Ryan v. State

• Decision Date: 20 December 2011
• Docket Number: No. 112067.,112067.
• Citation: 2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 21477,35 Misc.3d 260,939 N.Y.S.2d 266
• Parties: Joseph W.P. RYAN, Claimant, v. The STATE of New York and The Hudson River–Black River Regulating District, Defendant.
• Court: New York Court of Claims

2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 21477

35 Misc.3d 260

939 N.Y.S.2d 266

Joseph W.P. RYAN, Claimant,

v.The STATE of New York and The Hudson River–Black River Regulating District, Defendant.

No. 112067.

Court of Claims of New York.

Dec. 20, 2011.

Law Office Of Allen R. Day, LLC, by Allen R. Day, Esq., for Claimant.

Hon. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New York by G. Lawrence Dillon, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, for Defendant.

GLEN T. BRUENING, J.

Claimant commenced this action seeking money damages for personal injuries he sustained on March 13, 2005 when he was injured while snowmobiling on the Great Sacandaga Lake (hereinafter Reservoir). Defendants move this Court for an order pursuant to CPLR 3212 granting them summary judgment dismissing the Claim on the grounds that the State of New York is not a proper Defendant in this proceeding and that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider money damage claims against the Hudson River–Black River Regulating District (hereinafter District). In the alternative, Defendants contend that Claimant is barred from recovering damages based on the application of General Obligations Law § 9–103, the doctrine of assumption of the risk, and because it had no prior notice of any unsafe condition. Claimant opposes the motion in its entirety.

The facts of the accident are not in dispute. On March 13, 2005, at approximately 2:40 P.M., Claimant was operating a snowmobile owned by and in the presence of his friend, Chris Spencer, approximately 200 feet north of Sand Island on the Reservoir, located in the Town of Broadalbin and County of Fulton. Claimant was injured when, while operating the snowmobile at approximately 55 miles per hour, he hit a three-foot high ice heave and was thrown off the snowmobile, landing on the ice. Claimant sustained, among other injuries, a fractured pelvis.

There is no dispute that the State of New York owns the land encircling the Reservoir up to a certain water level ( see Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Hudson River–Black River Regulating Dist., 2010 WL 1838982, 1 [N.D.N.Y. 2010] ). However, Defendants contend that since that part of the Reservoir where Claimant sustained his injuries is maintained by the District, the State of New York is not a proper Defendant in this action and, as a result, this Court lacks jurisdiction. In opposition to Defendant's motion, Claimant submits that the State of New York owns the water where the accident occurred and that the District created the dangerous condition by reducing the Reservoir's water level after the surface had frozen. Claimant argues that the District is an agency of the State of New York, subject to the control and direction of the State or, in the alternative, that the District's functions are so closely linked with the State as to be essentially the State itself. In support of this contention, Claimant relies on the District's enabling legislation which, in part, provides the New York State Comptroller and the Department of Environmental Conservation (hereinafter DEC) with oversight of a river regulating district's creation, operations and finances. With respect to the merits of the Claim, Claimant argues that he cannot assume the risks where, as alleged here, the hazard was concealed. Claimant further contends that Defendants are not entitled to immunity from liability based on General Obligations law § 9–103. Finally, Claimant contends that a determination granting Defendants summary judgment is premature since discovery is not complete. The Court will first address the jurisdictional issue which is potentially dispositive of this matter.

Court of Claims Act § 8 provides, in relevant part:

The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and action and hereby assumes liability and consents to have the same determined in accordance with the same rules of law as applied to actions in the supreme court against individuals or corporations, provided the claimant complies with the limitations of this article

( see also Court of Claims Act § 9[2] ).

Accordingly, lawsuits for money damages are permitted against “the State itself, or actions naming State agencies or officials as defendants, where the action is, in reality, one against the State—i.e., where the State is the real party in interest” ( Morell v. Balasubramanian, 70 N.Y.2d 297, 300, 520 N.Y.S.2d 530, 514 N.E.2d 1101 [1987] ). However, such lawsuits must be litigated in the Court of Claims ( see id.; Easley v. New York State Thruway Auth., 1 N.Y.2d 374, 376–77, 153 N.Y.S.2d 28, 135 N.E.2d 572 [1956]; Court of Claims Act §§ 8 and 9[2] ).

