Ruppin v. McLachlan

• Decision Date: 23 January 1904
• Citation: 98 N.W. 153,122 Iowa 343
• Parties: ERNESTINE RUPPIN v. ELIZABETH MCLACHLAN et al., Appellants
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

98 N.W. 153

122 Iowa 343

ERNESTINE RUPPIN v. ELIZABETH MCLACHLAN et al., Appellants

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

January 23, 1904

Appeal from Johnson District Court.--HON. H. M. REMLEY, Judge.

ACTION in equity to have set aside and declared void a decree rendered by the district court of Johnson county quieting title to certain real estate in said county as against this plaintiff in Rebecca Ruppin, through whom defendants claim title, and now quiet title in plaintiff to said property as against defendants. Decree for plaintiff, from which defendants appeal.

Reversed.

Ranck & Bradley, J. H. Trewin and M. J. Wade for appellants.

Heinz & Fisher for appellee.

OPINION

MCCLAIN, J.

Herman Ruppin died in Johnson county in 1890, seised of the legal title to the real estate in controversy. In his will, duly probated, all his property, real and personal, was devised and bequeathed to his wife, Rebecca Ruppin, for life remainder to his sister, the plaintiff in this action; and it may be assumed that under the will his widow was entitled to one-third of the property in fee as dower, and to a life estate in the balance, and that, if plaintiff was entitled to any share therein, such share was the remainder of the two-third interest as to which a life estate was given to the widow. In 1893, a decree was rendered in the district court of Johnson county, on service of publication in an action brought by the widow against this plaintiff, declaring the widow (plaintiff in that action) to be the sole owner of the property in controversy, and quieting her title as against this plaintiff. In 1895 the widow died in possession of the entire property. Defendants now hold possession of and claim title to said property as her heirs. The decree of 1893 is conclusive against the plaintiff, unless it is shown either that it was rendered without jurisdiction, or that it should be set aside on some equitable ground. If the court rendering such decree had no jurisdiction, then the lower court in this case was justified in declaring it void and quieting plaintiff's title against defendants, claiming under and through it. Iowa Sav. & L. Ass'n v. Chase, 118 Iowa 51, 91 N.W. 807. If on the other hand, plaintiff has shown equitable grounds for vacating and setting aside said decree, then, even though such decree was rendered by a court having jurisdiction, the action of the lower court must be sustained, so far, at least, as the decree which it rendered in this case sets aside the former decree. It is not very clear on which of these grounds the lower court held the decree to be void and set it aside. We will consider the two grounds separately.

It is not questioned that the action brought by the widow, Rebecca Ruppin, in the district court of Johnson county, to quiet her title to the property in controversy, as against the claims of this plaintiff, was brought in the proper court, and that the court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action, for the property was situated in that county. The proceeding being in rem, jurisdiction could be acquired by publication of notice, as authorized by statutory provisions then in force, now found in section 3534 of the present Code. Carnes v. Mitchell, 82 Iowa 601, 48 N.W. 941; Knudson v. Litchfield, 87 Iowa 111, 54 N.W. 199; Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316 (10 S.Ct. 557, 33 L.Ed. 918).

But the view of the lower court seems to have been that the allegations of the petition on which the original decree was rendered did not show plaintiff in that action to be entitled to a decree against defendant; or, in other words, did not entitle plaintiff to the relief granted. No doubt, a so-called petition might fail so utterly to state any right to legal or equitable relief that it would not support a decree rendered on default, or the decree might be so far unwarranted by the allegations of the petition that the court might be said to be without jurisdiction to render it. And yet even these statements must be made with caution, for the power to grant equitable relief in actions at law, and vice versa, and to transfer cases from one forum to another, and, further, to allow amendments to pleadings, so as to add averments essential to a cause of action or eliminate those inconsistent with the cause of action stated, is so great under our form of procedure that it would be difficult to imagine a case where the court, having jurisdiction in other respects, could not render a valid judgment; that is, a judgment proof against collateral attack because of the insufficiency of the petition. To enable a court to render such a judgment, it is essential that the power of the court to give judical relief be invoked by a proper party, that the case be of such character as to bring it within the general scope of the court's power, and that the court shall have acquired the right to decide the particular case by reason of some form of notice, such as is sufficient to satisfy the constitutional and statutory requirements. Spoors v. Coen, 44 Ohio St. 497, (9 N.E. 132); 2 Freeman, Judgments, section 118.

