S.V. v. Estate of Bellamy

• Decision Date: 10 October 1991
• Docket Number: No. 18A02-9010-CV-570,18A02-9010-CV-570
• Citation: 579 N.E.2d 144
• Parties: S.V., on Behalf of Her Unborn Child, Appellant-Petitioner, v. The ESTATE OF James A. BELLAMY, Appellee-Respondent.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 144

579 N.E.2d 144

S.V., on Behalf of Her Unborn Child, Appellant-Petitioner, v. The ESTATE OF James A. BELLAMY, Appellee-Respondent.

No. 18A02-9010-CV-570.

Court of Appeals of Indiana Second District.

Oct. 10, 1991.

David W. Stone, IV, Anderson, Robert L. Lewis, Gary, for appellant-petitioner.

T. Eric Evans, Muncie, for appellee-respondent.

SULLIVAN, Judge.

S.V., on behalf of her child who was born subsequent to the commencement of this action, appeals from the dismissal of her Complaint for Paternity filed against the estate of James Bellamy and which alleged that James Bellamy (Bellamy), deceased, was the unborn child's father.

We reverse.

S.V. argues that the trial court erred when it held that the petition to establish paternity was time-barred; or, in the alternative, that I.C. 29-1-2-7(b) (Burns Code Ed.1989), the statute which sets forth the limitation period, if construed so as to time-bar her petition, is unconstitutional as violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This issue has not been previously addressed in Indiana.

The pertinent facts are not in dispute. Bellamy died on July 11, 1988. At the time of Bellamy's death, S.V. was approximately one month pregnant with the child in whose behalf the instant action was brought. S.V. claimed that Bellamy was her unborn child's father, and on March 1, 1989, instituted proceedings to establish paternity. On March 16, 1989, the child was born. On October 26, 1989, the Estate filed its Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the paternity action was not timely filed, pursuant to I.C. 29-1-2-7(b). On July 13, 1990, after a hearing, the trial court granted the Estate's Motion to Dismiss. S.V. appeals from that judgment.

The issues presented for our review involve the interpretation and constitutionality of I.C. 29-1-2-7(b), which states:

"(b) For the purpose of inheritance (on the paternal side) to, through, and from a child born out of wedlock, the child shall be treated as if the child's father were married to the child's mother at the time of the child's birth, if:

(1) The paternity of the child has been established by law in a cause of action that is filed:

(A) During the father's lifetime; or

(B) Within five (5) months after the father's death...." (emphasis supplied).

I. Statutory Construction

S.V. argues that I.C. 29-1-2-7(b) should be construed to mean that the five-month time period in which to file a paternity action against a deceased putative father, for inheritance purposes, does not commence to run until there is a person in being on whose behalf the action may be brought--that is, until the child is born. S.V. seeks to buttress her argument with a recitation and application of rules of statutory construction. However, this court is obliged to decline application of those rules of construction when, as here, the statute's meaning is plain and unambiguous.

When a statute is plain and unambiguous, this court may not "interpret" or substitute its own meanings for words the meanings of which are otherwise clear. We may not give an interpretation different than that which the legislature clearly and expressly intended. Kemper v. Warren Petroleum Corp. Inc. (1983) 2d Dist.Ind.App., 451 N.E.2d 1115. The statute in question clearly states that in order to establish inheritance rights the action must be commenced within five months of the death of the alleged father. No exception is made for, nor reference made to, situations involving posthumous children. The only triggering event identified in the statute is the death of the putative father. S.V.'s invitation to insert a second triggering event, i.e., the birth of a posthumous child, is more properly directed to the legislature because it amounts to a request to rewrite the statute. ¹

We hold that, for inheritance purposes, I.C. 29-1-2-7(b) requires paternity actions to be filed within five months after the death of the putative father, notwithstanding the fact that the action is filed on behalf of a posthumous child.

II. Constitutionality

S.V. asserts that I.C. 29-1-2-7(b) violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to posthumous children. When considering whether state legislation violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, courts apply different levels of scrutiny to different types of classifications made. It is not entirely clear whether S.V. claims that the class which is being discriminated against is composed of only posthumous illegitimate children ² or whether she refers to all illegitimate children. ³ However, it seems clear that illegitimacy is the essence of the claimed classification. Courts generally apply an intermediate level of scrutiny to discriminatory classifications based upon gender or illegitimacy. Clark v. Jeter (1988), 486 U.S. 456, 108 S.Ct. 1910, 1914, 100 L.Ed.2d 465. In order to withstand intermediate scrutiny, a statutory classification must be substantially related to an important government objective. Id.

