment and Housing Authority

• Decision Date: 09 September 1966
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: Catherine D. RUNNELS, as infant, etc., et al. v. STAUNTON REDEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING AUTHORITY et al.

Page 882

149 S.E.2d 882

207 Va. 407

Catherine D. RUNNELS, as infant, etc., et al. v. STAUNTON REDEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING AUTHORITY et al.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Sept. 9, 1966.

J. Sloan Kuykendall, Winchester (J. Forester Taylor, Staunton, Kuykendall & Whiting, Winchester, on brief), for appellants.

Richard W. Smith, George M. Cochran, Staunton, for appellees.

Before EGGLESTON, C.J., and SPRATLEY, BUCHANAN, SNEAD, I'ANSON, CARRICO and GORDON, JJ.

GORDON, Justice.

This is a contest between the Staunton Redevelopment and Housing Authority and the owners of properties the Authority wishes to condemn.

The Authority proposes to carry out its Plan for the redevelopment of a two and a half block area near the central business district of Staunton. ¹ The present use of the buildings in the area ranges from commercial or industrial to residential, with commercial uses in the majority. The Authority intends to redevelop the land for commercial uses.

To carry out the Plan the Authority must acquire all properties within the area by purchase or condemnation. And it can legally acquire these properties only if the Authority's finding that the area is 'blighted or deteriorated' can stand. See the Virginia Housing Authorities Law, Va. Code Ann. Title 36, Chapter 1 (Repl. vol. 1953), as amended, particularly Va. Code Ann. § 36--49(1) (Supp.1966).

Catherine D. Runnels and the other appellants, who own properties within the area, are unwilling to sell their properties to the Authority. To prevent condemnation they brought this suit against the Authority for a declaratory judgment, asking the court to declare (among other matters) that the area was not blighted or deteriorated. ² The trial court denied all of the complainants' prayers and dismissed their bill of complaint. We must decide whether the court erred.

The trial judge ruled that the property owners had the burden of proving the area was not blighted or deteriorated within the meaning of Code § 36--49. ³ He described this burden as 'heavy', because 'the exercise of municipal power in this case is clothed with a presumption of validity'. He ruled that the property owners had failed to bear their burden because the evidence did not show the Authority's finding of blight was arbitrary or unwarranted.

The property owners attack these rulings. They contend the burden of proof should have been placed upon the Authority and, even if the burden were properly placed upon them, they should have been required to prove absence of blight 'by (only) the ordinary preponderance of the evidence'.

The trial judge based his ruling upon our opinion in Bristol Redevelopment and Housing Authority v. Denton, 198 Va. 171, 93 S.E.2d 288 (1956), and the authorities relied on in that opinion. So in determining whether the trial judge in this case was correct in his rulings respecting the burden of proof, we will begin with an examination of our opinion in the Denton case.

In Bristol Redevelopment and Housing Authority v. Denton, supra, the property owners brought suit to enjoin the Bristol Redevelopment and Housing Authority from proceeding with a redevelopment project and from acquiring their lands by purchase or condemnation. The trial court held: '(1) Whether the city council ⁴ had exceeded its authority in determining that the area was a slum, blighted, or deteriorated area and available for redevelopment under the terms of the statute was subject to judicial review; (2) 'The overwhelming weight of evidence' showed that the area was not in fact a slum, blighted, or deteriorated area; and (3) The evidence showed that the 'primary purpose' of the proposed redevelopment was for 'commercial' uses and not the clearance of slum, blighted, or deteriorated areas.' Id. at 174, 93 S.E.2d at 291. The trial court enjoined the Authority from proceeding with the project, and we affirmed.

Because the power of a housing authority to acquire property in a proposed redevelopment area depends upon the condition of the area, we agreed in the Denton case that the trial court had 'the right to determine whether the area * * * (was) in fact 'blighted or deteriorated' as defined in the statute. Code § 36--49(1).' Id. at 178, 93 S.E.2d at 293. But we pointed out that the right to judicial review is subject to well-recognized limitations.

