Russian Orthodox Convent Novo-Diveevo, Inc. v. Sukharevskaya, 2015–02779

• Decision Date: 28 November 2018
• Docket Number: Index No. 4557/08,2015–02779
• Citation: 166 A.D.3d 1036,91 N.Y.S.3d 101
• Parties: RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CONVENT NOVO–DIVEEVO, INC., Appellant, v. Maria (Lydia) SUKHAREVSKAYA, respondent, et al., Defendant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

166 A.D.3d 1036

91 N.Y.S.3d 101

RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CONVENT NOVO–DIVEEVO, INC., Appellant,

v.Maria (Lydia) SUKHAREVSKAYA, respondent, et al., Defendant.

2015–02779

Index No. 4557/08

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Argued—May 15, 2018

November 28, 2018

Feerick Lynch MacCartney, PLLC, South Nyack, N.Y. (Donald J. Feerick, Jr., and Alak Shah of counsel), for appellant.

Legal Aid Society of Rockland County, Inc., New City, N.Y. (Alexander Bursztein and James K. Riley of counsel), for respondent.

REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., MARK C. DILLON, JEFFREY A. COHEN, COLLEEN D. DUFFY, FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The plaintiff, the Russian Orthodox Convent Novo Diveevo, Inc. (hereinafter the convent), operates a church and convent on its property in Nanuet. The defendant Maria (Lydia) Sukharevskaya (hereinafter the defendant) is a nun who has resided at the convent since 1999.

In or around 2003, the defendant complained to her superiors about sexual misconduct by one of the convent's priests. In or about 2005, the ruling bishops directed the defendant to vacate the convent property. When she refused to do so, an ecclesiastical court in June 2006 disciplined her by making her ineligible to wear religious garb and to receive communion for a two-year period. The defendant continued to complain of sexual harassment by the resident priest. In 2008, an ecclesiastical court permanently defrocked the defendant and, on that basis, disallowed her continued residency at the convent.

In January 2006, the convent commenced summary proceedings in the Justice Court for the Town of Clarkstown to evict the defendant and another similarly situated nun who is now deceased and not a party to this appeal. In May 2008, the convent commenced an action in the Supreme Court, Rockland County, inter alia, for ejectment and to recover damages for use and occupancy against the defendant and the other nun. In September 2008, the Supreme Court consolidated the action with the summary proceedings and thereafter conducted a nonjury trial. The court determined, inter alia, that the defendant had established an equitable defense to her eviction and ejectment. In particular, it determined that the proceedings and findings of the ecclesiastical court were in retaliation for the sexual misconduct allegations. As a result, the court dismissed the summary proceeding and the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant. The convent appeals.

"The First Amendment forbids civil courts from interfering in or determining religious disputes, because there is substantial danger that the state will become entangled in essentially religious controversies or intervene on behalf of groups espousing particular doctrines or beliefs" ( Matter of Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar, Inc. v. Kahana, 9 N.Y.3d 282, 286, 849 N.Y.S.2d 463, 879 N.E.2d 1282 ; see Matter of Ming Tung v. China Buddhist Assn., 124 A.D.3d 13, 18, 996 N.Y.S.2d 236, affd 26 N.Y.3d 1152, 28 N.Y.S.3d 355, 48 N.E.3d 497 ). A court may, however, properly preside over a dispute involving a religious body only when the dispute may be resolved utilizing neutral principles of law (see Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 ; First Presbyt. Church of Schenectady v. United Presbyt. Church in U.S. of Am., 62 N.Y.2d 110, 119–121, 476 N.Y.S.2d 86, 464 N.E.2d 454 ; Matter of Ming Tung v. China Buddhist Assn., 124 A.D.3d at 18, 996 N.Y.S.2d 236 ; Kelley v. Garuda, 36 A.D.3d 593, 595, 827 N.Y.S.2d 293 ).

Here, the summary proceedings for eviction and the action, inter alia, for ejectment are inextricably intertwined with the determinations of the ecclesiastical court, particularly its 2008 determination defrocking the defendant and ordering her to vacate the convent. Therefore, this consolidated action involves review of an ecclesiastical determination that may not be resolved by resort to neutral principles of law (see Matter of Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar, Inc. v. Kahana, 9 N.Y.3d at 286–288, 849 N.Y.S.2d 463, 879 N.E.2d 1282 ; Matter of Ming Tung v. China Buddhist Assn., 124 A.D.3d at 19, 996 N.Y.S.2d 236 ). Moreover, this matter does not involve a purely religious determination requiring this Court to accept the actions of the ecclesiastical court as final and binding (cf. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 ).

