S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Lewis

• Decision Date: 29 February 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 08–2187 (RMU).
• Parties: SOUTHERN UTAH WILDERNESS ALLIANCE et al., Plaintiffs, v. Wilma LEWIS, in her official capacity as Assistant Secretary for Lands and Minerals Management of the United States Department of the Interior et al. Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

845 F.Supp.2d 231

SOUTHERN UTAH WILDERNESS ALLIANCE et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Wilma LEWIS, in her official capacity as Assistant Secretary for Lands and Minerals Management of the United States Department of the Interior et al. Defendants.

Civil Action No. 08–2187 (RMU).

United States District Court,

District of Columbia.

Feb. 29, 2012.

Sharon Buccino, Natural Resources Defense Council, Washington, DC, David Garbett, Heidi Joy McIntosh, Stephen H.M. Bloch, Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, Salt Lake City, UT, Michael S. Freeman, Robin Cooley, Earthjustice, Denver, CO, for Plaintiffs.

Guillermo A. Montero, Michael D. Thorp, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Luther L. Hajek, U.S. Department of Justice, Denver, CO, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

RICARDO M. URBINA, District Judge.

Granting Carbon County, Utah's Motion to Transfer; Granting the Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration's Motion to Transfer

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the court upon two intervenor-defendants' motions to transfer the action to the United States District Court for the District of Utah. The plaintiffs, a group of environmental organizations, challenge the federal government's proposed usage of various tracts of public land in Utah. The plaintiffs initially brought suit in this court against various federal officials in the U.S. Department of the Interior and the U.S. Bureau of Land Management. Several Utah-based defendants subsequently intervened and moved to transfer this case to the judicial district in which the land is located. Because the public and private interest factors weigh in favor of transfer, the court grants the intervenor-defendants' respective motions.

II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The plaintiffs in this matter are a group of organizations dedicated to environmental protection and the conservation of natural resources. 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9–19. They challenge three resource management plans (“RMPs”) created by the U.S. Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) that provide a blueprint for managing several million acres of public lands located in Utah. Compl. ¶ 1. The plaintiffs contend that public lands at issue contain large portions of Utah's “magnificent red rock wilderness, wild stretches of rivers, irreplaceable archeological sites and cultural resources.” Id. The plaintiffs allege that the RMPs will permit the environmental despoliation of these areas. Id.

The defendants maintain that each of these RMPs were created and developed by BLM personnel in Utah. See Def. Carbon County's Mot. to Transfer at 4. According to the defendants, the BLM's local field offices in Utah were tasked with gathering relevant data and drawing up initial plans for management of these lands. Id. After deciding on a course of action, the BLM's field offices invited public comment on the proposals, which was received by those same offices. Id. The RMPs were then prepared in the local field offices in Utah with assistance from BLM's Utah State office. Id. at 5. After the RMPs were crafted, they were reviewed by the BLM director in Washington, D.C. Id. The Director concluded that the proposed RMPs were consistent with federal laws and regulations, and the Department of the Interior's Assistant Secretary for Land and Minerals Management signed the final approval of the RMPs. See id. at 6–8.

The plaintiffs brought suit against two defendants: Wilma Lewis in her official capacity as Assistant Secretary for Lands and Minerals Management at the United States Department of the Interior (“DOI”) ¹ and the BLM. 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 22–23. The plaintiffs maintain that these RMPs violate the Administrative Procedures Act and a number of federal laws designed to protect the environment. Id. ¶¶ 130–87.

