Russell v. State
Decision Date | 11 February 1998 |
Docket Number | No. A98A0189,A98A0189 |
Citation | 497 S.E.2d 36,230 Ga.App. 546 |
Parties | , 98 FCDR 789 RUSSELL v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Yvonne T. Wyman-Williams, Decatur, for appellant.
J. Tom Morgan, District Attorney, Robert M. Coker, Jennifer M. Daniels, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
Derrick Russell appeals his conviction of armed robbery in violation of OCGA § 16-8-41. He enumerates six errors. Held:
1. The record reveals that appellant was not present during proceedings conducted in chambers. During these proceedings, the voir dire of certain jurors took place in the presence of the judge, the prosecutor and appellant's counsel, and the State raised an objection to the defense's use of peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors purely on racial grounds. The voir dire of prospective jurors is a "critical stage of the proceedings" at which a defendant has "an absolute right to be present under Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XII of the Georgia Constitution" of 1983. Goodroe v. State, 224 Ga.App. 378, 380(1), 480 S.E.2d 378. "The right may be waived by the defendant personally, or by defendant's counsel if counsel does so in the defendant's presence or pursuant to the defendant's express authority, or the defendant may subsequently acquiesce in counsel's waiver." Id. "The State concedes [in its appellate brief] that the record shows neither a personal waiver by [a]ppellant of his right to be present nor an express authorization to counsel to waive his presence." We agree. "Even though defense counsel was present in [appellant's] absence and made no objection, this does not waive the right or prevent error from being asserted on appeal." Goodroe, supra at 380, 480 S.E.2d 378, citing Fictum v. State, 188 Ga.App. 348, 349-350, 373 S.E.2d 54. Wilson v. State, 212 Ga. 73, 90 S.E.2d 557, where appellant repudiated the attempted waiver by his counsel at the earliest opportunity, is distinguishable from the facts of this case. As appellant's right to be present was violated and his absence was neither consented to nor waived, reversible error would occur unless appellant knowingly acquiesced in his counsel's election to proceed in his absence. Goodroe, supra at 380-381(1), 480 S.E.2d 378. The State contends that in light of appellant's silence at the time of jury selection and after the overnight recess, he acquiesced in his absence at these proceedings, and asserts that this case should be remanded for a hearing as to this issue. As to the issue of acquiescence, see generally State v. Phillips, 247 Ga. 246, 248(1)(B), 275 S.E.2d 323 and cases cited therein; Allen v. State, 199 Ga.App. 365, 405 S.E.2d 94; Frank v. State, 142 Ga. 741, 758(3), 83 S.E. 645; see also Harmon v. State, 224 Ga.App. 890, 891, 482 S.E.2d 730 ( ); compare Parker v. State, 220 Ga.App. 303, 469 S.E.2d 410 with Fictum, supra. Acquiescence Dunaway v. Windsor, 197 Ga. 705, 709, 30 S.E.2d 627. Acquiescence may arise "where a person who knows that he is entitled to ... enforce a right neglects to do so for such a length of time that, under the circumstances of the case, the other party may fairly infer that he has waived or abandoned his right." Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.). Whether appellant knowingly acquiesced to the waiver of his presence, by his counsel, is a mixed question of law and fact. In view of the posture of the appellate record, including the lack of a motion for new trial and a hearing thereon, and in order to effectuate a just determination of this issue (Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. IV), this case shall be remanded to the trial court with direction to conduct a hearing, giving both sides adequate opportunity to address the issue of acquiescence.
2. The trial court did not err in returning two jurors to the jury panel after appellant exercised his peremptory strikes to remove them. "The principles of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 apply equally to the defense as to the prosecution." Ellerbee v. State, 215 Ga.App. 312, 315(6), 450 S.E.2d 443. Defense disproportionately used eleven of its twelve peremptory strikes against white jurors and only one against a black juror; it also used one of its two alternate jury strikes against a white juror. The State established a prima facie case of discriminatory use of peremptory strikes. Compare Ellerbee v. State, supra ( ). The defense initially asserted that one white female juror (juror no. 2) was struck because she had been the victim of a similar armed robbery and subsequently also asserted that this juror lived in Dunwoody which allegedly is "notorious for not having a lot of black people living there." However, the State noted that a black female juror (juror no. 7) had been accepted by the defense, although she too had been an armed robbery victim and had the perpetrator's gun pointed directly at her. The trial court held that the proffered race-neutral reason was "not acceptable on step 3," see generally O'Neal v. State, 226 Ga.App. 224(1), 482 S.E.2d 478 (three-part test required), thereby implicitly holding that the race-neutral reason proffered for the strike was pretextual and that the strike was exercised in a purposefully discriminatory manner. The State met its burden of showing that the defense's proffered reason was a pretext for discrimination "by showing that [appellant] had failed to strike [a] similarly situated [juror] of a different race." Blair v. State, 267 Ga. 166, 167(2), 476 S.E.2d 263. The defense struck a white male juror (juror no. 29) because he was an accountant, well dressed, would not have empathy with the accused, and was in an occupation indicating the person is conservative in their thinking. A strike based on a person's employment or marital status facially is race-neutral. O'Neal, supra at 225(1), 482 S.E.2d 478. Unlike O'Neal, supra, however, the record of voir dire in this case when viewed in its totality establishes that the trial court accepted the reason as a race-neutral explanation, under step 2, but affirmatively found, under step 3, that the race-neutral reason was pretextual and that the strike had been exercised in a purposefully discriminatory manner. This finding was made, after examining inter alia the circumstances of two black female jurors, including a female black juror (juror no. 4) who was an accountant (perceived to be a conservative-oriented profession), who had been a victim of both burglary and car theft, and who had a female cousin in jail for possession but opined that was the best thing to happen to her cousin. Compare Blair, supra. The trial court's finding of fact that the strike was exercised in a purposefully discriminatory manner must be affirmed unless clearly erroneous. Smith v. State, 264 Ga. 449, 451(1), 448 S.E.2d 179. The voir dire transcript reveals that the trial court's rulings were not clearly erroneous. ... Ellerbee, supra at 317(7)(b), 450 S.E.2d 443.
3. The trial court did not err as asserted by appellant in admitting in evidence a statement of co-defendant Steele contrary to Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476. The statement was redacted, before being read to the jury, to delete any direct reference to the appellant. The trial court instructed the jury that the statement could only be used against the co-defendant, and it could not be used against appellant and no inference could be drawn therefrom against appellant. " ...
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