Congregation Yetev Lev Dsatmar v. Kahana

• Decision Date: 20 November 2007
• Docket Number: No. 143.,143.
• Citation: 879 N.E.2d 1282,849 N.Y.S.2d 463,9 N.Y.3d 282
• Parties: In the Matter of CONGREGATION YETEV LEV D'SATMAR, INC., et al., Appellants, v. Jacob (Jeno)(Yaakov) KAHANA et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

879 N.E.2d 1282

9 N.Y.3d 282

849 N.Y.S.2d 463

In the Matter of CONGREGATION YETEV LEV D'SATMAR, INC., et al., Appellants, v. Jacob (Jeno)(Yaakov) KAHANA et al., Respondents.

No. 143.

Court of Appeals of New York.

November 20, 2007.

Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Preston Gates Ellis LLP, New York City, (Gerald A. Novack and Walter P. Loughlin of counsel), Smith, Buss & Jacobs, LLP, Yonkers (Jeffrey D. Buss of counsel), and Thacher Proffitt & Wood LLP, White Plains (Kevin J. Plunkett of counsel), for appellants.

Herrick, Feinstein LLP, New York City (Scott E. Mollen and Paul Rubin of counsel), for respondents.

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OPINION

PIGOTT, J.

The central issue in this appeal is whether resolution of an election controversy between two rival factions of a religious congregation can be achieved through the application of neutral principles of law without judicial intrusion into matters of religious doctrine. Like the trial court and Appellate Division, we conclude that it cannot.

Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar, Inc. is a community of Orthodox Judaism known as Satmar Hasidism located in Brooklyn. The Congregation was founded in 1948 by Grand Rabbi (also referred to as Rebbe) Joel Teitelbaum and formally incorporated in New York. In 1952, bylaws were promulgated setting forth the purpose of the Congregation, the functions of the Grand Rabbi, as well as issues involving membership in the community. The bylaws provided for a board of directors and officers to preside over the Congregation and, among other things, assure compliance with the rules of the Congregation.

In 1974, the Grand Rabbi expanded the Satmar community by establishing a new congregation in Monroe, New York. In

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1981, that congregation, named for him, was incorporated in New York as Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar of Kiryas Joel, Inc.

In 1979, the Grand Rabbi died and was succeeded by his nephew, Moses Teitelbaum. Moses Teitelbaum, now deceased, appointed his elder son, Aaron Teitelbaum, Chief Rabbi of the Monroe Congregation and his younger son, Zalman Leib Teitelbaum, Chief Rabbi of the Brooklyn Congregation. Some time thereafter, a bitter feud erupted between Rabbi Aaron's supporters and Rabbi Zalman's supporters pertaining to who should succeed as Grand Rabbi.¹ As a result, the Brooklyn Congregation split into two rival factions.

Each faction conducted a separate election of the board of directors and officers for the Brooklyn Congregation. The first election, which took place on May 12-13, 2001, resulted in the election of petitioners, with Berl Friedman as president. The second, which took place the same day and is claimed to have been certified by the Grand Rabbi Moses Teitelbaum himself on May 24, 2001, resulted in the election of respondents, with Jacob (Jeno, Jenoe) Kahan as president.

Petitioners brought the instant proceeding pursuant to Not-For-Profit Corporation Law § 618 seeking an order declaring that the respondents' election is null and void and directing that Congregation property be transferred to Berl Friedman. Petitioners claimed that their election resulted in certain members of the Congregation becoming duly elected officers, including Berl Friedman; that respondents illegally attempted to "remove" these duly elected officers and expel Berl Friedman from membership; and that respondents' election violated the bylaws and/or the Religious Corporations Law. Respondents challenged the jurisdiction of Supreme Court, arguing that it should refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the Congregation; and further contended that their election was proper, legal and in accordance with the Congregation's prior practice and bylaws. Respondents disputed petitioners' election, arguing it was a sham election for several reasons, including that Berl Friedman had been expelled from the Congregation by the Grand Rabbi.

Supreme Court declined to make a determination as to the validity of respondents' election, holding that it could not decide

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the election dispute through the application of neutral principles of law because the resolution of the issues would require it to apply ecclesiastical doctrine in violation of the First Amendment. The Appellate Division, with one Justice dissenting, agreed with Supreme Court that "resolution of the parties' dispute would necessarily involve impermissible inquiries into religious doctrine and the Congregation's membership requirements" (31 A.D.3d 541, 543, 820 N.Y.S.2d 62 [2d Dept. 2006]). The Appellate Division subsequently granted leave and certified the following question to us: "Was the decision and order of this court dated July 11, 2006, properly made?" We now affirm.

