Warner v. Brigham

• Decision Date: 06 June 1979
• Docket Number: Docket No. 78-838
• Citation: 282 N.W.2d 428,90 Mich.App. 640
• Parties: Linda K. WARNER, William H. Warner and William H. Warner, Jr., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Michael A. BRIGHAM, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 428

282 N.W.2d 428

90 Mich.App. 640

Linda K. WARNER, William H. Warner and William H. Warner, Jr., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Michael A. BRIGHAM, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 78-838.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

June 6, 1979.

Released for Publication Aug. 22, 1979.

Forsythe, Campbell, Vangenberg, Clevenger & Bishop, P. C. by Donald E. Shelton, Ann Arbor, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Douvan & Harrington, Gordon J. Barnett, Jr., Ann Arbor, for defendant-appellee.

Before BASHARA, P. J., and V. J. BRENNAN and MAHER, JJ.

MAHER, Judge.

Plaintiffs bring this appeal from an order of the trial court dismissing plaintiff William Warner's claim for loss of consortium resulting from injuries suffered by Linda Warner in an automobile accident. Linda Warner was injured when the car in which she was riding was struck by an automobile driven by defendant. Ms. Warner, joined by her husband and son, brought this action to recover noneconomic losses suffered as a result of the accident, alleging serious impairment of body function and permanent serious disfigurement under M.C.L. § 500.3135(1); M.S.A. § 24.13135(1). The sole issue before us on appeal is whether the trial court erred in holding that loss of consortium does not survive under the no-fault automobile insurance act.

The applicable statute is M.C.L. § 500.3135; M.S.A. § 24.13135, which provides in part:

"(1) A person remains subject to tort liability for noneconomic loss caused by his ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle Only if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement.

"(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, Tort liability arising from the ownership, maintenance or use within this state of a motor vehicle with respect to which the security required by subsections (3) and (4) of section 3101 was in effect Is abolished except as to :

"(b) Damages for noneconomic loss as provided and limited in subsection (1)." (Emphasis added.)

Defendant argues that section 3135 abolishes all tort liability except that specifically described in the statute. We agree. However, we are of the opinion that claims for loss of consortium come within the statute, where the claimant's spouse has suffered death, serious impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement.

We think that the language of the statute is clear. A person Remains liable for noneconomic loss if the injured person has suffered injuries which meet the threshold requirements. The statute does not limit liability only to those losses suffered by the injured person, excluding losses suffered by another as a result of the serious injury. Clearly any noneconomic loss compensable at common law may be recovered under section 3135. Once the threshold is crossed, the parties step from the purely statutory land of no-fault back into the common law, with all its virtues and shortcomings. We agree with the interpretation of section 3135 stated in Luce v. Gerow, 89 Mich.App. 546, 280 N.W.2d 592 (1979):

"M.C.L. 500.5135(1); M.S.A. 24.13135(1), retains traditional tort liability if certain threshold requirements are met."

The jury in this case having already decided that Linda Warner's injuries met the threshold requirements of § 3135, William Warner is entitled to press his claim for loss of consortium. Reversed and remanded for trial on the issue of damages suffered by William Warner. No costs.

BASHARA, Presiding Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. Plaintiff's spouse sustained injuries in an automobile accident. A jury found the injuries met the requisites of M.C.L. § 500.3135(1); M.S.A. § 24.13135(1), and awarded her $3,000 in damages.

The trial court, in dismissing the consortium claim, stated that loss of consortium is no longer recoverable under the recent no-fault legislation.

Plaintiff contends that where an injured person meets the threshold requirements of § 3135, the defendant remains subject to tort liability for the loss of consortium claim of the injured person's spouse. He claims the statute does not restrict tort liability to those losses suffered only by the injured party.

This issue is one of first impression. The statute in question, M.C.L. § 500.3135; M.S.A. § 24.13135, states:

"Sec. 3135. (1) A person remains subject to Tort liability for noneconomic loss caused by his ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle only if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement.

"(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, Tort liability arising from the ownership, maintenance or use within this state of a motor vehicle with respect to which the security required by subsections (3) and (4) of section 3101 was in effect Is abolished except as to :

"(a) Intentionally caused harm to persons or property. Even though a person knows that harm to persons or property is substantially certain to be caused by his act or omission, he does not cause or suffer such harm intentionally if he acts or refrains from acting for the purpose of averting injury to any person, including himself, or for the purpose of averting damage to tangible property.

"(b) Damages for noneconomic loss as provided and limited in subsection (1).

"(c) Damages for allowable expenses, work loss and survivor's loss as defined in sections 3107 to 3110 in excess of the daily, monthly and 3 year limitations contained in those sections. The party liable for damages is entitled to an exemption reducing his liability by the amount of taxes that would have been payable on account of income the injured person would have received if he had not been injured." (Emphasis added.)

A statute may be judicially construed if the language used is ambiguous or the statute is susceptible to two or more meanings. Statutory language should be given a reasonable construction considering the purpose of the statute and the object sought to be accomplished. King v. Director of the Midland County Dep't of Social Services, 73 Mich.App. 253, 258, 251 N.W.2d 270 (1977). I conclude that § 3135 is sufficiently lacking in clarity so as to necessitate judicial construction.

Enactment of the no-fault legislative scheme envisioned a correction of the deficiencies and problems that had been found to exist in the tort system. Shavers v. Attorney General, 402 Mich. 554, 621-2, 267 N.W.2d 72 (1978).

The operative language of the statute, coupled with the expressed purpose of limiting automobile injury tort actions in the courts, leads me to believe that the Legislature intended to abolish the type of common-law derivative tort action contemplated by this suit.

Where the Legislature provides specific direction in a...