In January 2009, the court allowed a number of defendants to intervene, including the State of Utah, a number of counties located in Utah, the Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration and a number of gas and oil companies. See Minute Order (May 28, 2009). Two of these defendants—Carbon County, Utah and the Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration—subsequently moved to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the District of Utah (“District of Utah”). See generally Def. Carbon County's Mot. to Transfer (“Carbon County Mot.”); Def. Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration's Mot. to Transfer (“USITLA Mot.”). With these motions ripe for adjudication, the court now turns to the applicable legal standards and the parties' arguments.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard for Venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and Transfer Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)

When federal jurisdiction is not premised solely on diversity, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) controls venue, establishing that venue is proper in:

(1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

In an action where venue is proper, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) nonetheless authorizes a court to transfer the action to any other district where it could have been brought “for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Section 1404(a) vests “discretion in the district court to adjudicate motions to transfer according to [an] individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.” Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27, 108 S.Ct. 2239, 101 L.Ed.2d 22 (1988) (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622, 84 S.Ct. 805, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964)). Under this statute, the moving party bears the burden of establishing that transfer is proper. Trout Unlimited v. Dep't of Agric., 944 F.Supp. 13, 16 (D.D.C.1996).

Accordingly, the defendants must make two showings to justify transfer. First, the defendants must establish that the plaintiffs originally could have brought the action in the proposed transferee district. Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 622, 84 S.Ct. 805. Second, the defendants must demonstrate that considerations of convenience and the interest of justice weigh in favor of transfer to that district. Trout Unlimited, 944 F.Supp. at 16. As to the second showing, the statute calls on the court to weigh a number of case-specific private- and public-interest factors. Stewart Org., 487 U.S. at 29, 108 S.Ct. 2239. The private-interest considerations include: (1) the plaintiffs' choice of forum, unless the balance of convenience is strongly in favor of the defendants; (2) the defendants' choice of forum; (3) whether the claim arose elsewhere; (4) the convenience of the parties; (5) the convenience of the witnesses; and (6) the ease of access to sources of proof. Trout Unlimited, 944 F.Supp. at 16 (citing Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir.1995); Heller Fin., Inc. v. Riverdale Auto Parts, Inc., 713 F.Supp. 1125, 1129 (N.D.Ill.1989); 15 Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 3848). The public-interest considerations include: (1) the transferee's familiarity with the governing laws; (2) the relative congestion of the calendars of the potential transferee and transferor courts; and (3) the local interest in deciding local controversies at home. Id.

B. The Court Grants the Intervenor–Defendants' Motion to Transfer

1. Venue Is Proper in the District of Utah

The threshold question to be resolved under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is whether this action could have been brought in the District of Utah. Trout Unlimited, 944 F.Supp. at 16. Because this action concerns real property situated in Utah, all parties conclude that this suit could have been brought in the District of Utah. See28 U.S.C. § 1391(e); Carbon County Mot. at 5–6; USITLA Mot. at 13; Pls.' Opp'n at 12 n.6. The court agrees. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Norton, 315 F.Supp.2d 82, 87 (D.D.C.2004) (concluding that venue was proper in the District of Utah because the dispute concerned land in Utah). Because venue would be proper in the District of Utah, the court now turns to its analysis of the relevant private-interest and public-interest factors.

2. The Private–Interest Factors Weigh in Favor of Transfer to the District of Utah

a. Weighing the Plaintiffs' Choice of Forum Against the Defendants' Choice of Forum

The defendants contend that a transfer would be appropriate notwithstanding the plaintiffs' decision to bring suit in the District of Columbia because there are no meaningful ties between this controversy and the District of Columbia. Carbon County Mot. at 1–3, 15–16; USITLA Mot. at 11–13. More specifically, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs have not shown that the BLM's personnel in Washington, D.C. played any meaningful role in crafting the RMPs at issue. Id. Rather, the defendants argue that the RMPs were created, drafted and developed in the BLM's field offices in Utah. Id.

The plaintiffs counter that the federal BLM defendants in this case played a significant role in finalizing the RMPs, thus establishing a substantial nexus between this controversy and the District of Columbia. Pls.' Opp'n at 13–14. The plaintiffs further argue that a substantial connection between the facts of this case and the District of Columbia can be drawn from the national importance of the environmentalissues implicated by this suit. Id. at 14–15.

The court begins its analysis by weighing the plaintiffs' choice to bring suit in the District of Columbia against the defendants' countervailing suggestion that this case should be heard in the District of Utah. See Trout Unlimited, 944 F.Supp. at 16. A plaintiff's choice of forum “is due substantial deference and, unless the balance of convenience is strongly in favor of the defendants, should...