There is no question in the case before us as to the sufficiency of the notice, or as to the general jurisdiction of the court rendering the decree to give relief in the class of cases to which the one in question belongs. But the contention in behalf of this plaintiff is that the action of the court in the original case was not invoked in such way as to give it power to render a decree. It was averred in the petition on which such decree was rendered, in substance, that the plaintiff therein was the widow and sole heir of Herman Ruppin; that he owned at the time of his decease certain described real estate; that he left a will, which had been duly probated; that defendant in that action, Ernestine Ruppin, was a legatee under said will; that said defendant was an alien and resident of Mecklenburg, Germany; and that plaintiff, as said widow and sole heir of Herman Ruppin, was the owner of the real estate described; and the prayer was that plaintiff be adjudged the owner of the property described, and that the title thereto be quieted in her as against the claims of all persons whomsoever, and therefore against any claim of the defendant, Ernestine Ruppin, and for such other and further relief as plaintiff might in equity be entitled to. It must be admitted that the averments of this petition are not, in themselves, consistent with each other. The will itself, however, which was referred to and made part of the petition, described Ernestine Ruppin as testator's sister, and described the real property devised to her subject to the widow's life estate, which was the same property to which plaintiff claimed title. If the will was valid and effectual, then Rebecca Ruppin was not the sole owner of the real estate described; but, on the other hand, even though the will were valid, Rebecca Ruppin, as widow, was entitled to one-third of the real estate in fee as widow, and she was an heir of the testator, for if, as matter of fact, Herman Ruppin left no descendants (and it is apparent from the whole record in this case that he had none), then his widow would, as heir, take a share of his property in excess of her interest as widow sufficient to constitute in all one-half of his property; so that, conceding Ernestine Ruppin to be an heir as well as a legatee, Rebecca Ruppin was properly described as being an heir to her deceased husband. Phillips v. Carpenter, 79 Iowa 600, 44 N.W. 898; Smith v. Zuckmeyer, 53 Iowa 14, 3 N.W. 782. Of course, the fact that Herman Ruppin left a will would not be inconsistent with the description of Rebecca Ruppin as his heir, for she would be such heir regardless of whether, in view of the will, any property passed to her as heir. The inconsistency in the petition consisted, therefore, first in the averment that the plaintiff, Rebecca Ruppin, was the sole heir of her deceased husband, in view of the fact that the will was referred to, in which Ernestine Ruppin was described as his sister; and, second, in the averment that said plaintiff was the absolute owner of the property described, in view of the fact that by the will an interest in such property was devised to said Ernestine Ruppin. The pleader, however, included in the petition an averment that Ernestine Ruppin was a nonresident alien, and it is evident that this fact was relied upon as depriving her of the character of heir, leaving the widow sole heir, and also as depriving her of the right to take under the will by devise, leaving the widow absolute owner of the property. As matter of fact this allegation must be deemed to have been true; as, indeed, it is conceded throughout the case that it was true. As matter of law it must now be conceded that the fact thus alleged did not warrant the conclusion which the pleader sought to have drawn from it; and it may further be conceded that by reason of a treaty between the United States and Mecklenburg, of which the court was bound to take judicial notice, Ernestine Ruppin was entitled to inherit from her brother, notwithstanding her alienage. 2 Blackstone, Commentaries, 249; Stemple v. Herminghouser, 3 Greene 408; Krogan v. Kinney, 15 Iowa 242; Rheim v. Robbins, 20 Iowa 45. At common law an alien could take by devise under a will, subject to the power of the sovereign to declare the devised property forfeited to the crown. Underhill on Wills, section 66. And under the provisions of Acts 22d General Assembly, page 125, chapter 85, which was in force when the will of Herman Ruppin was probated, a nonresident alien might, to some extent and for some purposes, take by devise, although he was still incompetent to take by descent. Bennett v. Hibbert, 88 Iowa 154, 55 N.W. 93.

Therefore while the facts...