Ryder v. Schreeder
| Decision Date | 20 June 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 24589,24589 |
| Citation | 224 Ga. 382,162 S.E.2d 375 |
| Parties | Margaret S. RYDER v. Margaret B. SCHREEDER et al. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Providential cause having been shown for the failure to file the enumeration of errors within the time required by the rules of this court, the motion to dismiss is denied.
2. The pleadings and proof made an issue of fact as to a parol gift by the complainant's mother to her; and the execution of a contract by the complainant ten years later, inconsistent with such gift, under the circumstances related by the complainant, did not conclusively refute the evidence of the gift.
Victor K. Meador, N. T. Anderson, Atlanta, for appellant.
Nall, Miller, Cadenhead & Dennis, Thomas S. Carlock, A. PaulCadenhead, Atlanta, for appellees.
In an equitable action by Mrs. Margaret S. Ryder against Mrs. Margaret B. Schreeder and Dr. John M. Schreeder, the trial court granted the motion of the defendants for summary judgment, and denied the motion of the complainant for summary judgment. The complainant appealed from these judgments.
1. Motion to dismiss the appeal has been filed because the enumeration of errors was filed four days after the time required by the rules of this court. Providential cause having been shown for the failure to file the enumeration of errors within the time required, the motion to dismiss is denied.
2. The amended complaint alleged: Mrs. Margaret B. Schreeder is the mother of the complainant. Dr. John M. Schreeder is the brother of the complainant, and is acting as agent, with power of attorney, for Mrs. Schreeder. In January, 1957, Mrs. Schreeder acquired described real property, subject to a security deed. In March, 1957, Mrs. Schreeder 'gave and turned over said real property to plaintiff * * * surrendering possession of same to plaintiff (who took possession of same at said time in March, 1957) and telling and causing plaintiff to occupy same as her own (which plaintiff accordingly forthwith did) and assuring plaintiff that said property and its use and enjoyment would be and were plaintiff's permanently and absolutely from that time, subject only to said security deed-urging and causing plaintiff accordingly to maintain, repair, and improve the property as her own and to pay (almost all of) the instalments upon said note against the property as they became due from said time.' For about two or three years after the complainant took possession of the property she paid to Mrs. Schreeder s54.93 per month to cover the loan payments, and thereafter she paid her $75 per month to cover the loan payments, taxes, and insurance. The loan on the property has been reduced from $7,119.23 to about $1,938.87, most of the payments having been made by the complainant. The complainant has made specified repairs and improvements on the property. About 1960, she desired to add two rooms to the house, and she asked Mrs. Schreeder to place the record title in her, subject to the security deed. Mrs. Schreeder objected to this, because she feared that the complainant would involve herself too much for her financial ability and lose the property, but said that it was her intention to will the record ownership of the property to the complainant. On further urging by the complainant, Mrs. Schreeder agreed at some later date, when the complainant was better situated financially, to enter into an agreement with her and a loan company, whereby Mrs. Schreeder would make a deed to the complainant, and the complainant would make a note and security deed to the loan company for whatever was necessary for her purposes and also for $2,000 which would be paid to Mrs. Schreeder. Mrs. Schreeder delayed such transaction in spite of repeated requests by the complainant. In April 1967, Dr. Schreeder, representing Mrs. Schreeder, demanded that the complainant and her husband enter into an agreement whereby a loan would be obtained by the complainant and her husband, upon the security of the described property, and the complainant would pay to Mrs. Schreeder an amount far in excess of the $2,000. The defendants threatened that should the complainant not carry through such arrangement, they would have her summarily dispossessed. A copy of the contract which the parties entered into is attached to the complaint. Dr. Schreeder convinced the complainant that she had no rights in the property which she could enforce, force, since she had nothing in writing, and she reluctantly signed the contract, not noting that it recited that she rented the property. The loan necessary to carry out the contract could not be obtained, and the contract was abandoned by the parties. Dr. Schreeder has made formal demand for possession of the property and threatens to dispossess the complainant. Because of her poverty she is unable to make bond to be filed with counter affidavit to prevent such dispossession. The defendants have declared to her their intention to sell the property to an innocent purchaser for value who would not know of the complainant's rights in the property.
The prayers were: that the court adjudge the complainant the equitable owner of the property; that the defendants be restrained and enjoined from dispossessing her; that the court require Mrs. Schreeder to join with the complainant in an agreement to obtain a loan to pay off the balance of the security deed, or to pay Mrs. Schreeder the amount of $2,000, as may appear just and proper, and for Mrs. Schreeder to make deed to the complainant; that there be an accounting between the parties; that the contract attached as an exhibit to the complaint be declared void and canceled as a result of mistake and duress; and for further relief. The supplemental complaint sought relief in connection with the dispossession of the complainant at a time when a restraining order was in effect.
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