Sabine River Authority of Tex. v. McNatt, A-7956

• Citation: 342 S.W.2d 741,161 Tex. 551
• Decision Date: 15 February 1961
• Docket Number: No. A-7956,A-7956
• Parties: SABINE RIVER AUTHORITY OF TEXAS, Petitioner, v. J. P. McNATT et al., Respondents.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 741

342 S.W.2d 741

161 Tex. 551

SABINE RIVER AUTHORITY OF TEXAS, Petitioner, v. J. P. McNATT et al., Respondents.

No. A-7956.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Feb. 15, 1961.

H. P. Kucera, City Atty., Dallas, n. Alex Bickley, 1st Asst., Dallas, Byron Tinsley, Lutcher Simmons, Orange, allen Clark, Greenville, for petitioner.

G. C. Harris, Greenville, H. B. Harrison, Paris, for J. P. McNatt and intervenor-appellees T. C. Bell and others.

O. P. McWhirter, and B. F. Lowrie, Greenville, for intervenor-appellees T. A. Chandler and others.

STEAKLEY, Justice.

Respondents by suit and pleas of intervention sought to enjoin Petitioner from exercising eminent domain proceedings in the manner and as authorized by Article 7880-126, Vernon's Ann.Civ.Stats., as amended by the 42nd Legislature in 1931. Constitutionality of the statute was attacked on various grounds, and error was alleged in certain proceedings of Petitioner.

The trial court declared the statute 'void and unconstitutional for the reasons stated in Petitioner's petition,' and in the pleas of intervention.

The Court of Civil Appeals felt bound by the decision in White v. Maverick County Water Control and Improvement District, Tex.Com.App., 35 S.W.2d 107, 'to hold that Section j. Art. 7880-126, Acts of 1931 continues as violative of due process,' and affirmed on this basis alone. In other respects the Court sustained the constitutionality of the statute and upheld the proceedings of Petitioner as to which Respondents alleged error. 337 S.W.2d 325, 336. Writ of error was granted to review the due process question. Respondents rely primarily on the decision in White v. Maverick County Water Control and Improvement Dist.

In 1925, the 39th Legislature set about to effectively implement Section 59 of Article XVI of the Constitution, Vernon's Ann.St., which was adopted in 1917, and is known as the Conservation Amendment. Acts 1925, Ch. 25. Section 126 of the 1925 Act conferred the right of eminent domain upon districts established under the Act. Amendments followed at the First Called Session of the succeeding Legislature. Acts 1927, 1 C.S., Ch. 107. The 41st Legislature in 1929, in turn, extensively amended the 1925 and 1927 Acts and recited the following in the emergency clause:

'(a) Said Chapter 25 is the only Act making practical the beneficial operation of the full scope and intent of Section 59 of Article 16 of the Constitution of Texas:

'(b) Said Chapter 107 materially aids and clarifies the intent of said Chapter 25:

'(c) This Act is intended materially to aid in the practical operation of said Chapter 25 in keeping with all pertinent provisions of the Constitution of Texas.' Acts, 1929, Ch. 280, p. 613.

Section 14 of the 1929 Act established a detailed procedure 'for the purposes of condemning land, and other property, easements, and assessing damages * * *,' and came under constitutional attack in White v. Maverick, etc., supra (35 S.W.2d 108). The opinion of the Commission of Appeals delineated its decision as follows:

'* * * As we have reached the conclusion that the provision for condemnation of lands contained in the section assailed is violative of article 2, section 1, of the Constitution of this state, which prohibits the conferring of judicial power upon executive officers of the government, it is unnecessary that we enter into a discussion of the remaining constitutional objections urged to this portion of the act.'

At no point did the Court in White v. Maverick discuss or allude to due process; the criticism of the statutory procedure (which deferred hearing until after filing of the proposed report) related to and strengthened the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend to create a court in the 1929 Act. Indeed, the White v. Maverick decision (as pertinent here) can be said to have turned altogether on the question of legislative intent:

'A careful review of the provisions of the act leads us to the conclusion that the Legislature in providing for this board of commissioners of appraisement contemplated the creation of an administrative board rather than that of a court. One of the best methods to ascertain the legislative intent in this respect is to determine whether the system under which the board of appraisement is to function is similar in nature to that usually provided when the Legislature creates a court.' (Emphasis added)

