S.G. MARINO CRANE SERVICE, CORP., Plaintiff v. THE SAXON GROUP, INC., Defendant, PEN CV-02-14
| Decision Date | 16 May 2002 |
| Docket Number | PEN CV-02-14 |
| Parties | S.G. MARINO CRANE SERVICE, CORP., Plaintiff v. THE SAXON GROUP, INC., Defendant |
| Court | Maine Superior Court |
The matter is before the court on the motion to dismiss or for summary judgment by the defendant, The Saxon Group, Inc. ("Saxon"). For the following reasons, the motion for summary judgment is granted.
The facts are undisputed. The plaintiff, S.G. Marino Crane Service Corporation ("Marino"), is a Connecticut company that provides cranes and related services to construction contractors. In April of 1999, Marino entered into two contracts with Saxon to provide two cranes, and related labor, materials, and equipment, for use at the construction of the Maine Independence Power Plant in Veazie Maine (the "Veazie Project"). The two contracts between Marino and Saxon were the only two contracts into which Marino and Saxon ever entered together, and Saxon has never engaged in business dealings with Marino on any project other than the Veazie Project.
At some point, Marino and Saxon got into a dispute over the amounts due and payable to Marino pursuant to the two contracts. In August of 2000, Marino filed a complaint (the "First Complaint") in Maine District Court entitled S.G. Marino Crane Service Corp. v. Casco Bay Energy Company LLC, as defendant, and The Saxon Group, Inc. H.E. Sargent, Inc. and The Spartan Group, Inc., as parties in interest (the "First Litigation"). The First Litigation was removed to Superior Court on October 4, 2000. Marino's purpose in filing the First Complaint was to collect the amounts allegedly owed by Saxon under the crane contracts. Marino specifically pled that the amounts it sought in the First Litigation arose "by virtue of a contract with The Saxon Group, Inc . . . ." On or about March 6, 2001, Marino moved to dismiss all parties other than Saxon from the First Litigation. The court (Hjelm, J.) granted the motion without opposition.
On March 14, 2001, Saxon filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. The basis for the motion was that Marino had dismissed the only named defendant, Casco Bay, leaving only Saxon, which had only been named as a party-in-interest. The court (Hjelm, J.) issued its order dated May 24, 2001, in which it stated:
[Saxon] correctly observes that because the plaintiff successfully sought the dismissal of its claims against the one defendant and the two other parties-in-interest, the only remaining issue relates to the priority of liens held by the plaintiff and [Saxon], which would be available to satisfy the obligation of the former defendant, Casco Bay Energy Company. Because Casco Bay Energy Company is no longer a party, the existence of any claim against it is not subject to resolution in this case. From this, the court is satisfied that there is no actionable claim remaining against [Saxon].
In that order, the court allowed Marino ten days to move to amend its complaint to cure the procedural defect of not having any defendant left in the lawsuit, and show cause why such an amendment should be allowed several months after the deadline for amendment. On June 4, 2001, Marino moved to amend the complaint to include Saxon as a party-defendant. On July 10, 2001, after having considered Marino's motion to amend, the court (Hjelm, J.) entered an order denying Marino's motion to amend and dismissing Marino's claim against Saxon. The court stated:
If the plaintiff's motion were granted, Saxon's role in this action would be much different that [sic] its original position, where it appeared only because of its secured interest in an asset in which the plaintiff held some security. It was included in this action only so that the priority of its lien could be determined relative to the plaintiff's interest. The motion to amend itself does not indicate the nature of the claim that the plaintiff seeks to pursue against Saxon, and the plaintiff has not filed a proposed amended pleading embodying such a claim. Nonetheless, it is apparent that the plaintiff seeks to assert a direct claim against Saxon, perhaps for money damages. This casts Saxon in a wholly new role that would work to Saxon's unfair prejudice. For example, because the discovery deadline is August 1, 2001, Saxon would be unable to initiate any discovery in time for its completion within that discovery period. Under these circumstances, the motion to amend must be denied.