Indeed, the resolution of the consolidated action necessarily involves an assessment of the propriety of the defendant's defrockment in light of her allegations of sexual misconduct against a priest. Therefore, the convent's claims are nonjusticiable, as any such resolution of them would involve an impermissible inquiry into religious doctrine or practice (see Matter of Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar, Inc. v. Kahana, 9 N.Y.3d 282, 849 N.Y.S.2d 463, 879 N.E.2d 1282 ; Rodzianko v. Parish of the Russian Orthodox Holy Virgin Protection Church, Inc., 117 A.D.3d 706, 984 N.Y.S.2d 614 ). In Matter of Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar, Inc. v. Kahana, 9 N.Y.3d 282, 849 N.Y.S.2d 463, 879 N.E.2d 1282, two sons, who were the respective heads of separate congregations in Brooklyn and in Monroe, each sought to succeed Grand Rabbi Moses Teitelbaum as leader of the broader Orthodox Jewish Satmar community. After the death of Grand Rabbi Moses Teitelbaum, a bitter feud erupted between supporters of his elder son, Aaron, who was the Chief Rabbi of the Monroe congregation, and supporters of his younger son, Zalman, Chief Rabbi of the Brooklyn congregation. This feud resulted in the Brooklyn congregation splitting into two rival factions. Each faction conducted a separate election, and each sought to have the election favorable to it recognized as legitimate. The petitioners sought to validate the election they favored on the ground that neutral principles of law could be applied to resolve the dispute, including such neutral concepts as election notice and quorum requirements. However, the first of the disputed elections resulted in the designation of Berl Friedman as the congregation's President. The record contained conflicting evidence as to whether Friedman, prior to the election, had earlier been removed and expelled from the congregation by the Grand Rabbi which, in turn, would affect whether Friedman could legitimately be named as its President. A 3–1 majority of this Court, and all but one judge of the Court of Appeals, held that because Friedman's religious standing within the congregation was ecclesiastical in nature, the dispute between the two factions involved more than notice and quorum challenges and, thus, could not be determined on the basis of neutral principles of law. As a result, the matter was not justiciable in the state courts, and the Satmar sect was left to its own devices to internally resolve its leadership issues (see id. at 288, 849 N.Y.S.2d 463, 879 N.E.2d 1282 ). This case highlighted the fact that not all disputes are justiciable. Moreover, there are other types of cases where courts will likewise not get involved in disputes, such as, for example, those involving political questions to be resolved entirely by another branch of government on its own (see Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 ; Matter of Gottlieb v. Duryea, 38 A.D.2d 634, 635, 326 N.Y.S.2d 889, affd 30 N.Y.2d 807, 334 N.Y.S.2d 904, 286 N.E.2d 278 ).

Matter of Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar, Inc. v. Kahana is instructive on the current appeal and is the closest precedent that we have to guide our decision. Both in that case and here, central figures in the parties' dispute were stripped, or allegedly stripped, of religious membership in their congregations. In both cases, whether or not the central figures were properly stripped of their religious memberships directly affected the secular issue before the Supreme Court. In Matter of Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar, Inc. v. Kahana, the issue was whether to recognize the civil validity of an election. Here, the issue is whether to order the evictions/ejectments of the defendant. In the cited case, Berl Friedman's membership status in the Satmar Congregation was an issue that prohibited the state court from resolving an election that would otherwise have been subject to neutral principles of law. Similarly, in this matter, the ecclesiastical issues related to the defendant's suspensions and defrockments should prohibit the state court from resolving the ejectment action that might otherwise have been subject to neutral principles of law. In other words, the various conflicting issues in this matter, which prominently include, but are not limited to, ecclesiastical determinations, are so intertwined with one another that our Court should not be expected to disentangle them.

Cases cited by the dissent to support a contrary conclusion, such as Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151, are not controlling. That case, in particular, did not involve an intertwining of an ecclesiastical determination and neutral principles of law. The circumstances here are different.

If this Court were to engage in a process here of disentangling the ecclesiastical issues from the civil law issues, we would impermissibly be inserting ourselves into matters of an ecclesiastical nature. As the rival factions in Matter of Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar, Inc. v. Kahana were obligated to resolve their election dispute without assistance from the courts, so too here, the convent and the defendant are obligated to resolve the issues surrounding the defendant's defrockment and residence. Accordingly, we affirm the Supreme Court's dismissal of the summary proceeding and the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant and deny the convent's request for court intervention to...