Rutledge v. Smart Ala., LLC (Ex parte Güdel AG)
Citation | 183 So.3d 147 |
Decision Date | 29 May 2015 |
Docket Number | 1131341. |
Parties | Ex parte GÜDEL AG. (In re Robert Rutledge and Cindy Rutledge v. Smart Alabama, LLC, et al.) |
Court | Supreme Court of Alabama |
Ed R. Haden and R. Bruce Barze, Jr., of Balch & Bingham LLP, Birmingham; and G. Lane Knight of Balch & Bingham LLP, Montgomery, for petitioner.
D. Michael Andrews of Beasley, Allen, Crow, Methvin, Portis & Miles, P.C., Montgomery; and C. Richard Hill, Jr., of Fritz & Hill, LLC, Montgomery, for respondents.
Güdel AG ("Güdel"), one of several defendants below, petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Crenshaw Circuit Court to vacate its order denying Güdel's motion to dismiss the personal-injury claims filed against it by Robert Rutledge ("Robert") and Cindy Rutledge ("Cindy") and to enter an order dismissing the Rutledges' claims on the basis of a lack of in personam jurisdiction. We grant the petition and issue the writ.
In February 2013, Robert sued Smart Alabama, LLC ("SAL"), an automotive-parts manufacturer located in Crenshaw County, seeking to recover worker's compensation benefits in connection with an alleged work-related injury Robert suffered in November 2011 while in SAL's employ. More specifically, Robert's complaint alleged that, while he was attempting to enter a doorway on a stamping-press unit the cable on the overhead, roll-up door to the unit broke, and Robert was hit by the door and was knocked to the floor. The door apparently came down on Robert's leg, resulting in a crushing injury and, ultimately, an amputation.
In November 2013, Robert amended his original complaint to add a count pursuant to Alabama's Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine as well as negligence and wantonness claims. In addition, the amended complaint added both Hyundai WIA ("Hyundai") and Güdel, as well as several fictitiously named entities, as defendants.1 The amended complaint alleged that Güdel, a foreign corporation headquartered in Switzerland, "designed, built, manufactured, tested and sold [the] subject machine/equipment that is the subject matter of [the Rutledges'] lawsuit."
Güdel, in February 2014, moved, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., to dismiss the claims against it for lack of personal jurisdiction on grounds that Güdel was subject to neither general nor specific jurisdiction in Alabama. See Elliott v. Van Kleef, 830 So.2d 726, 730 (Ala.2002) . Güdel's motion alleged that it did not, as the Rutledges' contended, manufacture the subject stamping-press unit. Instead, Güdel asserted that it merely "supplied to Hyundai ... a component system of the machine," namely "a [‘Transfer Automation System,’ to serve as the] control system for the conveyor system running through the press,"2 which was wholly designed and manufactured in Switzerland before being sold to Hyundai, a Korean entity. Güdel's motion was further supported by affidavit testimony and authority aimed at establishing the limited extent of Güdel's contacts with Alabama, including, but not limited to, testimony indicating that it had not conducted any systematic and/or continuous business activities in Alabama; that it was not licensed to do business in Alabama; and that it had no registered agent for service of process in Alabama. Thus, Güdel contended, to be subjected to suit in Alabama violated "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). See, e.g., Frye v. Smith, 67 So.3d 882, 892 (Ala.2011) .
In its motion, Güdel did admit that, after shipping the conveyor system to SAL pursuant to Hyundai's instructions, it "provided assistance to Hyundai" with respect to the installation of the conveyor system, including sending a representative to the SAL facility to assist in installation of the system and to train SAL employees with regard to its operation; however, Güdel denied participating in any way with the installation of the overhead door by which Robert was allegedly injured. The accompanying affidavit testimony asserted that Güdel's automation system is in no way connected to nor does it control the operation of the cable and overhead door that Robert alleges caused his injury. Thus, Güdel contended, it both lacked the systematic and continuous contacts with Alabama that would support a finding of general jurisdiction and, because its product indisputably did not cause Robert's injuries, there was no basis for a finding of specific jurisdiction.
In opposition to Güdel's motion, the Rutledges countered that Güdel, which both shipped parts directly to Alabama and sent employees to install and train in the use of those parts, had minimum sufficient contacts to support personal jurisdiction in Alabama, given that its contacts with the State were, according to the Rutledges, directly "related to the action against Güdel." Alternatively, the Rutledges asserted that Güdel's motion was "premature" in that additional "jurisdictional discovery" was necessary, and that, assuming that discovery "determine[d] that Güdel['s] involvement [was] not related to [Robert's] injuries," the Rutledges would voluntarily dismiss Güdel as a defendant to the action. In an order, which did not include the findings on which the ruling was based, the trial court denied Güdel's motion to dismiss. In response, Güdel filed this petition for a writ of mandamus.
Ex parte Covington Pike Dodge, Inc., 904 So.2d 226, 229–30 (Ala.2004) (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
In its petition, Güdel argues that the trial court erred in concluding that it had jurisdiction over Güdel. More specifically, Güdel, citing Ex parte Excelsior Financial, Inc., 42 So.3d 96 (Ala.2010), contends that the Rutledges failed to refute Güdel's prima facie demonstration that, contrary to the allegations in the Rutledges' complaint, Güdel does not have sufficient contacts with the State of Alabama to subject it to the jurisdiction of the trial court. We agree.
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Water Works & Sewer Bd. of the Town of Ctr. v. 3M Co. (In re Aladdin Mfg. Corp.)
... 305 So.3d 214 EX PARTE ALADDIN MANUFACTURING CORPORATION et al. (In re: The Water ... " "In considering a Rule 12(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to dismiss for want of personal ... ...
-
Dynamic Civil Solutions, Inc. v. ServisFirst Bank (Ex parte TD Bank US Holding Co.)
... ... Ex parte Bruner, 749 So. 2d 437, 439 (Ala. 1999)." Ex parte McInnis, 820 So. 2d 795, 798 (Ala. 2001)." [A] petition ... ...
-
Obtaining Personal Jurisdiction: a Deceptively Complex Stage of Litigation
...lack of personal jurisdiction even though plaintiff had requested, but had not received, jurisdictional discovery. In Ex parte Gudel AG, 183 So. 3d 147 (Ala. 2015), the plaintiff was injured at an automotive-parts-manufacturing plant in Crenshaw County when the cable of an overhead, roll-up......