Russ v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd.
| Decision Date | 19 November 1981 |
| Citation | 125 Cal.App.3d 834,178 Cal.Rptr. 421 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | , 1 Ed. Law Rep. 324 Evelyn M. RUSS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD, Defendant and Respondent; ROUND VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Real Party in Interest. Civ. 49362. |
George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., John J. Klee, Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen., San Francisco, for defendant and respondent.
Diana K. Smith, Breon, Galgani & Godino, San Rafael, for real party in interest.
At pertinent times, appellant Evelyn M. Russ was employed by a public school district as a teacher's aide at an elementary school. When the school closed for the summer at the end of the 1977-1978 academic year, she applied to the Employment Development Department for unemployment compensation benefits claimed for a period in which she was out of work during the summer recess. After administrative proceedings to be described, respondent Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board rendered a decision holding that appellant was ineligible for the claimed benefits, by operation of Unemployment Insurance Code section 1253.3, subdivision (c), because she had been given "reasonable assurance" that she would be reemployed by the school district when the 1978-1979 academic year commenced in the fall. 1
Appellant challenged the decision by petitioning the superior court for a writ of administrative mandamus, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, and for declaratory relief. The cause was submitted on the record of the administrative proceedings. The court made findings of fact and conclusions of law adverse to appellant and entered a judgment denying the relief prayed. She appeals from the judgment.
The administrative record supports the following recitals:
During the 1977-1978 academic year, appellant was employed by the Round Valley Unified School District (hereinafter "District") as a teacher's aide at Round Valley Elementary School. She had been employed in that position for six successive academic years. She and other teacher's aides were employed by the District during the regular academic year only, and they were paid on an hourly basis. Their positions were financed by the State or federal governments exclusively, and they were not paid with funds of the District.
At the end of each successive academic year before 1978, the District had notified appellant that her employment was terminated but that she would be summoned back to work in the following fall (i. e., that she would be reemployed during the next academic year) if funds for her position became available. This had materialized, and she had been reemployed each fall. Early in May of the 1977-1978 academic year, the District circulated a memorandum to all teacher's aides (including appellant) which read in pertinent part as follows:
2
Appellant stopped working when the 1977-1978 academic year ended in early June of 1978. She thereupon filed with the Employment Development Department ("Department") a written application for unemployment compensation benefits. She checked a space on the application indicating that she was "no longer working" because she had been "laid off due to lack of work."
On June 8, 1978, the District informed the Department by letter that appellant and six other named teacher's aides would be "returning" to work for the District on August 28, 1978. It was also stated in the letter that "(d)ue to their place on the seniority list, and the fact that funding has been approved for their positions, they will be notified to return to work on August 28, 1978." 3
On July 13, 1978, the Department sent appellant a "Notice Of Determination" informing her that she was "not eligible to receive benefits" as claimed. The reasons for this determination were stated in the notice as follows: (Italics added.)
Appellant took an administrative appeal to a referee of the Department pursuant to section 1328. After conducting an evidentiary hearing at which the above-summarized facts were shown, the referee filed a decision reversing the Department's determination and holding that appellant was "not ineligible to receive unemployment benefits under ... Section 1253.3." The Department appealed the referee's decision to respondent Appeals Board. (See § 1336.) Appellant and the department filed briefs on this appeal pursuant to a letter of authorization written by the Appeals Board on November 30, 1978.
The Department's appeal was concluded in a written decision filed by a three-member panel of the Appeals Board. (See § 409.) The panel reversed the referee's decision and held that appellant had been "ineligible for benefits under section 1253.3 ... beginning June 4, 1978," on the ground that the memorandum written by the District in May of 1978 (see the text at fn. 2, ante) had "afforded the claimant (appellant) a reasonable assurance of employment" in the 1978-1979 academic year.
Appellant commenced this proceeding by filing a "Petition For Writ Of Mandate And Complaint For Declaratory Relief (C.C.P. §§ 1060; 1094.5)" in the superior court. Respondent Appeals Board was named in the petition as "Respondent and Defendant." Appellant subsequently amended it to name the District as "Real Party In Interest."
