S.H. v. Macon Cnty. Dep't of Human Res.

• Decision Date: 09 October 2015
• Docket Number: 2140529 ,2140528 , 2140530.
• Parties: S.H. v. MACON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

195 So.3d 311

S.H.

v.MACON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES.

2140528

2140529

2140530.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

Oct. 9, 2015.

George B. Bulls II, Tuskegee, for appellant.

Sharon E. Ficquette, chief legal counsel, and Karen P. Phillips, asst. atty. gen., Department of Human Resources, for appellee.

Elaine L. Raymon of Raymon & Raymon, LLC, Tuskegee, guardian ad litem.

MOORE

, Judge.

S.H. (“the mother”) appeals from a single judgment of the Macon Juvenile Court (“the juvenile court”), which was rendered and entered in three separate juvenile-court actions, terminating her parental rights to T.T., N.H., and K.L.H. (hereinafter referred to collectively as “the children”). Because the appeals are taken from a nonfinal judgment, we dismiss the appeals.

On November 13, 2014, the Macon County Department of Human Resources (“DHR”) filed separate petitions seeking to terminate the parental rights of the mother and any unknown father or fathers to the children. The juvenile court entered an order requiring that service on the unknown father or fathers of the children be perfected by publication. On March 20, 2015, the juvenile court entered a judgment terminating the parental rights of the mother and any alleged or unknown father as to each child. In that judgment, the juvenile court made findings of fact, concluded that clear and convincing evidence supported the termination of the parents' parental rights, and set the case for further judicial review. The mother filed her notice of appeal to this court on April 1, 2015.

On April 10, 2015, DHR filed a “motion to amend order,” in which it noted that the juvenile court's March 20, 2015, judgment “does not indicate that permanent legal custody of the ... children is vested with [DHR]” and requested that the court enter an amended order “indicating that permanent legal custody of the ... children will be vested in [DHR].” The juvenile court entered an order purporting to grant that motion on that same date. This court issued an order calling for letter briefs from the parties on the issue of the finality of the juvenile court's March 20, 2015, judgment. In its letter brief to this court, DHR argues that there is no final judgment to support the mother's appeal. In her letter brief, the mother asserts that, pursuant to the juvenile court's April 10, 2015, order, the March 20, 2015, judgment terminating her parental rights to each child is final and appealable.

“ ‘It is a well established rule that, with limited exceptions, an appeal will lie only from a final judgment which determines the issues before the court and ascertains and declares the rights of the parties involved.’ Taylor v. Taylor, 398 So.2d 267, 269 (Ala.1981)

.... A ‘final judgment is a “terminal decision which demonstrates there has been a complete adjudication of all matters in controversy between the litigants.” ’ Dees v. State, 563 So.2d 1059, 1061 (Ala.Civ.App.1990) (citing Tidwell v. Tidwell, 496 So.2d 91, 92 (Ala.Civ.App.1986) ). The question whether a judgment is final is a jurisdictional question, and the reviewing court, on a determination that the judgment is not final, has a duty to dismiss the case.... See

Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Holman, 373 So.2d 869, 871 (Ala.Civ.App.1979).”

Horton v. Horton, 822 So.2d 431, 433–34 (Ala.Civ.App.2001)

. “ ‘Once an appeal is taken, the trial court loses jurisdiction to act except in matters entirely collateral to the appeal.’ ” Horton, 822 So.2d at 434 (quoting Ward v. Ullery, 412 So.2d 796, 797 (Ala.Civ.App.1982) ).

As noted previously, on March 20, 2015, the juvenile court entered its judgment terminating the mother's parental rights to each child. Section 12–15–320(b), Ala.Code 1975

, provides that, if a juvenile court terminates a parent's parental rights, it may:

“(1) Transfer or continue the permanent legal custody of the child to the Department of Human Resources or to any public or private licensed child-placing agency able and willing to assume the care and maintenance of the child....

“(2) Transfer or continue the permanent legal custody of the child to the petitioner who, after study by the Department of Human Resources, is found to be able to properly receive and care for the child.”

(Emphasis added.)

In Ex parte Alabama Department of Human Resources, 154 So.3d 1060, 1062 (Ala.Civ.App.2014)

(“Ex parte Alabama DHR ”), the juvenile court in that case terminated the parental rights of the child's parents and, in a later order correcting its original judgment, limited its award of the child's custody to the Madison County Department of Human Resources to temporary legal custody. In interpreting § 12–15–320(b), this court stated:

“Based on [the language of § 12–15–320(b)

], once the parental rights of a child's parents are terminated, a juvenile court may either place the child in the permanent legal custody of ‘the Department of Human Resources,’ another ‘public or private licensed child-placing agency,’ or the person who petitioned for the termination of parental rights and who is approved by ‘the Department of Human Resources.’ The juvenile court could not award the State [Department of Human Resources] or the Madison County [Department of Human Resources] only temporary legal custody of the child. See

State Dep't of Human Res. v. Thomas, 554 So.2d 1063, 1064 (Ala.Civ.App.1989) (finding that the judgment in that case was inconsistent with former § 26–18–8, Ala.Code 1975, because it awarded the Russell County Department of Human Resources only temporary custody and remanding the case for the juvenile court to resolve the inconsistency). Thus, the juvenile court committed reversible error in awarding only temporary, as opposed to permanent, legal custody of the child to either the Madison County [Department of Human Resources] or the State [Department of Human Resources].”

154 So.3d at 1064

.

Like in Ex parte Alabama DHR, the juvenile court in the present case did not include in its judgment a disposition as to the permanent legal custody of the children, as required by § 12–15–320(b)

. See

Horton, 822 So.2d at 433. Accordingly, because the judgment at issue did not determine all the issues before the juvenile court and did not ascertain and declare the rights of the parties, leaving open the issue of the permanent legal custody of the children, we conclude that the judgment is nonfinal.

Although the...