Sabados v. Planned Parenthood

• Decision Date: 28 December 2007
• Docket Number: No. 1-07-1442.,1-07-1442.
• Citation: 882 N.E.2d 121,378 Ill. App.3d 243
• Parties: Lauren SABADOS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF GREATER INDIANA, an Indiana Corporation, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

882 N.E.2d 121

378 Ill. App.3d 243

Lauren SABADOS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF GREATER INDIANA, an Indiana Corporation, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-07-1442.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division.

December 28, 2007.

John P. Twohy, Logan C. Hughs, Kirk D. Bagrowski of Eichhorn & Eichhorn LLP, Hammond, IN, for Appellant.

Tom Leahy, F. Michael Alkaraki of Leahy & Hoste, Chicago, for Appellee.

Justice GREIMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Planned Parenthood of Greater Indiana, Inc. (PPI)¹, appeals the order of the trial court denying its motion to dismiss the underlying cause of action for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to section 2-209 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-209 (West 2004)) in favor of plaintiff, Lauren Sabados. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction where the nonresident health care provider rendered services to plaintiff in its Hammond, Indiana, clinic.

Plaintiff filed the underlying medical negligence action based on defendant's alleged failure to comply with an adequate standard of care in her treatment. On June 4, 2004, plaintiff, who was 16 years old at the time, lived in Lansing, Illinois, and traveled four miles to the PPI clinic in Hammond, Indiana, to obtain contraceptives. PPI prescribed plaintiff a form of birth control pills and after ingesting the prescribed dosage for approximately two months, plaintiff developed a blood clot. In July 2006, plaintiff filed a complaint in the circuit court of Cook County alleging that she suffered permanent injuries as a direct result of defendant's failure to obtain an adequate medical history prior to prescribing her the birth control pills. In response, defendant's counsel filed a special and limited appearance to contest in personam jurisdiction on the basis that PPI does not provide any services in Illinois and lacks the requisite minimum contacts with Illinois to support an exercise of jurisdiction and subsequently filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619(1) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619(1) (West 2004)) to that effect. The trial court then granted plaintiff's request to conduct limited discovery pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 201(l) (166 Ill.2d. R. 201(l)), and thereafter plaintiff filed a response in opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss. A hearing was held on May 3, 2007, at the conclusion of which the trial court denied defendant's motion. The trial court did not elaborate as to which section of the jurisdictional statute it used to exercise jurisdiction over defendant. We granted defendant's timely filed petition for leave to appeal that order.

Pursuant to the Rule 201(l) discovery, the trial court learned that PPI provides health care throughout Indiana at 37 different locations within that state. PPI does not own property in Illinois and is not registered to conduct business in Illinois. From 2001 to 2005, PPI did, however, treat up to 1,500 Illinois residents per year. This number represented approximately 1.5% of the total number of patients seen by PPI. In addition, pursuant to review of PPF's corporate fund-raising database, a small number of Illinois residents were listed as participants. Moreover, from 2003 to 2007, advertisements for PPI appeared in the telephone books of four southern suburbs of Chicago, namely, Calumet City, Illinois; South Harvey, Illinois; Riverdale, Illinois; and Lansing, Illinois, plaintiffs hometown at the time in question. Further, over the course of five years, PPI employed eight Illinois residents.

Elizabeth Carroll, vice president of PPI's patient services, was deposed and testified that, in regard to the patient directory upon which its response was derived, the directory is continually updated to record the most current address information for patients, including those that moved, in order to provide patients with updates on any relevant medical data. Regarding the fundraising database, Carroll testified that some of the Illinois residents and entities listed may have expressly requested to be included in fund-raising efforts. In addition, as with the patient directory, the fund-raising database is continually updated with the most current address information. Finally, with regard to the telephone book advertisements, Carroll testified that PPI was not involved in the placement of the advertisements; rather, the listings were included solely based upon the decision of the publishers.

A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie basis for exercising a court's in personam jurisdiction over a defendant. Illinois Commerce Comm'n v. Entergy-Koch Trading, LP, 362 Ill.App.3d 790, 795, 298 Ill.Dec. 884, 841 N.E.2d 27 (2005). A plaintiff's prima facie case may be rebutted where a defendant presents uncontradicted evidence that defeats jurisdiction. Entergy-Koch Trading, LP, 362 Ill.App.3d at 795, 298 Ill.Dec. 884, 841 N.E.2d 27. When the trial court determines jurisdiction solely based upon documentary evidence, review is conducted de novo. Alderson v. Southern Co., 321 Ill.App.3d 832, 846, 254 Ill.Dec. 514, 747 N.E.2d 926 (2001). In the instant case, limited discovery was conducted, including deposition testimony. Because there is no material dispute regarding those facts uncovered, merely a dispute regarding the legal conclusions to be drawn from those facts, we review the trial court's ruling de novo. Alderson, 321 Ill.App.3d at 846, 254 Ill.Dec. 514, 747 N.E.2d 926.

