Rylee v. State
| Decision Date | 10 January 1898 |
| Citation | 75 Miss. 352,22 So. 890 |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
| Parties | MATTHEW RYLEE v. THE STATE OF, MISSISSIPPI |
December 1897
From the circuit court of Marshall county HON. Z. M. STEPHENS Judge.
The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Smith & Totten, for appellant.
The first instruction given for the state is certainly erroneous in telling the jury that they may, "if they [you] think it proper to do so, disregard the testimony of any witness, if, for any reason, they believe such testimony is untrue, " thereby telling the jury that they could make use of their personal knowledge of facts affecting the credibility of a witness not in evidence, and that they may capriciously do this, if, for "any reason, " they believe such testimony is untrue. Certainly this is not the law.
In the case of Lavenburg v. Harper, 27 Miss. 299, the court, in passing upon a similar charge and pronouncing it erroneous, says: "It did not confine them to the testimony adduced on the trial, nor to the manner nor demeanor of the witnesses while testifying, nor to any circumstances apparent upon the examination and legitimate subjects for their consideration, but permitted them to indulge any undue suspicions, and even to act upon their own private information and to condemn a witness unheard and undefended." Surely the state cannot ask for conviction upon facts not proven in the trial. Nail v. State, 70 Miss. 32. Would it not be mockery to try a man by the evidence on the trial, and then, after all the evidence has been submitted, for the court to tell the jury, as we contend was done in this charge, that, when they retired to consider of their verdict, they might, if they thought proper to do so, disregard the testimony of any witness, if, for any reason, whether from private knowledge of, or their dislike for the witness, because he was the defendant or otherwise, believe such testimony untrue? In this enlightened age such is not the law. Layton v. State, 56 Miss. 791; Graff v. People, 134 Ill. 380. Jurors cannot take into consideration anything not in evidence before them. State v. Jones, 7 S. E. Rep., 296.
Calhoon & Green, on the same side.
The case must be reversed because of error in giving the first instruction asked for by the state. Of course, the instruction was aimed directly at the defendant, because, as a matter of fact, he was the only witness to the killing. The instruction was plainly telling the jury that they might arbitrarily disregard all the testimony of the defendant in the cause. It will not do to tell a jury that they may disregard the testimony of any witness if, "for any reason, " they believe such testimony untrue. Such a reason must arise out of the evidence, and the instruction should so tell them, but this charge falls under the condemnation of Glenn v. State, 64 Miss. 724; Woods v. State, 67 Miss. 575, as we earnestly insist, and it also falls under the implied condemnation of Godwin v. State, 73 Miss. 873. Instructions on the weight of testimony, as this one is, are of a very delicate nature, and may be made the engines of great oppression, particularly in a case like the one at bar. It is not proper to tell a jury, when the defendant himself is practically the only witness in his own defense, that they may disregard the whole testimony of any witness, if for any reason, whether inside or outside the record, they believe it untrue, or because he has made contradictory statements without even, in such case, saying that those contradictory statements must be "intentionally false." Owens v. State, 63 Miss. 450.
Wiley N. Nash, attorney-general, for appellee.
There is no specific objection made in the assignment of errors to any particular charge, and the court ought not to treat the assignment as sufficiently made to require consideration. The fourth assignment is a most general objection. We do not believe the court will, however, find any error in the charges asked and given for the state in this case.
While the youth, Walter Stewart, testifies that he heard the word "lie, " spoken by the defendant to the deceased and the words "damned lie, " spoken by the deceased to the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
- Floyd v. State
- Younger v. State
- Wofford v. State
- Poole v. State