Rush v. Wilder
| Decision Date | 24 May 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. S-00-929.,S-00-929. |
| Citation | 644 N.W.2d 151,263 Neb. 910 |
| Parties | Lenora RUSH, legal guardian of Theodore Bland, Jr., an incapacitated person, Appellant, v. William D. WILDER, individually, and Douglas County, Nebraska, a political subdivision of the State of Nebraska, Appellees. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
D.C. Bradford and James R. Welsh, Omaha, of Bradford, Coenen & Welsh, for appellant.
Joseph S. Daly, Omaha, Kelly K. Brandon, Bellevue, and P. Shawn McCann, Omaha, of Sodoro, Daly & Sodoro, for appellee Douglas County.
Lenora Rush, legal guardian of Theodore Bland, Jr., sued Douglas County for injuries Bland suffered while incarcerated by Douglas County. The district court entered summary judgment for Douglas County, but the Nebraska Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the district court. Because Douglas County's evidence did not establish a prima facie case for summary judgment, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Rush filed a petition alleging that on June 24, 1996, while Bland was an inmate at the Douglas County correctional facility, William D. Wilder, another inmate, assaulted Bland with a food tray and caused Bland to suffer a traumatic brain injury. Rush's petition alleged causes of action against Wilder for assault and against Douglas County for depriving Bland of his "right ... to timely and appropriate medical care while in the custody of the defendant, Douglas County, under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States."
Douglas County filed a motion for summary judgment supported by the affidavit of Robert N. Brown, M.D., a physician employed by Douglas County who treated Bland during Bland's incarceration. Brown averred that he had reviewed the records of Douglas County's treatment of Bland, and based on that review of the record, as well as his own knowledge of the care given to Bland, Brown opined that all the employees of Douglas County met the relevant standard of medical care. The affidavit of Rush's expert witness, a professor of criminal justice, was rejected as a discovery sanction. The district court determined that without expert testimony for Rush, there was no issue of material fact, and entered summary judgment for Douglas County.
Rush appealed, arguing that the district court erred in requiring her to produce an expert witness and in striking the affidavit of her expert witness. The Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment, determining that Rush's petition was not intended to state a cause of action for medical malpractice, but instead stated a cause of action for simple negligence. See Rush v. Wilder, No. A-00-929, 2001 WL 1643585 (Neb.App. Dec.26, 2001) (). The Court of Appeals determined that the negligence of corrections officers did not require expert testimony to establish a case and, therefore, that the district court had erred in entering summary judgment. See id. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and remanded the cause for a new trial, without reaching the question whether the district court erred in striking the affidavit of Rush's expert witness. See id. Douglas County filed a petition for further review, which we granted.
Douglas County assigns, as consolidated and restated, that the Court of Appeals erred in determining that Rush was not required to produce expert medical testimony to rebut Douglas County's prima facie showing for summary judgment.
In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment is granted and gives such party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence. McCarson v. McCarson, 263 Neb. 534, 641 N.W.2d 62 (2002). The party moving for summary judgment has the burden to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and must produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
Initially, we note that Rush's petition pleads two causes of action, the first of which is a cause of action against Wilder. The record on appeal does not reflect any proceedings with respect to Rush's claim against Wilder. At oral argument, Rush's counsel stated that the cause of action against Wilder had been dismissed for failure to serve process. Moreover, the district court's order of summary judgment dismisses Rush's petition in its entirety, and Rush does not assign any error with respect to the apparent dismissal of the assault cause of action. Absent any other suggestion that the order appealed from is not a final order, we conclude that we have jurisdiction over the instant appeal.
The primary dispute between the parties relates to the appropriate characterization of Rush's second cause of action. On appeal, Rush characterizes this claim as one of simple negligence on the part of Douglas County. Douglas County claims that the cause of action involves medical malpractice and constitutional claims, thus requiring Rush to produce expert testimony in response to Douglas County's motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals adopted Rush's position in reversing the district court judgment.
The issues in a case are framed by the pleadings. City State Bank v. Holstine, 260 Neb. 578, 618 N.W.2d 704 (2000). An appellate court is obligated to dispose of cases on the basis of the theory presented by the pleadings. See, Ashland State Bank v. Elkhorn Racquetball, Inc., 246 Neb. 411, 520 N.W.2d 189 (1994); Wilson v. Misko, 244 Neb. 526, 508 N.W.2d 238 (1993). Rush's petition, in relevant part, alleges the following:
11. This action arises under the United States Constitution, particularly under the provisions of the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and under federal law, particularly the Civil Rights Act, Title 42 of U.S.C. § 1983.
12. This Court has jurisdiction of this cause under and by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Each and all of the acts of defendant, Douglas County, alleged herein, were done by defendant, Douglas County, under the color of the statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs and usages of the State of Nebraska, by and through its agents, employees and/or representations while acting in the course of their employment, agency and/or representation of defendant, Douglas County.
13. That the defendant, William D. Wilder, intentionally and forcibly struck Theodore Bland Jr., across the head with a food tray, without justification or cause, with the intent to inflict unnecessary harm upon the plaintiff. Such use of force caused physical and mental injuries to Theodore Bland Jr., as described in more detail below.
14. That the defendant, Douglas County, by and through its agents, employees and/or representatives, failed and/or refused to make available to Theodore Bland Jr. medical treatment for injuries sustained as a result of the assault for a period from 11:30 A.M. until 7:30 P.M., at which time Theodore Bland Jr. was taken to St. Joseph Hospital wherein he underwent emergency medical treatment for traumatic brain injury.
15. That the conduct of the defendant, Douglas County, by and through its agents, employees and/or representatives, while acting in the scope of their employment with the defendant, deprived Theodore Bland Jr. of the following rights, privileges, and immunities given to him by the Constitution of the United States:
a. The right of Theodore Bland to timely and appropriate medical care while in the custody of the defendant, Douglas County, under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States;
b. The acts, conducts and behavior of the defendant, Douglas County, by and through its agents, employees and/or representatives, were performed knowingly, intentionally and maliciously, by reason of which plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages in the sum of $1,000,000.
Based on our reading of Rush's petition, as set forth above, we agree with Douglas County insofar as it argues that the Court of Appeals erred in characterizing Rush's cause of action against Douglas County as simple negligence. Rush's petition clearly sets forth a single cause of action against Douglas County, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994): the failure to provide Bland with adequate medical care in violation of the Constitution of the United States. At oral argument, the parties agreed that the petition sets forth a cause of action under § 1983. In order to state a cause of action under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts establishing conduct by a person acting under color of state law which deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Claypool v. Hibberd, 261 Neb. 818, 626 N.W.2d 539 (2001).
Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment, whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner's needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). Regardless of how evidenced, deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury states a cause of action under § 1983. Estelle, supra.
A prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for failure to attend to a prisoner's medical needs unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm...
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