Ryder v. Philip Morris, Inc.

• Decision Date: 27 November 1996
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:96cv519.
• Citation: 946 F.Supp. 422
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
• Parties: Richard R. RYDER, Jr., Plaintiff, v. PHILIP MORRIS, INC., et al., Defendants.

946 F.Supp. 422

Richard R. RYDER, Jr., Plaintiff, v. PHILIP MORRIS, INC., et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:96cv519.

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Richmond Division.

November 27, 1996.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Vickey A. Verwey, David R. Simonsen, Jr., Richmond, VA, for plaintiff.

Jeffrey M. DeBord, Charles R. Sullivan, Hill B. Wellford, Jr., Hunton & Williams, Richmond, VA, for Philip Morris.

Jay J. Levit, Levit & Mann, Richmond, VA, for Union.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PAYNE, District Judge.

Richard R. Ryder ("Ryder") instituted this "hybrid action" against his employer and union under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185. Ryder alleges that Philip Morris, U.S.A. ("Philip Morris") discharged him in violation of a collective bargaining agreement. He also alleges that the Bakery, Confectionery and Tobacco Workers International Union, Local Union 203-T ("Union") breached its duty of fair representation by failing to fairly handle his grievance challenging the discharge.¹ (Notice of Removal, Exh. A. Motion for Judgment ¶ 1) (Plaintiff's Mem. in Support of Summary Judgment at 1). The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the question of whether the six month statute of limitations set forth in Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b), bars the action.

All parties agree that the appropriate statute of limitations is six months. See DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983). They disagree, however, about when the claim accrued. For the reasons set forth below, the court finds that the claim accrued when Ryder was informed that the Union had voted against submitting his grievance to arbitration on September 11, 1995. The court also finds no reason to toll the statute of limitations, and thus the six month limit set by DelCostello bars the present action, which was filed June 5, 1996.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Ryder was employed by Philip Morris from October 10, 1977 until he was discharged on July 13, 1995. This action was spawned by Ryder's discharge and the alleged failure of the Union to represent him fairly in connection with his grievance concerning the discharge. (Ryder Aff. at ¶ 1).

Throughout his employment, Ryder was a member of the Union. Pursuant to Article II of a collective bargaining agreement, the Union is the exclusive collective bargaining representative for Ryder and the other employees of Philip Morris at Richmond.² (Isley Aff. ¶ 3) (Sprouse Aff. ¶ 3) (Jolly Aff. ¶ 2). The collective bargaining agreement in effect at all times pertinent to this action was signed on February 1, 1995. It is entitled "1995 Union Agreement Between Philip Morris U.S.A. and Local # 203-T of the Bakery, Confectionery and Tobacco Workers International Union A.F.L.-C.I.O.-C.L.C." ("Agreement") (Jolly Aff. ¶ 2).

The Agreement provides for a five-step grievance procedure. (Agreement, Article XI). If a matter remains unresolved by the fifth step, the Union Committee of Local 203-T (the "Union Committee"), which consists of seven voting members, can elect to take the grievance petition to arbitration. The Union Committee will only take a grievance to arbitration if it believes that the grievant has a reasonable chance of success on the merits. (Isley Aff. ¶ 2). If arbitration is not requested by the Union Committee, the dispute is deemed settled. Specifically, Article XII of the Agreement states:

Any dispute arising out of the application or interpretation of this Basic Agreement shall be submitted to arbitration upon the request of the Union in the event that a settlement cannot be reached under the provisions of Article XI.

A dispute shall be deemed settled unless a written notification requesting arbitration is received by the Employer from the Local Union # 203-T Shop Committee within five (5) working days of the Union's receipt of the Employer's decision at the fifth step of the grievance procedure.

Ryder was no stranger to discipline while he was employed at Philip Morris, having been disciplined on some 35 occasions. And, Ryder's discharge on July 13, 1995 was not the first time his employment with Philip Morris was terminated. Ryder had been discharged from Philip Morris once before on April 4, 1995. (See Ryder Aff. ¶ 3). The Union Committee grieved that discharge on Ryder's behalf; and, at the fifth grievance step, Philip Morris reinstated him on or about May 31, 1995 without back pay. (See Ryder Aff. ¶ 3). However, Ryder was put on terms by virtue of an "undesirable letter," dated May 30, 1995, which warned that any further infractions, including leaving early for or overstaying breaks, would result in the termination of Ryder's employment. (Jolly Aff. ¶ 3).

