Ryder v. Sullivan, Civ. A. No. 92-K-891.

Decision Date13 October 1992
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 92-K-891.
Citation804 F. Supp. 1365
PartiesJune H. RYDER, Plaintiff, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Colorado

James A. May, Colorado Springs, Colo., for plaintiff.

George E. Gill, Asst. U.S. Atty., Denver, Colo., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON APPEAL

KANE, Senior District Judge.

This case is before me on an appeal from an adverse decision by the Secretary of Human Services ("Secretary") denying certain benefits to June H. Ryder ("claimant") because her husband, Robert Ryder, ("husband") receives a veteran's pension which is augmented by surviving spouse benefits. In the ruling below, the Appeals Council determined that the augmented portion of the husband's pension should be considered income to the claimant, thus reducing the amount of her SSI benefits. An administrative law judge ("ALJ") later determined that the Secretary had overpaid the claimant $871.90 between January 1, 1984 and June, 1991, but decided that the claimant was not at fault in causing the overpayment and that forcing her to repay would defeat the purposes of the act. The Secretary does not appeal the ALJ's determination of non-fault or repayment. Thus, only the legal correctness of the Secretary's position is at issue in this appeal. For the reasons discussed below, I determine that the Secretary's policy of automatically counting the claimant's portion of VA benefits as unearned income to the dependent is plainly erroneous and inconsistent with the act and accompanying regulations. I accordingly reverse that portion of the Secretary's decision.

I. Facts and Procedural Issues

June H. Ryder ("claimant") is disabled from cerebral palsy, for which she receives supplemental security income of approximately $200 per month. Claimant is married to Robert Ryder ("Ryder"). Ryder receives a non-service connected disability pension from the Veterans Administration. It amounts to approximately $900 per month of which approximately $175 is given to Ryder for the support of his wife. In most months, the Ryders' expenses exceed their income from the VA and SSI. Ryder receives his check in a lump sum, without formal breakdown of the augmented amount for his wife. The Ryders have no other income.

By letter dated July 27, 1989, the Secretary notified claimant that he intended to reduce her SSI benefits by approximately $25 per month because of the augmented VA benefits Ryder received. The Secretary also sought to force claimant to repay $2,408.17 she had allegedly received since 1984.1 By letter of August 23, 1989, claimant asked the Secretary waive the overpayment. The Secretary rejected her request on February 13, 1990. Ryder filed a request for hearing on March 15, 1990 to determine whether the so-called unearned income should be excluded for purposes of determining the amount of supplemental benefits she had received for the period March, 1984 to August, 1989.

An ALJ held an evidentiary hearing on August 15, 1990. Ryder and her husband both testified. The ALJ filed a written decision dated August 28, 1990. It concluded that the portion of the augmented benefits that Ryder's husband received were not deemable as income to Ryder and thus there was no overpayment. The ALJ alternatively ruled that if there were an overpayment the claimant was not at fault and the overpayment should be waived. The HHS regional commissioner asked the appeals council to review the ALJ's decision. By letter dated November 29, 1990, the Appeals Council determined to reopen the case. It specifically concluded that the ALJ's decision was erroneous on its face because the ALJ had relied upon a ninth circuit decision, Paxton v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 856 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir.1988), instead of an internal social security ruling, Title XVI: SSI Treatment of Veterans Administration Payments to SSI Eligibles/Fiduciaries 82-31 S.S.R. 291 (Cum.Ed.1982) ("SSR 82-31").

The Secretary had previously determined that it would acquiesce to Paxton within that circuit only. In other circuits it expected the ALJs to abide by SSR 82-31. The appeals council directed the ALJ to hold a supplemental hearing that would thus incorporate SSR 82-31, determine the actual amount of overpayment, and once again decide whether the Secretary should waive the overpayment. The Appeals' Council formal ruling to the same effect followed on February 12, 1991.

Without holding another formal hearing, the ALJ entered a written order on April 24, 1992. The ALJ deferred to the Appeals Council decision on the appropriate determination of her countable income. The ALJ then proceeded to determine the amount of overpayment, the relative fault of the claimant, and whether repayment would work a hardship on claimant. The ALJ determined that there had been an overpayment of $871.90 for the period January 1, 1984 to June, 1991. The ALJ went on to determine that the overpayment was without fault and that requiring repayment would defeat the purpose of the act. This appeal followed. Review is limited to whether the Secretary's decision is in error as a matter of law.

II. Discussion

Many other cases have described the legal background of this case. See, e.g., Whaley v. Schweiker, 663 F.2d 871 (9th Cir.1981); Tsosie v. Califano, 651 F.2d 719 (10th Cir.1981); and Paxton v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 856 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir.1988). Accordingly, I will not...

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3 cases
  • Ryder v. Shalala, 92-1390
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • 2 Junio 1994
    ...a regulation) was invalid because it was in conflict with various Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") regulations. Ryder v. Sullivan, 804 F.Supp. 1365 (D.Colo.1992). In thus concluding, the district court relied heavily on Paxton v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 856 F.2d 1352 (9th Ci......
  • Fair v. Shalala
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • 14 Noviembre 1994
    ...part, relied on Paxton in determining that SSR 82-31 was invalid. See White v. Sullivan, 813 F.Supp. 1059 (D.Vt.1992); Ryder v. Sullivan, 804 F.Supp. 1365 (D.Colo.1992); Inman v. Sullivan, 809 F.Supp. 659 ...
  • Thomas v. Sullivan, 91-K-967.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Colorado
    • 13 Octubre 1992

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