Rusinek v. Schultz, Snyder & Steele Lumber Co.

• Citation: 309 N.W.2d 163,411 Mich. 502
• Decision Date: 24 August 1981
• Docket Number: Docket No. 65509
• Parties: Eugene RUSINEK and Marie Rusinek, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SCHULTZ, SNYDER & STEELE LUMBER COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee, and Richard Braybrook, Defendant. 411 Mich. 502, 309 N.W.2d 163
• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan

Page 163

309 N.W.2d 163

Eugene RUSINEK and Marie Rusinek, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SCHULTZ, SNYDER & STEELE LUMBER COMPANY Defendant-Appellee and Richard Braybrook, Defendant.

Docket No. 65509.

411 Mich. 502, 309 N.W.2d 163

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Aug. 24, 1981.

Edwin Jakeway, P. C. by Bennett S. Engelman, Grand Blanc, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Brownell, Andrews, Philpott & Piper, Flint, for defendant.

PER CURIAM.

In this case we examine the question of whether Michigan's no-fault insurance act has abrogated, in automobile injury cases, the common-law action for loss of consortium.

I

Plaintiffs, husband and wife, brought suit for damages arising out of an automobile accident which occurred on July 30, 1974. Plaintiff Eugene Rusinek claimed he sustained personal injuries to his neck, back and elbow amounting to "serious impairment of body function" within the meaning of the no-fault act. Plaintiff Marie Rusinek, who was not involved in the accident, claimed the loss of consortium arising out of her husband's injuries. The trial court denied a motion to dismiss the consortium claim, and, following trial on the question of damages, the jury returned a verdict of $50,000 in favor of Mr. Rusinek and a verdict of $10,000 in favor of Mrs. Rusinek. A motion for a new trial was denied.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals, 98 Mich.App. 380, 296 N.W.2d 262, reversed both verdicts, the panel agreeing that an instructional error required retrial on the issue of damages as to Mr. Rusinek, and a majority of the panel holding that Michigan's no-fault act had abolished the right of the spouse of a person injured in an automobile accident to recover in tort for loss of consortium.

The decision of the Court of Appeals on this question directly conflicts with the decision reached by another panel of the Court of Appeals in Warner v. Brigham, 90 Mich.App. 640, 282 N.W.2d 428 (1979), lv. den. 407 Mich. 907 (1979). In another reported decision, Cotton v. Minter, 469 F.Supp. 199 (E.D.Mich.1979), the United States District Court, interpreting Michigan law, held that Michigan's no-fault act does not preclude an action for loss of consortium.

We take up the question to resolve this conflict, and we hold that Michigan's no-fault act has not abolished the common-law action for loss of consortium.

II

The right of a spouse to recover from a tortfeasor for loss of consortium occasioned by injuries inflicted on the other spouse is well established in Michigan's common law. Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227 (1960). Consortium is defined as including "society, companionship, service, and all other incidents of the marriage relationship". Washington v. Jones, 386 Mich. 466, 472, 192 N.W.2d 234 (1971).

In 1972, Michigan enacted its no-fault insurance act which partially abolished the common-law remedy in tort for persons injured by negligent motor vehicle tortfeasors. The act was a response to the long payment delays, inequitable payment structure, and high legal costs inherent in the tort liability system. The goal of the no-fault system was to provide victims of motor vehicle accidents assured, adequate, and prompt reparation for certain economic losses through a system of compulsory insurance which would provide victims with benefits for their injuries as a substitute for their common-law remedy in tort. Shavers v. Attorney General, 402 Mich. 554, 267 N.W.2d 72 (1978). Section 3135 of the no-fault act, the operative provision which partially abolished tort liability and which is the source of the present controversy, provides, in pertinent part:

"(1) A person remains subject to tort liability for noneconomic loss caused by his or her ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle only if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.

"(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, tort liability arising from the ownership, maintenance, or use within this state of a motor vehicle with respect to which the security required by section 3101(3) and (4) was in effect is abolished except as to :

"(b) Damages for noneconomic loss as provided and limited in subsection (1)." (Emphasis added.) M.C.L. § 500.3135; M.S.A. § 24.13135.

It is undisputed that loss of consortium is a noneconomic loss. The question that has arisen, however, is whether "liability for noneconomic loss" refers only to losses suffered by the "injured person" who "has suffered death, serious impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement" or whether the phrase: "if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement", is merely the statement of a threshold condition that must be met before another who suffers noneconomic loss may seek recovery in tort. Under the latter interpretation the spouse of a person who receives above-threshold injuries may recover for loss of consortium, while under the former interpretation he or she may not.

In Warner v. Brigham, supra, a majority of a Court of Appeals panel held that the language of the statute was clear; that it did not limit liability to those losses suffered by an injured person, and that any noneconomic loss compensable at common law may be recovered under the statute once the injured person has suffered injuries which meet the statute's threshold requirements. The dissenting member of the panel, Judge Bashara, found the language of the statute ambiguous and wrote that the only reasonable construction consistent with the operative language of the statute and the act's purpose of limiting automobile injury tort actions was that tort recovery was limited to injured persons who meet the threshold requirements.

A majority of the Court of Appeals panel in the instant case agreed with the reasoning of Judge Bashara and held that the spouse of a person injured in an automobile accident may not recover for loss of consortium. Judge Cynar dissented from this part of the...