Rushing v. State
| Citation | 382 N.W.2d 141 |
| Decision Date | 19 February 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-587,85-587 |
| Parties | Tim RUSHING, Appellee, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellant. Douglas SMITH, Appellee, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellant. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Gordon E. Allen, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., and John M. Parmeter, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.
Charles L. Harrington, Appellate Defender, and Linda Del Gallo, Asst. Appellate Defender, Des Moines, for appellees.
Considered by REYNOLDSON, C.J., and HARRIS, MCGIVERIN, SCHULTZ and WOLLE, JJ.
This is an appeal from judgments by the district court in two postconviction relief actions brought by two inmates of the Iowa State Men's Reformatory pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 663A (1983). These cases arose out of prison disciplinary proceedings. The district court granted the separate applications for postconviction relief, and the State appealed. We now reverse the judgments of the district court and uphold the adjustment committees' disciplinary decisions.
During July and August 1984, in two unrelated incidents, applicants Tim Rushing and Douglas Smith, Iowa Men's Reformatory inmates, were required to provide urine specimens to prison staff members which then were analyzed for the presence of the substance tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the active ingredient in marijuana. The urinalysis results for both inmates were positive for THC, indicating that applicants had either smoked marijuana or ingested it orally within the thirty-day periods prior to the tests.
Subsequently, both inmates received disciplinary notices charging them with various institutional rule violations for the use and possession of marijuana. Applicants denied the charges; each inmate claimed that he had not smoked or ingested marijuana within the thirty days prior to the administration of the test.
Following separate disciplinary hearings, the prison adjustment committee found each inmate had committed the institutional rule violations charged in his disciplinary notice. The written decision of the committee in each case stated that in reaching its decision, the committee had relied on the evidence of the positive result of the THC analysis indicating that the inmate had smoked or ingested marijuana within the preceding thirty days.
The committee decisions imposed sanctions on both inmates, including solitary detention and loss of good time. Rushing and Smith appealed the adjustment committee's decision in their respective cases to the warden of the reformatory. Iowa Code § 903A.3(2) (1985). Both appeals were denied.
Applicants then sought postconviction relief in district court, Iowa Code section 663A.2(6), on the grounds that the adjustment committee violated their due process rights under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. They contended that the committee considered the positive THC analysis as irrebuttably and conclusively establishing that each inmate was guilty of possession and use of contraband drugs because the positive test result was the only item listed under the "evidence relied on" section of the written committee decision. Applicants argued that such an irrebuttable presumption was in violation of a United States district court injunction forbidding Iowa reformatory officials from deeming positive THC test results alone as conclusive evidence of possession and use of marijuana. See Harmon and Burton v. Auger, C 82-174 (N.D.Iowa 1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 768 F.2d 270 (8th Cir.1985).
At separate postconviction relief hearings held to consider each applicant's petition, a reformatory employee who served as a member of the three-person adjustment committee in both cases testified that the committee did not solely rely on the results of the urinalysis in making its decision, but that it also considered each applicant's testimony denying the charges.
The postconviction court in both cases stated that there was no written evidence in the record to support the claim that the inmates' testimony was considered by the committee. The court also ruled that any consideration of an inmate's defense must be reflected in the written disciplinary decision. Therefore, the court concluded it was fundamentally unfair later to hear oral testimony of a committee member that additional evidence was considered at the disciplinary hearing, but was not placed or noted in the committee's written decision. The written decisions stated that the evidence relied on was the urine test results which indicated positive for THC being contained in the urine specimen. The postconviction courts believed the decisions violated the Harmon v. Auger federal court injunction. From the district court decisions, the State appealed to us. Iowa Code § 663A.9. The two cases subsequently were consolidated on appeal.
The issue presented for our review is whether due process requires a prison disciplinary committee to expressly state in its written decision that the committee has considered the inmate's defenses in reaching its decision even though those defenses may have not have been believed by the committee.
I. Standard of review. Applicants assert that their right to due process of law as secured by the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution was violated. Therefore, because there are fundamental constitutional rights involved here, we review the case de novo in light of the totality of the circumstances and record upon which the postconviction court ruling was made. Wagner v. State, 364 N.W.2d 246, 249 (Iowa 1985).
II. Due process claim. In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), the Supreme Court established minimum requirements of procedural due process to be afforded prisoners in disciplinary proceedings. However, the Court noted:
Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply. Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 488 33 L.Ed.2d 484 [ (1972) ]. In sum, there must be mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application.
Id. at 556, 94 S.Ct. at 2975, 41 L.Ed.2d at 951.
The Court then stated that a prisoner in a disciplinary proceeding was entitled to receive "advance written notice of the claimed violation and a written statement of the factfindings as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the...
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Meier v. SENECAUT III
...each defense to a claim on its merits, even though the district court did not address each defense in its ruling. See Rushing v. State, 382 N.W.2d 141, 145 (Iowa 1986); Brunner v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 338 N.W.2d 151, 152 (Iowa 1983). At first blush, this principle would appear to assist ......
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...requirements of due process are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary board. Id.; Rushing v. State, 382 N.W.2d 141, 145 (Iowa 1986). The EMIT test results obviously provide some evidence of drug use. EMIT tests have been found sufficiently reliable to m......
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Harpster v. State, 96-39
...a statement that the ALJ or discipline committee considered the inmate's proffered defense in reaching its decision. Rushing v. State, 382 N.W.2d 141, 144 (Iowa 1986). The Rushing court analogized the situation to that of a civil law nonjury case when a court has found in favor of the plain......
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...it in light of the totality of the circumstances and the record upon which the postconviction court's ruling was made. Rushing v. State, 382 N.W.2d 141, 143 (Iowa 1986). Inmates in prison disciplinary proceedings have no right to either retained or appointed counsel. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418......