On July 13, 1995, Ryder was again terminated (Ryder Aff. ¶ 5) because of what Ryder claims to be a "minor infraction": specifically, overstaying a break by three minutes in violation of a company rule and of the terms imposed by the "undesirable letter." Philip Morris and the Union agree that Ryder was late returning from the break, but both deny that constituted the sole reason for his discharge. They contend that the termination is grounded also in the facts that: (i) Ryder also left early for the break; (ii) the infraction occurred just over one month after he received the "undesirable letter;" and (iii) Ryder had been disciplined not less than 35 times during his employment with Philip Morris.

After his termination on July 13, Ryder filed a grievance, alleging that the discharge was without just cause in violation of the collective bargaining contract. (Ryder Aff. ¶ 6). The Union grieved the discharge, but after completing the grievance steps, Philip Morris maintained its position and upheld its termination of Ryder's employment. On September 11, 1995, the Union Committee met and considered whether to take Ryder's grievance to arbitration. The Union Committee unanimously concluded, not surprisingly, that Ryder's grievance did not stand a reasonable chance of success in arbitration on the merits because of his poor work record and because the latest infractions had occurred slightly more than one month following the issuance of an undesirable letter. Accordingly, on September 11, 1995, the Union Committee decided not to take Ryder's grievance to arbitration. (Isley Aff. ¶ 8) (Sprouse Aff. ¶ 7).

Ryder does not dispute that the Union Committee voted against arbitrating his grievance. (Ryder Reply at 2). He also admits that, on the evening of September 11, 1995, he received a telephone call from Daniel Isley, a member of the Union Committee. Isley informed Ryder that the Union Committee had voted against arbitrating Ryder's grievance. (Isley Aff. ¶ 9) (Ryder Supp.Aff. ¶ 3). On the other hand, Ryder claims that he was not told either that his grievance was concluded or that the Union Committee would not continue to process his grievance. (Ryder Supp.Aff. ¶¶ 4-5) (Ryder Reply at 2).

Ryder also claims that Isley continued to speak with him throughout the fall and winter of 1995-96, suggesting that Ryder should talk to management about his grievance, (Ryder Supp.Aff. ¶ 6), and helping Ryder obtain meetings with various Philip Morris officials for that purpose. (Ryder Supp.Aff. ¶ 7). Finally, according to Ryder, Isley advised Ryder to telephone the International Union and gave Ryder the name of a person to contact there. (Ryder Supp.Aff. ¶ 13). Based on his conversations with Isley, Ryder claims that he understood that the Union was interested in his grievance and was open to further action on his behalf.

On September 12, 1995, Jerry Sprouse, President of the Union, sent a letter to Ryder by certified mail. The letter explained that the Union Committee had decided not to pursue arbitration and stated that "no further action will be taken by the Union in this matter." This letter was returned unclaimed, even though it was sent to the correct address.

In the original affidavit filed in support of his motion for summary judgment, Ryder claimed that the Union and Philip Morris told him that Philip Morris would not offer settlement of his grievance, unless and until he withdrew a charge of racial discrimination that Ryder had filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on July 11, 1995. (Ryder Aff. ¶ 4). Thus, according to Ryder, he requested withdrawal of the EEOC charge. The EEOC issued formal notice of withdrawal in February or March of 1996. (Ryder Aff. at ¶ 10).

However, when the Union and Philip Morris pressed for greater details of this allegation, Ryder subsequently explained that David Parks, Manager of Labor Relations for Philip Morris merely had informed Ryder that he could not speak with Ryder while EEOC charges were pending. Ryder said he would withdraw the charges and then talk to Parks. Parks said that he could not promise anything, but that he could not talk with Ryder while the EEOC charge was pending. After Ryder dropped the charge, Parks allegedly told Ryder there was nothing he could do. Ryder furthermore stated that he arranged several meetings with Philip Morris officials to talk about his discharge. (Ryder Supp.Aff. ¶¶ 8-11).

Ryder contends that, in February or March 1996, after receiving notice of withdrawal of the EEOC charge, and on the advice of the Union, he called the Union's International Representative, Bobby Curtis, to talk about his grievance. (Ryder Aff. at ¶ 10). Several conversations ensued. In the first conversation, on or about March or April 1996, Ryder claims to have told Curtis the facts of his discharge; and Curtis allegedly told Ryder that he would look into the matter and get back to Ryder. (Ryder Aff. at ¶ 11). Ryder contacted Curtis again, and Curtis asked Ryder to send Curtis a letter describing the matter in writing. (Ryder Aff. at ¶ 12). Finally, sometime between April 15 and 23, 1996, Curtis told Ryder that the Union would not assist in...