Rybicki v. State Bd. of Elections of State of Ill.
| Decision Date | 27 April 1984 |
| Docket Number | 81 C 6052 and 81 C 6093.,No. 81 C 6030,81 C 6030 |
| Citation | 584 F. Supp. 849 |
| Parties | Chester J. RYBICKI, et al., Plaintiffs, v. The STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS OF the STATE OF ILLINOIS, et al., Defendants. Miguel DelVALLE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. The STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS OF the STATE OF ILLINOIS, et al., Defendants. Bruce CROSBY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. The STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS OF the STATE OF ILLINOIS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Thomas P. Sullivan, Jeffrey D. Colman, Jenner & Block, Carol Moseley Braun, Richard H. Newhouse, Jr., Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff Crosby.
Virginia Martinez, Raymond G. Romero, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Chicago, Ill., Vilma S. Martinez, Morris J. Baller, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, San Francisco, Cal., Joaquin Avila, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, San Antonio, Tex., Cesar A. Perales, Gabriel Kaimowitz, Lizette A. Cantres, Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Educational Fund, New York City, for plaintiff DelVallee.
Jerris Leonard, Ronald A. Goodbread, Kathleen Heenan, Jerris Leonard & Associates, P.C., Washington, D.C., Mayer, Brown & Platt, and Justin A. Stanley, Roger W. Barrett, Douglas A. Poe, Kenneth J. Jurek, Richard A. Salomon, Mayer, Brown & Platt, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff Rybicki.
Tyrone C. Fahner, Atty. Gen., State of Ill., Chicago, Ill., for defendants State Board of Elections and James Edgar.
William J. Harte, William J. Harte, Ltd., Chicago, Ill., for defendant Legislative Redistricting Commission.
Before CUDAHY, Circuit Judge, and GRADY, and BUA, District Judges.
These lawsuits, consolidated before this three-judge panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a), were brought by three groups of plaintiffs against the State Board of Elections of the State of Illinois ("the Board"), members of the Board individually and in their official capacities, the Legislative Redistricting Commission ("the Commission"), members of the Commission individually and in their official capacity, and James Edgar, the Illinois Secretary of State in his official capacity. Each of the three groups of plaintiffs challenged the 1981 legislative redistricting plan for election of candidates to the Illinois General Assembly ("the Commission Plan").
In Rybicki v. State Board of Elections, No. 81 C 6030, plaintiffs alleged that the Commission Plan unlawfully discriminated against suburban voters in the Chicago area by disproportionately concentrating voting power in the City of Chicago. The Rybicki plaintiffs also alleged that the Commission Plan was politically unfair, contained noncompact districts and unnecessarily fractured political subdivisions. Plaintiffs in Crosby v. State Board of Elections, No. 81 C 6093, alleged that the Commission Plan intentionally discriminated against black voters by diluting their voting strength and providing white voters a disproportionate opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. Plaintiffs in DelValle v. State Board of Elections, No. 81 C 6052, alleged that the Commission's redistricting effort similarly diluted the voting power of Hispanics.
Following a nine-day trial in which the Court heard testimony from 25 witnesses and received into evidence more than 200 exhibits, the Court, on January 12, 1982, issued written findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). Rybicki v. State Board of Elections, 574 F.Supp. 1082 (N.D.Ill.1982) ("Rybicki I"). In Rybicki I, the Court rejected the Rybicki plaintiffs' claims, on behalf of Republican and suburban voters, of noncompactness, partisan unfairness and impermissible fracturing of political subdivisions. See Rybicki I, 574 F.Supp. at 1096-1104. Regarding the Crosby plaintiffs' claims brought on behalf of black voters, the Court held that the Commission Plan purposefully diluted black voting strength in several significant instances. Id. at 1108. Specifically, the Court found evidence of "retrogression" in certain Senate districts (id. at 1108-09), evidence of purposeful racial discrimination in two additional Senate districts (id. at 1110), and evidence of racial vote dilution in three West Side Senate districts (id. at 1111). Rybicki I, however, rejected the Crosby plaintiffs' claims that "packing" certain black votes on Chicago's South Side and the creation of a "wall" separating black and white residential areas on Chicago's South Side constituted purposeful racial discrimination as defined by City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980). Id. at 1114-22. Finally, the Court in Rybicki I approved a settlement agreement entered into between the defendants and the DelValle plaintiffs on behalf of Hispanic voters. After reviewing the settlement proposal, the Court concluded that the DelValle settlement agreement was "fair, adequate and reasonable to Hispanics and affords them a fair opportunity to elect candidates of their choice to the General Assembly." Id. at 1124.
After Rybicki I was issued, however, and while various post-trial motions were pending before the Court, Congress amended the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976), as amended on June 29, 1982, by Pub.L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 134 (1982), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973 (West.Supp.1983). In light of these amendments, the Court reconsidered the portion of Rybicki I which rejected certain claims presented by the Crosby plaintiffs. Utilizing the "results" test of the amended Voting Rights Act, the Court held that further relief was necessary to eradicate the "result" of vote dilution in voting districts in which the "packing" of black voters was proven at trial. Rybicki v. State Board of Elections, 574 F.Supp. 1147 (N.D.Ill.1983) ("Rybicki II"). Accordingly, the Court requested that the Commission submit new district lines in several areas to implement the requirements of Rybicki II under the amended Voting Rights Act. Id. at 1158.
