S.T. v. 1515 Broad St., LLC

• Decision Date: 09 March 2020
• Docket Number: A-87 September Term 2018,081916
• Parties: S.T., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. 1515 BROAD STREET, LLC, the Walsh Company, LLC, and County Glass & Metal Installers, Inc., Defendants-Respondents, and County Glass & Metal Installers, Inc., Third-Party Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Virginia Glass Products, Third-Party Defendant, and Idesco Corp., Third-Party Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

241 N.J. 257

227 A.3d 1190

S.T., Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.1515 BROAD STREET, LLC, the Walsh Company, LLC, and County Glass & Metal Installers, Inc., Defendants-Respondents,andCounty Glass & Metal Installers, Inc., Third-Party Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.Virginia Glass Products, Third-Party Defendant,andIdesco Corp., Third-Party Defendant-Respondent.

A-87 September Term 2018

081916

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued November 6, 2019

Decided March 9, 2020

Charles Dawkins, Jr. argued the cause for appellant (Law Office of Charles Dawkins, Jr., Elizabeth, attorneys; Charles Dawkins, Jr., of counsel and on the briefs).

Peter A. Gaudioso argued the cause for respondent County Glass & Metal Installers, Inc. (McElroy, Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter, attorneys; Peter A. Gaudioso, Morristown, of counsel and on the briefs, and Cassandra J. Neugold, on the briefs).

Gerard H. Hanson argued the cause for respondent Idesco Corp. (Hill Wallack, attorneys; Gerard H. Hanson, of counsel and on the briefs, and Victoria J. Airgood, Princeton, on the briefs).

Matthew S. Mahoney argued the cause for respondent 1515 Broad Street, LLC (Law Offices of Linda S. Baumann, attorneys; Matthew S. Mahoney, on the briefs).

JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court.

An individual's right to determine how best to pursue her personal and financial affairs -- and the fate of her lawsuit -- is so fundamental that it is embedded in our State Constitution and our laws. See In re M.R., 135 N.J. 155, 166-67, 638 A.2d 1274 (1994). That right is recognized in our Rules of Professional Conduct, which command lawyers to "abide by a client's decisions concerning the scope and objectives of representation" and "abide by a client's decision whether to settle" or proceed with a lawsuit. See RPC 1.2(a). Lawyers and judges may conclude that a client's decision to turn down a settlement offer is mistaken or even foolish, but in a system of justice that respects the right of every individual to control her personal destiny, the client's decision must be honored.

Only when, through proper legal procedures, a court determines that a litigant lacks the mental capacity to govern her affairs may the litigant be deprived of the right to decide the destiny of her lawsuit. Those essential principles are at the heart of the case before us.

Plaintiff S.T. allegedly suffered a serious injury when, as she exited the building where she worked, an object from above the building's door fell and struck her on the head. The injuries, she asserts, have severely impaired all aspects of her life, including her career. She filed a personal-injury lawsuit against the building owner and other purported responsible parties. S.T. rejected defendants' offer of judgment against the advice of her attorney. Because the attorney believed that S.T. suffered from a diminished mental capacity and that her rejection of defendants' offer was not in her best interests, he applied to the trial court for the appointment of a guardian ad litem.

The court appointed a guardian ad litem and then ceded to the guardian ad litem the authority to determine whether S.T. had the mental capacity to make an informed decision on whether to accept or reject a settlement offer. Based on the recommendation of the guardian ad litem and S.T.'s personal-injury attorney, the court accepted a settlement of the lawsuit against S.T.'s forceful objections.

The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of the trial court and the procedures that led to the approval of the settlement. S.T. v. 1515 Broad St., LLC, 455 N.J. Super. 538, 548-49, 190 A.3d 1073 (App. Div. 2018).

We now reverse. The trial court erroneously granted the guardian ad litem the power to make "any and all decisions regarding the ultimate disposition of this case, whether by trial or settlement" without ever conducting a guardianship hearing.

Before depriving S.T. of the right to control the direction of her case and appointing a guardian to make legal decisions on her behalf, the court was required to conduct a hearing to determine whether she lacked "sufficient capacity to govern [herself] and manage [her] affairs" "by reason of mental illness or intellectual disability." See N.J.S.A. 3B:1-2 ; N.J.S.A. 3B:12-24 ; R. 4:86-4. At such a hearing, S.T. had the right to independent counsel. See R. 4:86-4(a)(7). In the absence of a guardianship hearing and a judicial finding by clear and convincing evidence that S.T. lacked the requisite mental capacity to decide how to proceed with her lawsuit, the court had no authority to accept a settlement against S.T.'s wishes.