The District was created in 1959 by legislation that combined the then-existing Hudson River and Black River Regulating Districts ( see Environmental Conservation Law §§ 15–2137). The District is a “public corporation” (Environmental Conservation Law § 15–2103[1] ) charged with the construction, maintenance and operation of reservoirs and appurtenant facilities in the Hudson and Black River basins for the purpose of regulating the flow of those rivers “when required by the public welfare, including public health and safety” (Environmental Conservation Law § 15–2103[1]; see Environmental Conservation Law §§ 15–2109[3]; 15–2139[2]; Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. State of New York, 300 A.D.2d 949, 950, 753 N.Y.S.2d 541 [3d Dept. 2002] ). Commonly, a legislatively created public corporation, such as the District, would be devised, in theory, to be “self-supporting, able to meet debt obligations through revenues obtained from its own valuable assets, such as fares and user fees. Such public benefit corporations would separate their administrative and fiscal functions from those of the State [citation omitted] to protect the State from liability and enable public projects to be carried on free from restrictions otherwise applicable' ” ( Schulz v. State of New York, 84 N.Y.2d 231, 244, 616 N.Y.S.2d 343, 639 N.E.2d 1140 [1994], cert. denied 513 U.S. 1127, 115 S.Ct. 936, 130 L.Ed.2d 881 [1995], quoting Matter of Plumbing, Heating, Piping & A.C. Contrs. Assn. v. New York State Thruway Auth., 5 N.Y.2d 420, 423, 185 N.Y.S.2d 534, 158 N.E.2d 238 [1959]; see also Bordeleau v. State of New York, 18 N.Y.3d 305, 313–14, 937 N.Y.S.2d 126, 960 N.E.2d 917 [2011] ).

In addition to hearing cases against the State itself pursuant to Court of Claims Act §§ 8 and 9(2), by statute, the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction of tort and contract claims against the State Thruway Authority ( see Public Authorities Law § 361–b), exclusive jurisdiction of claims for property damage or for personal injury arising out of the operation by the New York State Olympic Regional Development Authority of any participating Olympic facility owned by the state or of the Gore mountain ski center ( see Public Authorities Law § 2622[4] ), exclusive jurisdiction of tort and contract claims against the former Jones Beach State Parkway Authority ( see Public Authorities Law § 163–a), and exclusive jurisdiction of tort and contract claims against the former Bethpage Park Authority ( see Public Authorities Law § 212–a). However, in other instances, a public corporation's enabling legislation is silent as to whether the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction of certain actions against it ( see e.g. Public Authorities Law § 540 [New York State Bridge Authority]; Public Authorities Law § 1691 [New York State Dormitory Authority]; Public Authorities Law § 1831–a [New York Job Development Authority] ). One such instance was addressed by the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, in Cole v. State of New York, 64 A.D.2d 1023, 1023, 409 N.Y.S.2d 306 [4th Dept. 1978], where Claimant sought permission to file a late Claim in the Court of Claims against the Power Authority of the State of New York, a public corporation ( see Public Authorities Law § 1002 [1] ), alleging injuries arising out of Claimant's use of a snowmobile on property claimed to be maintained by the Authority. The Appellate Division, in modifying the Court of Claims decision, held that based on the absence of any language in the enabling legislation, the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims does not encompass a suit sounding in tort against the Authority ( see id.; Public Authorities Law § 1017 [added L. 1990, c. 804, § 9, compelling compliance with the commencement requirements of General Municipal Law § 50–e for actions founded upon tort]; compare Public Authorities Law § 1007 [10] [Court of Claims has jurisdiction over appropriation matters involving the Power Authority of the State of New York]; see also Gembala v. Audobon Assn., 97 A.D.2d 345, 347, 469 N.Y.S.2d 502 [4th Dept. 1983] ).

In other cases, courts have undertaken an analysis of the public corporation's functions and enabling legislation to determine whether the business of the corporation “is so closely linked with State functions as to be essentially the State itself” ( Belscher v. New York State Teachers' Retirement Sys., 45 A.D.2d 206, 208, 357 N.Y.S.2d 241 [4th Dept. 1974] ). For example, in Story House Corp. v. State of N.Y. Job Dev. Auth., 37 A.D.2d 345, 349, 325 N.Y.S.2d 659 [3d Dept. 1971], affd. 31 N.Y.2d 942, 340 N.Y.S.2d 929, 293 N.E.2d 97 [1972], an action commenced in Supreme Court regarding the alleged refusal of the New York Job Development Authority to disburse certain loan proceeds, the Appellate Division, Third Department, held that the Court of Claims did not have exclusive jurisdiction over the Authority. The Court concluded that “[t]he functions—which seem to be the fundamental test in deciding jurisdiction—of this Authority are of such an economic and financial nature and not so closely allied with the State itself as to meet the test that jurisdiction over the Authority attaches to the Supreme Court” ( id., at 349, 325 N.Y.S.2d 659 [emphasis added]; see also Pantess v. Saratoga Springs Auth., 255 App.Div. 426, 429, 8 N.Y.S.2d 103 [3d Dept. 1938] [The Court of...