The First Amendment forbids civil courts from interfering in or determining religious disputes, because there is substantial danger that the state will become entangled in essentially religious controversies or intervene on behalf of groups espousing particular doctrines or beliefs (see Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 [1976]). Civil disputes involving religious parties or institutions may be adjudicated without offending the First Amendment as long as neutral principles of law are the basis for their resolution (see First Presbyt. Church of Schenectady v. United Presbyt. Church in U.S. of Am., 62 N.Y.2d 110, 476 N.Y.S.2d 86, 464 N.E.2d 454 [1984]; Park Slope Jewish Ctr. v. Congregation B'nai Jacob, 90 N.Y.2d 517, 521, 664 N.Y.S.2d 236, 686 N.E.2d 1330 [1997], citing Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 [1979]). The "neutral principles of law" approach requires the court to apply objective, well-established principles of secular law to the issues (First Presbyt. Church, 62 N.Y.2d at 119-120, 476 N.Y.S.2d 86, 464 N.E.2d 454). In doing so, courts may rely upon internal documents, such as a congregation's bylaws, but only if those documents do not require interpretation of ecclesiastical doctrine. Thus, judicial involvement is permitted when the case can be "decided solely upon the application of neutral principles of ... law, without reference to any religious principle" (Avitzur v. Avitzur, 58 N.Y.2d 108, 115, 459 N.Y.S.2d 572, 446 N.E.2d 136 [1983]).

Petitioners argue that this case involves nothing more than notice, quorum or other technical challenges to the respondents' election. At first blush, the arguments raised by the petitioners in their appellate brief to this Court,² do not appear to implicate ecclesiastical issues. Indeed, courts have properly adjudicated

[849 N.Y.S.2d 287]

disputes involving religious elections on neutral principles of law. For example, in Rector, Churchwardens & Vestrymen of Church of Holy Trinity v. Melish, 3 N.Y.2d 476, 168 N.Y.S.2d 952, 146 N.E.2d 685 (1957), after determining that the quorum rules of the Religious Corporations Law, by their terms, did not apply to an Episcopalian church's election of a rector, we held that two meetings held by the church complied with applicable quorum requirements of a church canon. The Appellate Divisions have resolved similar disputes (see Matter of Kaminsky, 251 A.D. 132, 295 N.Y.S. 989 [4th Dept.1937], affd. 277 N.Y. 524, 13 N.E.2d 456 [1938]; Sillah v. Tanvir, 18 A.D.3d 223, 794 N.Y.S.2d 348 [1st Dept. 2005], lv. denied 5 N.Y.3d 711, 804 N.Y.S.2d 35, 837 N.E.2d 734 [2005]; but see Mays v. Burrell, 124 A.D.2d 714, 508 N.Y.S.2d 226 [2d Dept.1986]). These cases were resolved under neutral principles of law pursuant to the court's power to adjudicate under the Religious Corporations Law and/or the Not-For-Profit Corporation Law (see e.g. N-PCL 618, 706). In each of those cases, the courts resolved the election dispute by applying those laws as well as the bylaws or rules of the religious organization.

Here, however, as both Supreme Court and the Appellate Division recognized, the dispute between the two factions involves issues beyond mere notice and quorum challenges, such as whether Berl Friedman had been removed or expelled from the Congregation. Respondents claim that Jacob (Jeno, Jenoe) Kahan succeeded Berl Friedman as president and thus Jacob (Jeno, Jenoe) Kahan had the authority to conduct respondents' election. Specifically, respondents claim that Grand Rabbi Moses Teitelbaum denounced Berl Friedman and another member of his faction for rebelling against the authority of the Grand Rabbi and the Grand Rabbi's son, resulting in their expulsion from the Congregation. Berl Friedman denies being removed from the Congregation and further argues that an elected corporate officer cannot be removed by a spiritual authority such as the Grand Rabbi, which respondents refute.

It is well settled that membership issues such as those that are at the core of this case are an ecclesiastical matter (Park Slope Jewish Ctr. v. Stern, 128 A.D.2d 847, 513 N.Y.S.2d 767 [2d Dept. 1987], appeal

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dismissed 70 N.Y.2d 746, 519 N.Y.S.2d 1032, 514 N.E.2d 390 [1987]; Matter of Kissel v. Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Holy Trinity Church of Yonkers, 103 A.D.2d 830, 478 N.Y.S.2d 68 [2d Dept.1984]). A decision as to whether or not a member is in good standing is binding on the courts when examining the standards of membership requires intrusion into constitutionally protected ecclesiastical matters. Although courts generally have jurisdiction to determine whether a congregation has adhered to its own bylaws in making determinations as to the membership status of individual congregants, here, the Congregation's bylaws condition membership on religious criteria, including whether a congregant follows the "ways of the Torah." Whether Berl Friedman was expelled from membership of the Congregation inevitably calls into question religious issues beyond any membership criteria found in the Congregation's bylaws (Park Slope Jewish Ctr., 128 A.D.2d 847, 513 N.Y.S.2d 767 [1987]; Kissel, 103 A.D.2d 830, 478...