We therefore vacate the settlement and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

I.

A.

The record is derived from the discovery in S.T.'s personal-injury lawsuit, the pleadings and medical reports filed with the motion for the appointment of a guardian ad litem, and the proceedings related to the settlement of the personal-injury case.

On March 11, 2008, S.T. was a forty-four-year-old chemical engineer fluent in four languages. She came to this country as a teenage refugee from Vietnam and later served in the United States Army. She held a bachelor's degree in chemical engineering and master's degrees in both chemical engineering and environmental sciences.

On the evening of March 11, S.T. was working as a chemical engineer at ABB Lummis Global, located at 1515 Broad Street in Bloomfield, N.J. While exiting the building, S.T. was struck in the head by a metal plate that fell from above the building's doorway. Immediately after the impact, a security guard and maintenance worker offered to call an ambulance, but S.T. declined help. As S.T. drove home, she experienced double vision and "a severe left-sided headache with swelling of the left jaw, as well as pain behind the left eye and within the left ear." The next day, she went to the hospital, was diagnosed with a concussion, and was given intravenous medications for the pain. That was the first of more than 500 visits S.T. made to healthcare providers to address a constellation of conditions related to her claim that she suffered a traumatic brain injury.

One year after the accident, the Social Security Administration declared S.T. permanently disabled and awarded her permanent disability benefits. Since the accident, S.T. has received ongoing speech and cognitive therapy at the Veterans Administration Hospital.

Beginning in November 2010, S.T. was treated by Dr. Paula Reid, a clinical psychologist. In November 2010, Dr. Reid performed a neuropsychological evaluation and found that S.T. had experienced a "significant reduction in the predicted intellectual performance on verbal comprehension and processing speed." Dr. Reid noted that S.T.'s "processing speed difficulties impaired her performance on many of the tasks which were time dependent [and] specifically those related to complex" language material. S.T. also exhibited "a significant amount of depressive and anxious symptomology." Dr. Reid diagnosed S.T. as suffering from cognitive, anxiety, and depressive disorders. Dr. Reid opined that S.T.'s cognitive impairment is "expected to be a chronic and permanent condition."

Between June 2011 and August 2012, Dr. Peter Crain, a board-certified forensic psychiatrist, examined S.T. and reviewed her medical records.¹ He diagnosed S.T. as suffering from such conditions as post-concussion syndrome, major depressive disorder, post-traumatic migraine disorder, intracranial hypertension, and left trigeminal neuralgia.² Dr. Crain found those conditions to be "causally related to the accident and ... permanent in nature."

A 2013 psychological report from the Veterans Administration Hospital indicated that S.T. scored varied results on cognitive, intelligence, and psychological assessment tests. On the one hand, the report indicated that S.T.'s "[m]easures of verbal comprehension ... suggest[ed] a superior level of receptive language functions" and that her "measures of nonverbal domains including memory, spatial processing and nonverbal abstract reasoning" were above average. On the other hand, her speed in processing complex information remained impaired. The report recommended -- as had Dr. Reid -- that S.T. receive extended time to complete projects, and that she be permitted "to record all verbally presented job related assignments" and be provided with "frequent breaks to reduce fatigue and headaches."

S.T. also took numerous medications on a daily basis which were prescribed to treat anxiety, depression, chronic headaches and migraines, facial pain, and symptoms resulting from her cognitive impairment.

B.

In February 2010, S.T. filed a civil complaint alleging that she suffered serious injuries resulting from the negligence of defendants 1515 Broad Street, LLC (1515 Broad Street); the Walsh Company, LLC (Walsh); County Glass & Metal Installers, Inc. (County Glass); and other fictitious defendants responsible for the building's construction, repair, or maintenance. On May 26, 2010, County Glass filed a third-party complaint against Virginia Glass Products Corp. (Virginia Glass) and Idesco Corp. (Idesco). In an amended complaint filed two years and six months after her injury, S.T. brought a negligence claim against Idesco and product-liability claims against Virginia Glass.³ S.T. essentially contended that defendants played various roles in the negligent manufacture, installation, and maintenance of the doorway header that led to the accident and her injuries.

Idesco and Virginia Glass both moved for summary judgment arguing that S.T.'s claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The trial court denied Idesco's motion, finding that S.T. satisfied the fictitious- practice rule, R. 4:26-4, and therefore her claim was not barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The court, however, dismissed all claims against Virginia Glass because S.T.'s amended complaint asserted new causes of action that did not relate back to the original complaint...