Ryan v. State

• Decision Date: 19 May 1922
• Citation: 83 Fla. 610,92 So. 571
• Parties: RYAN v. STATE.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

92 So. 571

83 Fla. 610

RYAN v. STATE.

Florida Supreme Court

May 19, 1922

Rehearing Denied June 22, 1922.

Error to Circuit Court, Suwannee County; C. L. Wilson, Judge.

Willie Ryan, alias Bobbie Ryan, was convicted of murder, and a sentence of death imposed, and he brings error.

Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Premeditation may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Upon the trial of an indictment for murder in the first degree, the character of the homicide and the element of premeditation may be proved by circumstantial evidence; the jury being privileged to infer the existence of premeditation and the unlawful character of the homicide from the evidence submitted as they may infer the existence of any other material element in a criminal charge.

Accused's conduct at or about time of offense admissible. The conduct of the accused at or about the time the offense is alleged to have been committed may go in evidence to the jury as one means of establishing the fact and existence of his guilt.

Criminal assault by accused upon third person a few moments after alleged homicide held admissible as res gestae. A criminal assault made by the accused upon a third person a few minutes after the alleged homicide is admissible as a part of the res gestae when it appears that the accused regarded such third person as being the instigator of the difficulty resulting in the homicide, and the second assault was intimately and directly connected in his mind with the crime for which the accused was on trial.

Evidence of other crime is admissible to show identity, motive intent, and common scheme. Any evidence tending to throw light upon the character of the act under investigation is admissible, such as motive, intent, absence of mistake, and common scheme embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other and identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial.

Objection to evidence as irrelevant and immaterial is too general unless evidence inadmissible for any purpose. Objection to the introduction of evidence upon the ground that it is irrelevant and immaterial is so general in character that it will not be considered unless it be made to appear that the evidence sought to be introduced is inadmissible for any purpose.

COUNSEL

J. L. Blackwell and A. Lee Humphreys, both of Live Oak, for plaintiff in error.

Rivers Buford, Atty. Gen., and Marvin C. McIntosh, Asst. Atty. Gen for the State.

OPINION

ELLIS J.

The plaintiff in error was convicted in the circuit court for Suwannee county of the crime of murder in the first degree. The offense was alleged to have been committed in September, 1921. The person killed was Gertrude Ryan, wife of Willie, alias Bobbie, Ryan. There was no recommendation to mercy by the jury and sentence of death was imposed. The judgment is sought to be reversed upon writ of error.

There are four assignments of error, two of which only are discussed. They attack the propriety of the admission in evidence of an account of a difficulty between the accused and his wife which occurred about two weeks before the homicide, and the conduct of the accused a few minutes after the homicide, in which he made a murderous attack with a pistol upon his deceased wife's second cousin, Alberta Adams, at whose house the deceased woman frequently visited.

During the trial the defendant in the court below testified in his own behalf. His account of the transaction is not a denial of the homicide, but an admission of it, and contains both the elements of accident and self-defense. The substance of his statement was that his wife was dissatisfied about money matters; that he gave her $12 after asking her what she did with the $60 she had taken over to Alberta Adams' house; that his wife left the house in a few moments, went to Alberta Adams' house, and returned with a pistol in her hand. He succeeded in getting away from her and went on to church, but, being late, he went on to the house of some friend, returning home about 10 o'clock. When he arrived home his wife renewed the attack, following him into the room where he had taken refuge behind a door. She fired at him 'three times from the back porch.' Finally he 'kinder got up from behind the door and caught her, and in the scuffle the pistol fired off and shot her. It hit on the side of the head.' That wound produced her death.

There was evidence from which the jury might reasonably have inferred that the defendant's account of the transaction was more or less of a fabrication. As, for instance, the shooting occurred after 11 o'clock; the woman was in her nightdress. After the shooting the defendant went to Alberta Adams' house and inquired if his wife was there. He was seen to leave his house where the killing occurred soon after the shooting and go to Alberta Adams' house and then return to his own. The reports of the pistol shots occurred in different sequence to that described by the defendant, and his statement to the sheriff after the arrest was different from the one made as a witness in his own behalf in several important details.