'* * * (W)hether a particular ordinance enacted pursuant to a general grant of power is arbitrary and unreasonable and therefore void is a question for the court.' Id. at 177, 93 S.E.2d at 293. But '(a)ll presumptions are in favor of the validity of the exercise of municipal power', and '(t)he burden is upon one alleging the invalidity of an ordinance to establish such invalidity by clear and convincing proof'. Id. 'The same principles apply to the findings of fact by a redevelopment authority to which * * * the General Assembly has delegated the primary responsibility of determining the conditions in an area and initiating the project.' Id.

We pointed in the Denton opinion to previous declarations by this Court that legislative findings will not be disturbed unless they are arbitrary and unreasonable. ⁵ Other authorities cited in Denton are to the same effect. ⁶

Nevertheless, we agreed that the evidence before the trial court in the Denton case warranted its finding that "to characterize this as a slum or blighted area is to go contra to the overwhelming weight of the evidence in the case." Id. at 180, 93 S.E.2d at 295. We held: 'Since the evidence clearly shows that the area as a whole does not meet * * * (the) statutory definition (in Code § 36--49(1)), it necessarily follows that the action of the local Authority in finding that because of this condition the property should be acquired for redevelopment purposes, and the action of the council in approving the project, Were devoid of legal authority, arbitrary and unwarranted. Consequently, the appellees (property owners) were entitled to the relief prayed for in their bill.' (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 181--182, 93 S.E.2d at 296.

The trial judge's ruling in the present case was consistent with our opinion in the Denton case. The property owners asked him to invalidate the Staunton Authority's finding of blight and the City Council's approval of the Authority's redevelopment Plan. They had the burden under Denton of establishing the invalidity of these actions.

Furthermore, the trial judge correctly assessed the measure of proof required of the property owners to sustain their burden. In the Denton case we reaffirmed the principle that 'legislative conclusions based on findings of fact are not immune from judicial review where they are arbitrary and unwarranted'. Id. at 176--177, 93 S.E.2d at 292. The trial court therefore had jurisdiction in this case to review the Staunton Authority's finding that the area was blighted. But it was incumbent upon the property owners to show by competent evidence that the Authority's finding of blight was arbitrary and unwarranted. The trial judge correctly ruled that the property owners' burden could not be sustained by the 'ordinary preponderance of the evidence'.

The property owners do not concede defeat even if, as we have held, the trial judge ruled correctly concerning the burden of proof. They contend the evidence proved conclusively that the project area was not blighted. However, the trial judge found that the property owners not only had failed to prove the Authority's determination of blight was arbitrary and unwarranted, but failed even to rebut the affirmative evidence of blight brought forth by the Authority. The trial judge said in his opinion:

'Though the complainants (property owners) have had expert witnesses examine every building and these apparently well qualified experts have testified that the majority of the buildings are structurally sound, complainants' witnesses have not successfully rebutted defendants' (Authority's) well qualified experts who made careful and minute examinations of each building, room by room, and testified convincingly that the buildings are blighted within the meaning of Sec. 36--48 and 36--49 of the Code.' ⁷

After issue was joined and before the taking of evidence, the trial judge made an examination of the project area. He viewed 'the exterior of all the buildings therein and the interior of practically every room of each building'. The judge heard all the property owners' evidence in chief and part of the Authority's evidence in chief. The Authority's remaining evidence in chief and the property owners' rebuttal evidence were submitted by depositions. The evidence consumes 1,475 pages of the printed record. We deem it necessary to point out only the most significant evidence brought forth by the Authority.

The Authority called, among other expert witnesses, an architect and an engineer. They had made independent and detailed inspections of the building in the project area. Each was familiar with the definition of blight contained in Code § 36--49 (see footnote 3) and the requirements of the building and safety codes adopted by the City of Staunton. ⁸ These experts testified at length (293 pages of the printed record) about the condition of each building in the area. They concluded that 22 of the 32 buildings in the area were dilapidated. Other buildings, though not classified as dilapidated, had inadequate lighting, ventilation and sanitary facilities or other defects. More than 200 photographs introduced in evidence supported their conclusions. Many other witnesses, lay and expert, agreed that the area as a whole was deteriorated and in a 'run-down' condition.

The Authority introduced evidence relating also to the question whether the dilapidated or 'run-down' condition of the area was 'detrimental to the safety, health, morals or welfare of the community' within the meaning of Code § 36--49 (see footnote 3). The evidence indicated that the condition of the area was detrimental to the 'safety' of the...