The United States Supreme Court has adopted a framework for evaluating equal protection challenges to statutes of limitations that apply to suits to establish paternity, and which thereby limit the child's ability to obtain support.

"First, the period for obtaining support ... must be sufficiently long in duration to present a reasonable opportunity for those with an interest in such children to assert claims on their behalf. Second, any time limitation placed on that opportunity must be substantially related to the State's interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims." Mills v. Habluetzel (1982), 456 U.S. 91, 99-100, 102 S.Ct. 1549, 1554-1555, 71 L.Ed.2d 770.

The standard adopted in Mills is therefore a two-pronged test in which courts examine 1) the limit placed by the statute, and 2) the state's interest in setting that limit. See also S.M.V. v. Littlepage (1982) 1st Dist.Ind.App., 443 N.E.2d 103, 110, (Ratliff, J., concurring).

I.C. 29-1-2-7(b) grants five months following the putative father's death within which to file a paternity action. At that time the right to establish legal paternity for inheritance purposes is extinguished. S.V. argues that the five-month period does not pass constitutional muster, citing several Indiana and United States Supreme Court cases which struck down statutes of limitations which granted periods even longer than five months. In Clark, supra, the United States Supreme Court held that a Pennsylvania statute allowing six years within which to bring a paternity action violated the equal protection clause. The statute had been amended while the appeal was pending. 108 S.Ct. at 1915. The interest which the State claimed to justify its six-year limitation was the avoidance of stale or fraudulent claims. Id. The Court rejected this reason as insufficient:

"We are, however, confident that the 6-year statute of limitations is not substantially related to Pennsylvania's interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims....

A more recent indication that Pennsylvania does not consider proof problems insurmountable is the enactment by the Pennsylvania Legislature in 1985 of an 18-year statute of limitations for paternity and support actions.... Nevertheless, the new statute is a tacit concession that proof problems are not overwhelming." Clark, supra, 108 S.Ct. at 1915-16.

In In the Matter of the Paternity of M.D.H., R.L.W., and C.D.M., Appellants (1982) 1st Dist.Ind.App., 437 N.E.2d 119, the court held that a two-year statute of limitations for bringing paternity actions was unconstitutional.

"There can be no question but that the state has a legitimate interest in preventing stale or fraudulent claims and that such legitimate interest is the fundamental rationale of statutes of limitation ... [B]ecause we find that problems of proof in paternity cases are no greater than, if as great as, problems of proof in other causes of action whose statutes of limitation are tolled by infancy, we hold there is no substantial, or even reasonable, state interest which would justify any longer the invidious barrier erected before the illegitimate child who after two years is precluded from bringing a support action if it depends upon a determination of paternity." Matter of M.D.H., supra, 437 N.E.2d at 128-29.

The other cases cited by S.V. are similar to Clark and Matter of M.D.H. in that they involved actions for support in which the identified state interest was the prevention of stale and fraudulent claims. As is apparent in the above quoted excerpts, courts struck down the disputed statutes based upon a determination that the state's interest simply did not justify the imposition of the complained-of limitation period. Therefore, the statutes were found to be constitutionally infirm. However, we do not find S.V.'s authority persuasive. Those cases are distinguishable in one critical aspect: The nature of the State's interest in setting the limitation period.

Prevention of stale and fraudulent claims is a state's interest offered as justification for I.C. 29-1-2-7(b). See Matter of Estate of Edwards (1990) 1st Dist.Ind.App., 562 N.E.2d 763, 766. In light of Clark and Matter of M.D.H., the constitutionality of this statute could not be sustained based upon that State interest alone. However, the limit placed by I.C. 29-1-2-7(b) is also justified by the State's interest in the orderly disposition of decedents' estates. Id. at 767. For this reason, we are persuaded that the instant case is more closely analogous to Lalli v. Lalli (1978) 439 U.S. 259, 99 S.Ct. 518, 58 L.Ed.2d 503.

In Lalli, the Supreme Court upheld, against an equal protection challenge, a New York Statute ⁴ which required that paternity be established by an order of filiation made by a court of competent jurisdiction before the death of the putative father. We note initially that the New York Statute was even more restrictive than I.C....