There were no witnesses to the transaction. Whether the homicide was an unlawful one and perpetrated by the defendant from a premeditated design to effect the death of his wife were facts the burden of proving which was upon the state, and circumstantial evidence the only medium of proof available.

The character of the homicide and the element of premeditation may be proved by circumstantial evidence; the jury being privileged to infer the existence of premeditation and the unlawful character of the homicide from the evidence submitted as they may infer the existence of any other material element in a criminal charge. See Lovett v. State, 30 Fla. 142, 11 So. 550, 17 L. R. A. 705; Barnhill v. State, 56 Fla. 16, 48 So. 251; Keigans v. State, 52 Fla. 57, 41 So. 886; Miller v. State, 75 Fla. 136, 77 So. 669, L. R. A. 1918C, 562; Dukes v. State, 14 Fla. 499; Robinson v. State, 69 Fla. 521, 68 So. 649, L. R. A. 1915E, 1215, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 506; 6 Ency. Evidence, p. 691.

Three witnesses, Alberta Adams, Francis Davis, and Anna Ford, each testified over defendant's objection that a few minutes after the shooting the defendant came to Alberta Adams' house and attempted to kill her by shooting her with a pistol. The objection made was that the evidence was 'irrelevant and immaterial,' 'not part of the res gestae,' and too 'remote to be a part of the main altercation.' These objections were overruled, and exception in each case taken. They were all embraced in and made the subject of the third assignment of error.

Alberta Adams, the first of the three who was called, testified without objection that she heard the pistol shots, went to her window, and called Gertrude, the woman who was killed; that Gertrude did not answer, and the witness asked her husband and another person to go to town and get the sheriff. She then went on the porch, and in about 10 minutes the defendant came to her house and inquired if Gertrude was there. The witness asked who he was, and he replied, 'Willie Ryan.' Thereupon Alberta told him that he knew Gertrude was not there, and then asked him who was doing the shooting at his house? Ryan did not reply, but went away. In a very short time he came back and asked the witness if her husband, Math Adams, was there. She first replied that he was not; then, to contradict the impression made by that answer, told Ryan that she 'would see' whether her husband had gone. The defendant then said she would do as well and 'came on inside the gate with his gun in his hand.' She arose to go in the house, and before she could shut the door he was 'standing right at the door.' At this point defendant's counsel objected to the witness testifying to any assault upon her. The objection was overruled, and the witness continued:

'I reached in and try to slam the door shut, and he stood right there and looked at me and said, 'G----- D----- you, I am going to kill every son of bitch of you that is big enough to die.' Then I taken a nervous attack. He shot right through the curtains into the next room and the shots went in the wall, and then he left and went that way.'

This witness received a wound over the left eye and temple.

Counsel point out that the defendant did not have the pistol when he called at the house of the Adams woman the first time, and therefore whatever caused him to have the trouble with Alberta must have arisen after the first trip. It is contended that in order for the defendant's act after the homicide to be admissible in evidence against him it should have been spontaneous, and not the result of deliberate design. The case of Stinson v. State, 76 Fla. 421, 80 So. 506, is relied upon in support of that proposition. The case is not authority for such a proposition. Stinson was being tried for the murder of Prevatt, and it was sought to show what Stinson said immediately after he had shot Prevatt tending to exculpate him. What he said constituted a self-serving declaration. The trial court excluded the evidence, and this court held the ruling to be correct.

The objection made in this case was that the evidence was immaterial, not part of the res gestae, and too remote. It was admissible as a part of the res gestae and as tending to show the defendant's state of mind shortly after he had killed his wife, and the intent with which the act was done. It was admitted as tending to show a criminal intent in killing his wife, malice, and premeditation. The conduct of the accused at or about the time the offense is alleged to have been committed may go in evidence to the jury as one means of establishing...