Section 2-209 of the Code, known as the long-arm statute, governs when Illinois courts have the power to exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. See Commercial Coin Laundry Systems v. Loon Investments, LLC, 375 Ill.App.3d 26, 29, 313 Ill.Dec. 171, 871 N.E.2d 898 (2007). In particular, subsection 2-209(a) describes 14 grounds under which specific jurisdiction arises and subsection 2-209(b) describes 4 grounds under which general jurisdiction arises. 735 ILCS 5/2-209(a), (b) (West 2004). However, exercise of any form of personal jurisdiction must comport with due process. Commercial Coin Laundry Systems, 375 Ill.App.3d at 30, 313 Ill.Dec. 171, 871 N.E.2d 898.

Traditionally, Illinois courts employed a two-step analysis to determine whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction by evaluating: (1) personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute; and (2) due process under both the United States and Illinois Constitutions. Crum & Forster Specialty Insurance Co. v. Extended Stay America, Inc., 375 Ill.App.3d 654, 660, 314 Ill.Dec. 34, 873 N.E.2d 964 (2007). In 1989, the legislature amended the long-arm statute to include subsection 2-209(c), known as a "catch-all" provision, which provides a court with personal jurisdiction based on "any other basis now or hereafter permitted by the Illinois Constitution and the Constitution of the United States." 735 ILCS 5/2-209(c) (West 2004); Kostal v. Pinkus Dermatopathology Laboratory, P.C., 357 Ill.App.3d 381, 386, 293 Ill.Dec. 150, 827 N.E.2d 1031 (2005). This subsection has since been treated as an independent basis for asserting in personam jurisdiction over a defendant; therefore, personal jurisdiction may be asserted so long as it does not offend the guarantees of due process provided by the Illinois and United States Constitutions. Alderson, 321 Ill.App.3d at 856, 254 Ill.Dec. 514, 747 N.E.2d 926. When that occurs, the traditional two-step analysis is no longer necessary under the long-arm statute. Crum & Forster Specialty Insurance Co., 375 Ill. App.3d at 660, 314 Ill.Dec. 34, 873 N.E.2d 964. Accordingly, once federal and state due process requirements have been met, analysis of the enumerated acts listed in the statute is wholly unnecessary. Kostal, 357 Ill.App.3d at 387, 293 Ill.Dec. 150, 827 N.E.2d 1031.² We, therefore, focus our analysis on whether the due process requirements have been satisfied.

Federal due process requires that the defendant has sufficient "minimum contacts" with the forum state such that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend "`traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. [Citation.]'" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95, 102 (1945). Moreover, the action must arise out of the defendant's contacts with the forum state to the extent that it is reasonable to require the defendant to litigate in the forum state. Crum & Forster Specialty Insurance Co., 375 Ill.App.3d at 664, 314 Ill.Dec. 34, 873 N.E.2d 964, citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-77, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2181-85, 85 L.Ed.2d 528, 540-44 (1985). In the same vein, Illinois due process requires that it be "fair, just, and reasonable to require a nonresident defendant to defend an action in Illinois, considering the quality and nature of the defendant's acts which occur in Illinois or which affect interests located in Illinois." Rollins, 141 Ill.2d at 275, 152 Ill.Dec. 384, 565 N.E.2d 1302. Although dependent on whether a court seeks to assert specific jurisdiction or general jurisdiction, the minimum contacts analysis requires that the defendant engaged in some act "by which the defendant purposefully availed itself [or himself] of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state, in order to assure that a nonresident will not be haled into a forum solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts with the forum or the unilateral acts of a consumer or some other third person." Rosier v. Cascade Mountain, Inc., 367 Ill. App.3d 559, 562, 305 Ill.Dec. 352, 855 N.E.2d 243 (2006), citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475, 105 S.Ct. at 2183, 85 L.Ed.2d at 542. In the context of corporations, specific jurisdiction may be asserted when the suit directly arises out of or is connected to the defendant's purportedly wrongful acts within the forum state and general jurisdiction...