S. Y. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc.
| Citation | 521 F.Supp.3d 1173 |
| Decision Date | 22 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 2:20-cv-628-JES-MRM |
| Parties | S. Y., Plaintiff, v. WYNDHAM HOTELS & RESORTS, INC. and Rist Properties, LLC, Defendants. |
| Court | United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Court of Middle District of Florida |
Brian J. Perkins, Pro Hac Vice, Levin Simes Abrams, San Francisco, CA, Diana Yastrovskaya, Randolph Janis, Pro Hac Vice, Virginia E. Anello, Pro Hac Vice, Douglas & London, P.C., New York, NY, Yale T. Freeman, Yale T. Freeman, PA, Gainesville, FL, Sharon M. Hanlon, Zelman & Hanlon, PA, Naples, FL, for Plaintiff.
David S. Sager, DLA Piper LLP, Short Hills, NJ, J. Trumon Phillips, DLA Piper US, LLP, Tampa, FL, Lianna Bash, Pro Hac Vice, DLA Piper LL, Seattle, WA, for Defendant Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc.
Brooke E. Beebe, Cole, Scott & Kissane, PA, Bonita Springs, FL, for Defendant Rist Properties, LLC.
This matter comes before the Court on review of the following motions: (1) defendant Rist Properties, LLC's Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Strike, or For a More Definite Statement and Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof (Doc. #13), filed on September 28, 2020, and (2) defendant Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. #14), filed on September 30, 2020. Plaintiff filed an Opposition to each motion (Doc. #32; Doc. #36) on November 2nd and November 4th, 2020. Defendant Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc. filed a Reply (Doc. #43) on November 30, 2020. For the reasons set forth below, the motions are denied.
The origins of this case began on October 30, 2019, when plaintiff and another alleged victim of sex trafficking filed a case in the Circuit Court of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit in and for Collier County, Florida. See S.Y. et al. v. Naples Hotel Co. et al., Case No. 2:20-cv-118 (Doc. #1, p. 3). On December 31, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint which asserted ten claims against over forty defendants. Id. at (Doc. #1, pp. 2-4). The case was removed to federal court in February 2020. Id. at (Doc. #1). On April 15, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint. Id. at (Doc. #85). On August 5, 2020, the undersigned denied various motions to dismiss, but determined severance of the parties was appropriate. S.Y. v. Naples Hotel Co., 476 F. Supp. 3d 1251, 1258-59 (M.D. Fla. 2020). Following the Court's severance order, plaintiff and the other alleged victim filed nearly thirty new actions against various defendants, including this case.
The Complaint (Doc. #1) in this case was filed on August 19, 2020, and alleges that plaintiff S.Y., a resident of Collier County, Florida, was a victim of continuous sex trafficking at a certain Ramada by Wyndham Naples Hotel in Naples, Florida (the Ramada Hotel) between 2015 and February 2016. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 13, 22-24.) The Complaint alleges that during this time period the Ramada Hotel was operated by defendant Rist Properties, LLC (Rist) as a franchisee of defendant Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc. (Wyndham).1 (Id. ¶¶ 25-28, 49.)
The Complaint alleges the following six claims: (1) violation of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA), 18 U.S.C. § 1595 ; (2) violation of the Florida RICO statute, § 772.104, Florida Statutes ; (3) premise liability; (4) negligent hiring, supervision, and retention; (5) negligent rescue; and (6) aiding and abetting, harboring, confining, coercion, and criminal enterprise. (Id. pp. 33-48.) Counts One through Four are asserted against each defendant, while Counts Five and Six are asserted against only Rist. (Id. )
The Rist and Wyndham motions raise numerous arguments as to why the Complaint as whole, and each individual claim, should be dismissed. The Court will address each of these arguments in turn.
Rist argues that the Complaint contains numerous allegations that are redundant, irrelevant, and scandalous, and therefore should be struck. (Doc. #13, pp. 4-7.) Pursuant to Rule 12(f), a party may move to strike "any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter" within the pleadings. The Court enjoys broad discretion in determining whether to grant or deny a motion to strike. Anchor Hocking Corp. v. Jacksonville Elec. Auth., 419 F. Supp. 992, 1000 (M.D. Fla. 1976). "The purpose of a motion to strike is to clean up the pleadings, streamline litigation, and avoid unnecessary forays into immaterial matters." Hutchings v. Fed. Ins. Co., 2008 WL 4186994, *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 8, 2008) (marks and citation omitted). It is not intended to "procure the dismissal of all or part of a complaint." Id. A motion to strike is a drastic remedy and is disfavored by the courts. Schmidt v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 289 F.R.D. 357, 358 (M.D. Fla. 2012). Therefore, a motion to strike should be granted only if "the matter sought to be omitted has no possible relationship to the controversy, may confuse the issues, or otherwise prejudice a party." Id.
Rist moves to strike ten paragraphs in the Complaint, arguing the allegations therein contain (1) irrelevant "puffing" about sex trafficking and its alleged relationship with the hotel industry, and (2) immaterial and scandalous matters regarding Rist's knowledge of the tactics of sex traffickers. (Doc. #13, pp. 5-6.) Having reviewed the allegations at issue (Doc. #1, ¶¶ 3-5, 55-57, 78-80, 146), the Court declines to strike them. The majority2 of the allegations relate to the defendants’ knowledge of sex trafficking, the failure to prevent it, and the motivation for doing so. Such allegations are relevant to the type of claims plaintiff asserts, S.Y., 476 F. Supp. 3d at 1259 n.5, and the Court does not find any to be overly redundant or unduly prejudicial. Accordingly, the request to strike the allegations is denied.
The Complaint identifies Wyndham and Rist collectively as the "Ramada Defendants." (Doc. #1, p. 1 introductory paragraph.) Wyndham and Rist argue that because the Complaint groups them together, it should be dismissed as a shotgun pleading. (Doc. #13, pp. 7-10; Doc. #14, pp. 5-6.)3
One way in which a complaint may constitute an impermissible shotgun pleading is if it "assert[s] multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought against." Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015) ; see also Barmapov v. Amuial, 986 F.3d 1321, 1324–25 (11th Cir. 2021). Such a pleading fails "to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests," Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323, and violates the requirement that a plaintiff provide "a short and plain statement of the claim," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).4
The Complaint does indeed repeatedly refer to the two defendants collectively as the "Ramada Defendants." The failure to specify a particular defendant is not fatal, however, when "[t]he complaint can be fairly read to aver that all defendants are responsible for the alleged conduct." Kyle K. v. Chapman, 208 F.3d 940, 944 (11th Cir. 2000). The Complaint typically (but not always) alleges that "each and every" such defendant was involved in the activity described in the particular paragraph of the Complaint. A fair reading of the Complaint is that each of these defendants was involved in the identified conduct attributed to the "Ramada Defendants." While defendants may disagree that such allegations are accurate, that dispute is for another day. The group allegations do not fail to state a claim, Auto. Alignment & Body Serv., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 953 F.3d 707, 732–33 (11th Cir. 2020), and the Complaint does not constitute a shotgun pleading.
Each defendant argues certain claims should be dismissed due to plaintiff's failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This obligation "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citation omitted). To survive dismissal, the factual allegations must be "plausible" and "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ; see also Edwards v. Prime Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010). This requires "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citations omitted).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007), but "[l]egal conclusions without adequate factual support are entitled to no assumption of truth," Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Factual allegations that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability fall short of being facially plausible. Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Thus, the Court engages in a two-step approach: "When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
Wyndham challenges the one...
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