Ryan v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co.
| Decision Date | 02 October 1972 |
| Citation | 485 S.W.2d 548 |
| Parties | Edward M. RYAN, Jr., Appellant, v. LUMBERMEN'S MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY, Appellee. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Wendal D. Jackson, Slaughter & Jackson, Bristol, for appellant.
J. Paul Coleman, Simmonds, Herndon, Johnson & Coleman, Johnson, City, for appellee.
This is a workmen's compensation case. The plaintiff, Edward M. Ryan, Jr., brought suit after the one year Statute of Limitations had run, alleging that the defendant was estopped from denying the claim. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss; the Chancellor sustained the motion, and the plaintiff has appealed.
The question for the Court to decide is whether or not under the facts the defendant is estopped from asserting the Statute of Limitations as a defense.
For the purpose of this appeal it may be conceded that on February 25, 1970, the plaintiff was seriously injured in an automobile accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with Radio Station WFHG, the defendant's insured. The accident occurred in Tennessee, where the plaintiff resided, and where he regularly performed part of his duties as a newscaster. Radio Station WFHG is located in Bristol, Virginia, where the contract of hire between the plaintiff and the station was made.
About six weeks after the accident, the plaintiff was contacted by the defendant's claims adjuster who informed him that his claim for workmen's compensation would be paid, but that there was a question as to whether payment would be made under the laws of Virginia or Tennessee.
Some six months folllowing the accident, however, the plaintiff received the following letter from Mr. J. L. Logan, the area claims manager for the defendant.
Bluff City, Tennessee
Dear Mr. Ryan:
We have now reached a decision regarding your workmen's compensation claim. After carefully considering all the facts and the pertinent law, it is our conclusion that your claim would not be compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Law of Tennessee or Virginia.
Since we are unable to accept liability in this case, we are returning to you the medical bills previously submitted.
Yours very truly,
LUMBERMENS MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY
/s/ J. L. Logan
Branch Office Claim Manager.'
Upon the request of the plaintiff's wife, another letter dated November 11, 1970, was sent by Mr. Logan to the plaintiff.
1402 Charles Drive
Knoxville, Tennessee 37918
Re: File 503--C--6794--X D/A 2--25--70
Dear Mr. Ryan:
This will supplement my letter of September 3 in which your workmen's compensation was denied.
One question involved in your claim is whether you were in the course of your employment at the time of the automobile accident.
Another question concerns jurisdiction and involves conflicting laws of Virginia and Tennessee. You were a Tennessee resident injured in a Tennessee accident while allegedly in the course of employment for a Virginia employer with the contract of employment being made in Virginia. The Workmen's Compensation Law of Virginia does not cover out of state accidents unless the employee resides in Virginia, therefore the Industrial Commission of Virginia declined to accept jurisdiction.
Tennessee would not accept jurisdiction unless the employment contract was made in Tennessee which unfortunately leaves you in legal vacuum between the two states.
Yours very truly,
LUMBERMENS MUTUAL CASUALTY CO.
/s/ J. L. Logan
Branch Office Claim Manager.'
On August 9, 1971, the plaintiff instituted this action for workmen's compensation benefits. By his complaint the plaintiff admitted that more than one year had passed since the date of his accident, but contended that the defendant was
'Estopped from pleading or setting up the statute of limitations as a bar in this case by virtue of the fact that defendant through its agents and employees perpetrated fraud upon the plaintiff and so materially misled him and gratuitously misadvised him as to the law that he was thereby induced not to file a claim or to take other legal action to toll the running of the statute of limitations.'
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the action, relying on the statute of limitations. By stipulation of the parties, the Chancellor heard evidence bearing on the question of estoppel, and then rendered his judgment sustaining the motion to dismiss.
The only substantial question raised on this appeal is whether the representation made by Mr. Logan that 'Tennessee would not accept jurisdiction' of the plaintiff's case is sufficient to form the basis of an equitable estoppel. It is entirely clear that any representation that the plaintiff's claim would be paid made prior to the letter of September 3, 1970, could have no such effect, because at that time the plaintiff know that the defendant was denying liability, and almost six months remained within which his action might have been brought. We also need not consider the effect, if any, of Mr. Logan's statement concerning the Virginia Workmen's Compensation Law and the action of its Industrial Commission, because there is nothing in the record to show that it is false.
It is probably impossible to frame a rigid definition of the doctrine of equitable estoppel because Saylor v. Trotter, 148 Tenn. 359, 367, 255 S.W. 590, 593 (1928), Nevertheless, the general elements of an equitable estoppel have been stated, and a fair example of such a statement is that found in 31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 67 at 402:
'In order to constitute an equitable estoppel, estoppel by conduct, or estoppel in pais there must exist a false representation or concealment of material facts; it must have been made with knowledge, actual or constructive, of the facts; the party to whom it was made must have been without knowledge or the means of knowledge of the real facts; it must have been made with the intention that it should be acted on; and the party to whom it was made must have relied on or acted on it to his prejudice.'
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