Moreover, the court's order specifically dismissed, pursuant to the May 24, 2001 order, the First Complaint against Saxon "with prejudice." Marino did not appeal the July 10, 2001 order dismissing its First Complaint with prejudice.
On January 6, 2002, Marino filed this complaint (the "Second Complaint") in this litigation (the "Second Litigation"). The Second Complaint states that it seeks recovery under a variety of different legal theories arising out of a contract between Marino and Saxon "for Marino to provide crane services and labor at the Maine Independent Power Plant in Veazie, Maine." Specifically, Marino's complaint alleges that Saxon has materially breached the contract by failing to make payments to Marino (Count I); that Saxon has been unjustly enriched by Marino's labor (Count II); that Saxon owed Marino for goods and services delivered (Count III); and that Saxon violated the Maine Prompt Payment Act, 10 M.R.S.A. § 1111 (Count IV). The Second Complaint arises out of the exact same transaction as the First Complaint: Saxon's rental of two cranes from Marino for use on the Veazie Project. On February 14, 2002, Saxon moved to dismiss, or for summary judgment on two grounds. First, that all of Marino's claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and second, that Marino was required by the Mechanic's Lien Statute to pursue all claims against Saxon in the First Litigation.
A party is entitled to summary judgment when there are no genuine issues of material fact, and that party "is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." M.R. Civ. P. 56 (c); In re Estate of Davis, 2001 ME 106, ¶ 7, 775 A.2d 1127, 1129. "A fact is material when it has the potential to affect the outcome of the suit." Kenny v. Dep't of Human Services, 1999 ME 158, ¶ 3, 740 A.2d 560, 562 (citation omitted). "An issue is genuine if sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute exists to require a choice between the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." Id. (citation omitted). The court must look at the facts in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment is being granted. Johnson v. Samson Constr. Corp., 1997 ME 220, ¶ 5, 704 A.2d 866, 868.
"A plaintiff may not split a cause of action and prosecute each of its parts in separate lawsuits." Johnson, 1997 ME 220, ¶ 7, 704 A.2d at 868 (citation omitted). "Judicial economy, fairness to litigants, and the strong public interest favoring finality in judicial proceedings demand that a plaintiff present all relevant aspects of his cause of action in a single lawsuit." Id. Res judicata prevents a litigant from splintering his or her
claim and pursuing it in a piecemeal fashion by asserting in a subsequent lawsuit other grounds of recovery for the same claim that the litigant had a reasonable opportunity to argue in the prior action. Id. As discussed in the Restatement:
The rule that a defendant's judgment acts as a bar to a second action on the same claim is based largely on the ground that fairness to the defendant, and sound judicial administration, require that at some point litigation over the particular controversy come to an end. These considerations may impose such a requirement even though the substantive issues have not been tried, especially if the plaintiff has failed to avail himself of opportunities to pursue his remedies in the first proceeding, or has deliberately flouted orders of the court.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) JUDGMENTS § 19 cmt. a (1982).
The doctrine of res judicata is comprised of two types: "issue preclusion" and "claim preclusion." Saxon argues that claim preclusion applies here. "Claim preclusion" prohibits relitigation of an entire cause of action if: (1) the same parties or their privies are involved in both actions; (2) a valid final judgment was entered in the prior action; and (3) the matters presented for decision in the second action were, or might have been, litigated in the first action. Camps Newfound/Owatonna Corp. v. Town of Harrison, 1998 ME 20, ¶ 11, 705 A.2d 1109, 1113. Thus, to avoid the risk of subsequent claim preclusion, a plaintiff must seek and exhaust all alternative theories for recovery in one action. In resolving this matter, the court will deal with each of the enumerated requirements in turn.
This case is distinguishable from the cases cited by the parties,[1] in that in each of those cases, the first requirement, that of the "same parties or their privies," had been satisfied. In this case, however, there is a question as to whether the "same parties or their privies" are involved in both actions. In the First Litigation, Saxon was a "party in interest," and in the second, is a defendant. The question is, therefore, whether a "party in interest" is considered a "party" for purposes of res judicata.
Generally, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 775 (Abr. 6th ed. 1991). The term "party" refers to those by or against...
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