Following our decision in Rybicki II, the Crosby plaintiffs and defendants reached agreement on new district lines. After reviewing the parties' proposed Settlement Map, and finding that the proposed changes substantially increased black voting strength in the South Side districts, the Court approved the Crosby settlement agreement and incorporated its terms into the redistricting plan ordered in Rybicki I. Rybicki v. State Board of Elections, 574 F.Supp. 1161 (N.D.Ill.1983) ("Rybicki III").
Presently before the Court are petitions submitted by all plaintiffs requesting attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and costs under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rybicki plaintiffs request $226,030.50 in attorneys' fees and $31,018.18 in costs. The Crosby plaintiffs request $357,688.80 in fees and $71,378.10 in costs. The DelValle plaintiffs request $102,068.90 in fees and $2,6001 in costs. The Commission objects to any fee award to the Rybicki plaintiffs but, in a letter to the Court dated June 6, 1983, has withdrawn its earlier objections to the Crosby and DelValle petitions. Defendants Edgar and the State Board of Elections object to any fee award to the Rybicki and Crosby plaintiffs and, although conceding that the DelValle plaintiffs are entitled to a portion of their requested fees, object to the amount of fees and costs the DelValle plaintiffs have requested. Although the Commission believes the Crosby and DelValle plaintiffs' request for a 20-percent multiplier is reasonable, the remaining defendants strenuously object to the award of any multiplier in these cases.2
For the reasons stated below, we deny the Rybicki plaintiffs fees and costs, as they did not prevail in their lawsuit. We award the Crosby plaintiffs $255,795.25 in attorneys' fees and $71,378.10 in costs. The DelValle plaintiffs are awarded $78,580 in attorneys' fees and $2,600 in costs.
The Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, allows federal courts discretion to award reasonable attorneys' fees to prevailing parties in federal civil rights actions. In this Circuit, a plaintiff will be considered a prevailing party if the plaintiff has succeeded "`on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the party sought in bringing suit.'" Illinois Welfare Rights Organization v. Miller, 723 F.2d 564, 566 (7th Cir. 1983), (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)). The threshold question of whether a party prevailed should not, however, involve a highly technical determination, but rather should be resolved in a "practical sense." Dawson v. Pastrick, 600 F.2d 70, 78 (7th Cir.1979).
In Rybicki I, we rejected each of the Rybicki plaintiffs' theories of liability, brought on behalf of Republican and suburban interests, of noncompactness, partisan unfairness and impermissible fracturing of counties and suburban communities. Rybicki I, 574 F.Supp. at 1089-92. In regard to the interests of Republican and suburban voters, therefore, the Rybicki plaintiffs failed to prevail on any claims presented to this Court. The Rybicki plaintiffs, however, assert that because the final Commission Plan ordered by this Court ultimately benefitted Republican and suburban interests, they should be considered prevailing parties under the "catalyst" principle articulated in Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F.2d 846 (7th Cir.1982). Similarly, the Rybicki plaintiffs contend that they should be considered prevailing parties because their complaint acted as a "catalyst" in forcing defendants to grant the Crosby and DelValle plaintiffs relief.
In Stewart, the court recognized that a prevailing party need not always prevail by pursuing the lawsuit to a favorable verdict in order to obtain fees under § 1988. In fact, a plaintiff will be considered a prevailing party for purposes of § 1988 if ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Major v. Treen
...and cut the hourly rate by 50% for the non legal tasks which counsel for plaintiffs performed. See Rybicki v. State Board of Elections of State of Ill., 584 F.Supp. 849, 861 (N.D.Ill.1984). Defendants have furnished the Court with 147 entries totaling 306.86 hours in which plaintiffs' attor......
-
Spell v. McDaniel
...obtained justify compensation for the related but unsuccessful issues. 103 S.Ct. at 1940; See also Rybicki v. State Board of Elections of Illinois, 584 F.Supp. 849, 856-57 (N.D.Ill. 1984); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 572 F.Supp. at 363. The Court held that when a fee applicant has s......
-
Green Party v. Board of Elections
...v. Civiletti, 609 F.2d 514 (D.C.Cir.1979) (cases consolidated for trial and request of the fee award); Rybicki v. State Bd. of Elections of Ill., 584 F.Supp. 849 (N.D.Ill.1984) (cases consolidated for trial and appeal, and each plaintiff separately requested fees); Vaughns v. Bd. of Educ. o......
-
Duncan v. Poythress
...is, in large part, applicable to the present case. Indeed, Ellis was cited as persuasive authority in Rybicki v. State Board of Elections, 584 F.Supp. 849 (N.D.Ill.1984) (three-judge court) where an attorney pro se plaintiff was granted fees under section 1988. But see Lawrence v. Staats, 5......