Appellant alleged the substance of the above-summarized facts and proceedings in a count entitled "First Cause Of Action (Administrative Mandate)." On the basis of this count, she prayed that "pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5" the court "issue its peremptory writ of mandate commanding respondent (Appeals Board) to set aside its decision ... and to take further action consistent with ... (the court's) ... opinion and judgment." On the basis The Appeals Board and the District filed answers in the action, which was orally argued at a hearing set on appellant's motion. The full administrative record was received in evidence at the hearing, and the cause was submitted for decision on that record only. The trial court filed a memorandum decision in which it reviewed the record and stated that "the petition for writ of mandate and for declaratory judgment is denied." Appellant requested written findings of fact and conclusions of law, which were eventually settled in favor of respondent Appeals Board and filed. The court thereupon entered a judgment denying the relief prayed in the petition. This appeal followed.
of another count entitled "Second Cause Of Action (Declaratory Relief)," she prayed for a declaratory judgment to the effect that classified employees of a public school district "are not rendered ineligible" for unemployment compensation benefits pursuant to section 1253.3, subdivision (c), if they are laid off by a "notice issued pursuant to Education Code section 45117." (See fn. 2, ante.)
It has been undisputed throughout the successive proceedings that section 1253.3, subdivision (c), operated to make appellant ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits in the summer of 1978 if there were at that time "a reasonable assurance" that she would be reemployed by the District in the same position, or in one involving her performance of the same "service," when the schools reopened at the commencement of the next academic year in the fall. (See fn. 1, ante.) She invoked the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 in seeking judicial review of the Appeals Board's determination that she was ineligible for the claimed benefits because such "reasonable assurance" existed. The trial court was therefore required to conduct a limited trial de novo, and to exercise its independent judgment, on the evidence of the element of "reasonable assurance" shown in the administrative record.
Proceeding as required, the court (1) made a finding that such "reasonable assurance" existed at pertinent times as a matter of ultimate fact; (2) stated in a conclusion of law that it existed "within the meaning" of section 1253.3; 4 and (3) denied relief in administrative mandamus accordingly. Appellant challenges both the finding and conclusion, contending in effect that the only evidence pertinent to the issue of "reasonable assurance" was the message communicated to her in the memorandum written by the District to teacher's aides in May of 1978 (quoted in the text at fn. 2, ante) and that the message did not establish the requisite "reasonable assurance" because it did not show an "agreement" for her reemployment within the meaning of the federal law which underlies section 1253.3. She also contends that the message was an "of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
United Educators of San Francisco AFT/CFT, AFL–CIO, NEA/CTA v. Cal. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd.
...grade level ... if there is ‘reasonable assurance’ (only) of his or her reemployment in the fall.” (Russ v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 834, 843, 178 Cal.Rptr. 421, italics added (Russ ).) The California Legislature responded to the 1976 amendment to the FUTA by amen......
-
United Educators of San Francisco v. Cal. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd.
...California employers receive federal tax credits for their contributions to the state fund. ( Russ v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 834, 842, 178 Cal.Rptr. 421 ( Russ ); see 42 U.S.C. § 502(a) ; 26 U.S.C. § 3302(a).) In exchange, the Legislature has agreed to conform o......
-
Davis v. District of Columbia
...See Herrera v. Industrial Commission, 197 Colo. 23, 26-27, 593 P.2d 329, 332 (1979) (en banc); Russ v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, 125 Cal.App.3d 834, 843, 178 Cal.Rptr. 421, 426 (1981). Despite the indefinite nature of their employment, we hold that § 46-110(7)(B) applies to subs......
-
Board of Education v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd.
...issued its "Precedent Benefit Decision No. P-B-419" on January 20, 1981, it did not have the benefit of Russ v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 834, 178 Cal.Rptr. 421 (filed Nov. 19, 1981; pet. for hg. den. S.Ct. Feb. 3, In Russ, the trial court denied the petition of a ......