Rutledge v. State

• Decision Date: 24 March 1966
• Docket Number: No. 8483,8483
• Parties: William L. RUTLEDGE and Velora A. Rutledge, husband and wife, Appellants, v. The STATE of Arizona, Appellee.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Page 467

412 P.2d 467

100 Ariz. 174

William L. RUTLEDGE and Velora A. Rutledge, husband and wife, Appellants, v. The STATE of Arizona, Appellee.

No. 8483.

Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc.

March 24, 1966.

Rehearing Denied April 19, 1966.

Dunseath, Stubbs & Burch, Tucson, for appellants.

Darrell F. Smith, Atty. Gen., Robert W. Pickrell, former Atty. Gen., Stanley Z. Goodfarb, Sp. Asst. to Atty. Gen., for appellee.

McFARLAND, Justice:

William L. Rutledge and Velora A. Rutledge, appellants, hereinafter designated plaintiffs, filed a complaint in inverse eminent domain seeking compensation for loss of access to their land in Superior Court, Pima County, against the State of Arizona on November 26, 1962. Plaintiffs appeal from the granting of a motion for summary judgment in favor of the state.

Plaintiffs are the owners of Lot 14, Block 9, Sunset Villa Addition, Tucson, Arizona. On June 8, 1954, the state completed construction of a portion of a controlled-access freeway. The northeast edge of the freeway right-of-way is immediately adjacent to the southwest corner of plaintiffs' land, as indicated by the following diagram of the property and its relationship to adjacent streets and the freeway:

Thirty-ninth Street going west was intercepted and blocked by the freeway, as shown by the following aerial photograph, and between Ninth and Eighth Avenues dedicated but not developed. Ninth Avenue was also dedicated but not developed. The freeway has thus prevented plaintiffs from going west. Plaintiffs' only route from their property, therefore, is either over the undeveloped portion of Ninth Avenue, or east on the undeveloped portion of Thirty-ninth Street. Ninth Avenue is eighty feet from their property. Plaintiffs' property is outlined in white in the photograph, showing its relationship to the adjacent physical features and the freeway.

The summary judgment of the lower court provided as follows:

'* * * (T)hat Defendant's motion for summary judgment in favor of Defendant is granted for the reason that Plaintiffs' cause of action arose on or before June 8, 1954 but their Complaint was not filed until November 26, 1962 so that there being no allegation of direct physical invasion of Plaintiff's property, Plaintiffs' cause of action is barred by A.R.S. Sec. 18--158.'

Section 18--158, Arizona Revised Statutes, provides:

'Actions against state concerning lands taken or damaged in construction of highway; limitation

'An action brought to recover possession of or to clear title to real property claimed by the state, or any legal subdivision thereof, as a public highway, or an action brought to recover compensation or damage for property taken or damaged in or for the construction of a public highway, shall be commenced within two years after the cause of action has accrued and not afterwards.'

It is the contention of plaintiffs that A.R.S. § 18--158 is in conflict with Article II, Section 17, of the Arizona Constitution, A.R.S., and is therefore unconstitutional.

' § 17. Eminent domain; just compensation for private property taken; public use as judicial question

'Section 17. * * * No private property shall be taken or damaged for public * * * use without just compensation having first been made, or paid into court for the owner, and no right of way shall be appropriated to the use of any corporation other than municipal, until full compensation therefor be first made in money, or ascertained and paid into court for the owner, * * *.'

The question presented is whether the alleged damage to plaintiffs' property was such as would come within the constitutional provision requiring that '(n)o private property shall be taken or damaged for public * * * use without just compensation having first been made, or paid into court for the owner * * *.' It is the contention of plaintiffs that the building of the highway in question constituted a taking of their easement of ingress and egress. It is evident from the diagram and aerial photograph of the property that, since plaintiffs could not proceed west on Thirty -ninth Street because of the freeway, either Ninth Avenue would have to be developed by the plaintiffs or the City of Tucson north to Thirty-eighth Street, or Thirty-ninth Street east to Eighth Avenue to permit them to go in and out of their property on a public thoroughfare.

We held, in State ex rel. Morrison v. Thelberg, 87 Ariz. 318, 350 P.2d 988, in overruling our previous decision in In re Forsstrom, 44 Ariz. 472, 38 P.2d 878, that damage to the easement of an owner of property abutting a public highway is compensable:

'* * * The rule to the contrary, supported by the weight of authority, is based upon the fact that an abutting propery owner to a highway has an easement of ingress and egress to and from his property which constitutes a property right. Our State Constitution, Art. 2 § 17, A.R.S., prohibits the taking or damaging of private property for public use without just compensation. It follows that the State can neither take nor damage said easement of ingress or egress of an abutting property owner without just compensation.' 87 Ariz. at 324, 350 P.2d at 991.

It will be noted, in the instant case, that the right of ingress and egress on Thirty-Ninth Street, which plaintiffs' property abuts, was not taken or damaged. There was no physical invasion of plaintiffs' property. We have held there is no compensable damage to an abutting property owner resulting from limitation of the direction of traffic flow to one way. Rayburn v. State, 93 Ariz. 54, 378 P.2d 496. Assuming, without deciding that there was damage, it was incidental to the construction of the freeway. A constitutional provision such as Article II, § 17, does not contemplate damage incidental to the building of a highway where there is no physical invasion of the plaintiffs' property. Other states have made distinctions under similar constitutional provisions where there is no direct physical invasion of the property. Forsythe v. City of South St. Paul, 177 Minn. 565, 225 N.W. 816. Any other interpretation would require the state to anticipate any and all damages that might indirectly occur to property and the payment of money in court before a highway could be constructed. For the reason the state cannot anticipate all claims for such damage that might indirectly occur from the building of a highway, the legislature passed A.R.S. § 18--158, which placed a 2-year limitation for commencement of suit for recovery of such damages. The state, in answer to plaintiffs' contentions, contends that A.R.S. § 18--158 is an adverse-possession statute. However, because there was no allegation of direct physical invasion of plaintiffs' property, the lower court held the action was barred by A.R.S. § 18--158, in effect holding that the allegation was that of incidental damage rather than a physical invasion of plaintiffs' property rights.

Plaintiffs contend that A.R.S....