Following the decision in White v. Maverick, which was handed down February 4, 1931, the 42nd Legislature, which was then in session, curatively amended the 1925 and 1929 Acts with this declaration of intent in Section 2:

'Sec. 2. (Expressing the reasons for the enactment hereof and designating the Statutory Acts to be amended hereby) * * * (b) A recent decision by the Supreme Court f decision by the Supreme Court of provisions of Section 14 of Chapter 280 to be void as constituting a legislative intent to invade the province of the Judicial Department of the State's Government by conferring Judicial functions on an Administrative body in contravention of Section 1 of Article 2 of the Constitution of Texas. The effect of said decision is to render uncertain the means by which a District may assess taxes on a basis of specific benefits; and, will deny to Districts the right to exercise the more practical, economical and equitable procedure for condemnation, intended by the Legislature to be conferred by said Section 14; wherefore said Section 14 of Chapter 280 hereby is repealed, and in lieu thereof it is provided as follows, viz:'

It is apparent that the Legislature promptly met the decision in White v. Maverick in its continuing effort to provide more expeditious land acquisition procedures for Water Control and Improvement Districts; and we agree with the holding of the Court of Civil Appeals that:

'In the wording of Art. 7880-126, the Legislature made certain that it intended to create and did create a court or tribunal which was to have original jurisdiction of proceedings for condemnation and was to exercise judicial functions as provided in our State Constitution; thereby freeing the 1931 Act from the infirmity above referred to in White's appeal, supra, where merely an administrative body was involved rather than a 'tribunal' vested with judicial powers.'

We differ from the Court of Civil Appeals in its interpretation of the decision in White v. Maverick as also holding the 1929 Act invalid as lacking in due process. As before noted, the Court pretermitted any consideration of due process (or other constitutional questions), and we come to the due process problem as an original question insofar as this decision is concerned.

The mode of determination of the compensation to be awarded for the taking of property under the 1931 amendment may be summarized as follows:

Interested persons are given notice of the institution of proceedings by the Authority by means of registered mail and newspaper publication, and at the time and place fixed by the District Judge for the hearing of the petition of the Authority for appointment of the Tribunal all interested persons have opportunity to show good cause why the District Judge should not appoint any or all of the persons nominated in the petition. (Sec. (c))

The Tribunal appointed by the District Judge is governed by Article 3265 of Title 52 (Eminent Domain) in 'assessing the value of property sought to be condemned, damages and compensation benefits,' and views, appraises and assesses damages which will justly compensate and liquidate all injuries to affected lands, easements or property rights. (Sec. (j))

The Tribunal prepares 'a specific and detailed proposed report of their findings,' and in the proposed report fixes '(the) times and places when and where they shall hear objections to their findings as reported.' (Sec. (j))

The Secretary of the District gives notice 'forthwith' by newspaper publication once a week for two consecutive weeks, and, in addition, mails written notice to each person whose land or other property is listed in the proposed report, or, in lieu thereof, personal notice may be executed and returned under oath. (Sec. (k))

Any owner of land or other property affected by the report of plans for improvements may file exceptions and a claim for damages at, or before, the hearing, and at the time and place named in the notice the Tribunal proceeds to hear evidence and determine objections and claims for damages, and, after determining all matters presented, enters final decree 'to conform to the justice of each case under the facts presented.' (Sec. (l))

A certified copy of the final decree is filed with the County Clerk as notice to all persons and is subject to appeal and judicial review in the manner of a trial de novo by the District Court without the intervention of a jury, the court to be 'governed by the law and rules of procedure relating to trials and awards in damage suits' in considering 'whether just compensation has been allowed, or whether any damages are lawfully recoverable,' such review by the District Court being 'as summary in character as is consistent with the doing of full and complete justice.' (Sec. (l))

After hearing 'all evidence and argument offered, the Court in term time shall enter its final decree, either approving the decree of the Tribunal of Original Jurisdiction, modifying the same, or in any manner changing the same, so that the decree will in the Court's Judgment conform to the justice of each specific case.' (Sec. (l))

Appeals may be taken as in other civil cases, and each appeal constitutes a separate cause upon the docket of the Court of Civil Appeals. (Sec. (l))

The Court of Civil Appeals held the statute unconstitutional as violative of due process in the fact that the provision for Tribunal hearing is after, and not before, the filing of the proposed report of the Tribunal. The sufficiency of notice under the statute is not here questioned.

It is at once apparent that the...