Rutledge v. Barrett

• Decision Date: 07 January 1991
• Docket Number: No. 89-70-I,89-70-I
• Citation: 802 S.W.2d 604
• Parties: Patsy Olene Barrett RUTLEDGE, Petitioner-Appellee, v. James Albert BARRETT, Respondent-Appellant. 802 S.W.2d 604
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 604

802 S.W.2d 604

Patsy Olene Barrett RUTLEDGE, Petitioner-Appellee, v. James Albert BARRETT, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 89-70-I.

802 S.W.2d 604

Supreme Court of Tennessee at Nashville.

Jan. 7, 1991.

Sam E. Wallace, Nashville, for petitioner-appellee.

Joe P. Binkley, Jr., Nashville, for respondent-appellant.

DAUGHTREY, Justice.

OPINION

In this appeal, we are asked to resolve the question we left open in Hoyle v. Wilson 46 S.W.2d 665, 677 (Tenn.1988) (opinion on petition to rehear), that is, whether the 1987 amendment to Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 36-5-101(a)(5) prevents both retroactive modification of child support orders and the interposition of traditional equitable defenses to the enforcement of such orders. We hold that it does and affirm the judgments against the delinquent father entered by the courts below.

I. Factual Background

The facts in this case are sadly typical. The parties were divorced in 1973, and the mother secured custody of their three children, then aged one, four, and eight years. The father was out-of-state at the time of the divorce, and no support order was entered. When he returned to Tennessee in 1975, however, the mother secured a child support order requiring him to pay to the court clerk one-half of his income, up to a maximum of $50.00 per week, for the support of his minor children. He was also ordered to file periodic reports concerning his income.

The father initially made a few payments to the clerk's office. The record indicates that the last payment was made in June of 1975. He exercised his visitation privileges erratically.

The mother and three children subsequently left Nashville and lived in North Carolina for a period of several years. The father contends that he was thus prevented from seeing his children. The mother counters that he made no effort to get in touch with them. After she moved back to Nashville, the mother contacted the children's father, seeking support payments and offering visitation. Again, his performance was erratic, although he did contribute some money directly to the children's mother in the form of money orders. By late 1985 or early 1986, however, all contact between father and children was lost.

In March 1988, the mother filed a petition for contempt in Circuit Court and asked for a judgment for child support arrearages in the amount of $33,555.00. The father counterfiled for contempt, claiming that he had been denied visitation and asking for forgiveness of the arrearages. The trial judge ultimately held that the father (but not the mother) was in contempt of court and ordered him to pay $27,100 in arrearages. That amount took into account a period of approximately two years, from 1975 to 1977, when the father was purportedly unemployed because of a job-related injury. The trial court recognized that if the father had no income during this period of time, he was not responsible for making child support payments under the terms of the 1975 order, which obligated him to pay a percentage of his income rather than a fixed amount of money per week.

On appeal, the father continues to seek modification of the trial court's order, raising various equitable defenses to enforcement such as the doctrine of unclean hands, laches, estoppel, waiver, and acquiescence. He also claims error in the trial court's failure to "pro-rate, both prospectively and as to arrearages, the father's child support obligation according to the emancipation of the two elder children," who had both reached the age of 18 by the time of the 1988 judgment against him.

The latter proposition requires little by way of response and resolution. The trial judge found that as the older two children progressively reached majority, the needs of the remaining minor child(ren) were fully sufficient to require weekly support payments in the amount of $50.00. There is no legal basis to disturb this factual finding. The more significant questions are legal: whether the order is subject to reduction under circumstances of this case, and, if not, whether there are any available defenses to the judgment based upon the equitable doctrines invoked on the father's behalf.

II. Legal Background

Prior to its amendment, Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 36-5-101 permitted modification, but "only upon a specific written finding that the obligor was unable to pay the full amount of such allowance through no intentional fault of his or her own and that the facts of the case require such a modification retroactively in order to meet the ends of justice." T.C.A. Sec. 36-5-101 (Supp.1986) (emphasis added). In 1986, Congress amended 42 U.S.C. Sec. 666 (Supp.1990), which prescribes requirements for "improv[ing the] effectiveness of child support enforcement." The federal statute, as amended, provides that in order to receive federal assistance, each state must utilize procedures which guarantee that a child support payment is:

(A) a judgment by operation of law, with full force, effect, and attributes of a judgment of the State, including the ability to be enforced,

(B) entitled as a judgment to full faith and credit in such State and in any other State, and

(C) not subject to retroactive modification by such State or by any other State.

42 U.S.C. Sec. 666(a)(9) (Supp.1990).

Faced with the possible loss of millions of dollars in federal assistance because of the existing retroactive modification provision in Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 36-5-101, the Tennessee legislature amended that statute in 1987 to track the provisions of the new federal act, as follows:

Any order for child support shall be a judgment entitled to be enforced as any other judgment of a court of this state and shall be entitled to full faith and credit in this state and in any other state. Further, such judgment shall not be subject to modification as to any time period or any amounts due prior to the date that an action for modification is filed and notice of the action has been mailed to the last known address of the opposing parties.

Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 36-5-101(a)(5) (Supp.1989).

The legislative history of this amendment reflects the General Assembly's clear understanding that as a result of legislative action to bring Tennessee law in line with the federal requirement, the courts of this state would lose their ability to forgive past arrearages in child support cases (but not the discretion to determine how and when the past due amounts were to be paid). Tennessee House Judiciary Committee hearing, March 3, 1987; Tennessee Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, March 3, 1987.

The new amendment became effective March 27, 1987. It has since been held to prevent the reduction of child support arrearages in several unreported decisions of the Tennessee Court of Appeals. We agree with these rulings. The language of the 1987 amendment could not be more clear. Retroactive modifications are plainly unauthorized; prospective modifications can be made, but only after...