Sabir v. Williams
| Decision Date | 26 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:20-cv-0008 (VAB),3:20-cv-0008 (VAB) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | RAFIQ SABIR, Plaintiff, v. WARDEN DONNA K. WILLIAMS, WARDEN, TRUST FUND ADMINISTRATOR JUAN RUIZ, & NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS KATHLEEN HAWK SAWYER, Defendants. |
Rafiq Sabir ("Plaintiff"), currently incarcerated in the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") and formerly housed at the Federal Correctional Institution Danbury ("FCI Danbury") has sued FCI Danbury Warden Donna Williams, Trust Fund Administrator Juan Ruiz ("Administrator Ruiz"), and National Director of Federal Bureau of Prisons Kathleen Hawk Sawyer. Compl., ECF No. 1 (Jan. 2, 2020).
Mr. Sabir has brought his Complaint under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 288 (1971) (Bivens); the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1029-1030; the Federal Torts Claims Act (or "FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-26801; the Administrative Procedure Act (or "APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706; and the Declaratory Judgment Act (or "DJA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2201.
The Court construes Mr. Sabir's Complaint as asserting claims for damages under Bivens based on violations of the First and the Fifth Amendments, as well as claims for equitable relief under the APA based on violation of the Fifth Amendment's implicit equal protection guarantee.
Mr. Sabir alleges he has "class action status" as he is bringing claims asserting violations occurring against Muslim inmates at FCI Danbury and other federal prisons. Compl. ¶ 54. As a pro se litigant, however, Mr. Sabir may not bring a class action lawsuit because non-attorneys may not represent anyone other than themselves. See American Psychiatric Ass'n v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc., 821 F.3d 352, 358 (2d Cir. 2016) (); Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 558 (2d Cir. 1998) ().
For the following reasons, Mr. Sabir's claim for injunctive relief under the APA will be permitted to proceed. All other claims will be dismissed.
Mr. Sabir has been in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons since 2005. Compl. ¶ 8. In July 2014, he was allegedly transferred to FCI Danbury. Id. ¶ 9.
In July 2019, the Bureau of Prisons allegedly transferred Mr. Sabir from FCI Danbury to FCI Loretto, id. ¶ 13, a transfer allegedly in retaliation for litigation he filed against FCI Danbury. Id. ¶ 11. At FCI Danbury, he allegedly violated Prison Rule 212 by participating or organizing a group demonstration. Id.
Mr. Sabir, a Sunni Muslim, allegedly purchases and uses prayer oil for religious purposes. Id. ¶ 12. Mr. Sabir allegedly purchased prayer oil at each federal prison where he hasbeen assigned since 2005. Id. ¶ 13. At FCI Loretto, however, he allegedly has been unable to purchase prayer oil due to a restriction on his commissary purchases for disciplinary reasons. Id.
Administrator Ruiz allegedly directly supervises the commissary operation at FCI Danbury and is responsible for issuing commissary purchase order forms to inmates that enable them to select items for purchase. Id. ¶ 15. These commissary forms allegedly are amended to reflect changes in items available and prices. Id. ¶ 16.
At FCI Danbury, under Prison Program Statement 4500.11, religious articles allegedly had "no mark-up" added to the item's cost. Id. ¶ 14. Prayer oil allegedly is a religious item on the commissary order form and is listed in the prison inmate handbook under permissible inmate property. Id. ¶¶ 17-18. It allegedly also is a religious item within the list of transferable inmate property. Id. ¶ 19. Based on use of the term "prayer oil" in the "Program Statement" and in official documents, Mr. Sabir allegedly ordered and paid for two bottles of prayer oil at $15 each as part of a special Ramadan order in 2017 available only to Muslim inmates. Id. ¶ 20. After purchasing the prayer oil, Mr. Sabir allegedly learned that the price of the prayer oil had been marked up from its cost of $12 to a price of $15 per bottle. Id. ¶ 21.
Mr. Sabir allegedly then filed an informal resolution form, BP-8, to request a refund of the marked-up amount. Id. ¶ 22. Administrator Ruiz allegedly refused to refund the mark-up and claimed that the prayer oil was not a religious item. Id.
Mr. Sabir alleges the commissary form is a means of advertising under the direction and control of Administrator Ruiz. Id. ¶ 24. The description of prayer oil as a religious item allegedly is under the direction of the FCI Warden. Id. at ¶ 25. Both Administrator Ruiz and Warden Williams allegedly knew or should have known that they were deceiving Mr. Sabir and other Muslim inmates by describing prayer oil as a religious item and then marking up the price. Id. ¶26. Mr. Sabir alleges this practice has been ongoing since 2014, when FCI Danbury became a men's correctional facility. Id. ¶ 27. Mr. Sabir alleges that these marking up of Muslim religious items have been occurring at federal prisons throughout the United States. Id. ¶ 28.
The prison commissary allegedly makes deductions from inmate accounts after scanning an inmate's fingerprint to identify the inmate making the purchase. Id. ¶ 31. The fingerprint scan allegedly accesses government computers and inmate financial banking records. Id. ¶ 32. Through the fingerprint scan, an inmate allegedly endorses the purchases and the commissary may withdraw funds from that inmate's account. Id. ¶ 31. Funds from outside of Connecticut allegedly were added to Mr. Sabir's account and the prayer oil sold by FCI Danbury was acquired from outside of Connecticut. Id. ¶ 33. Revenue from the Trust Fund is supposed to support inmate activities, but Mr. Sabir alleges that the money is diverted for staff purposes. Id. ¶ 41.
On January 2, 2020, Mr. Sabir filed his Complaint against Warden Williams, Administrator Ruiz, and National Director Ruiz. Compl.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), district courts must review prisoners' civil complaints against governmental actors and sua sponte "dismiss . . . any portion of [a] complaint [that] is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted," or that "seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also Liner v. Goord, 196 F.3d 132, 134 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1999) (); Tapia-Ortiz v. Winter, 185 F.3d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1999) .
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a plaintiff plead only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), to provide the defendant "fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests," see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
A plaintiff's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and assert a cause of action with enough heft to show entitlement to relief and "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. A claim is facially plausible if "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require "detailed factual allegations," a complaint must offer more than "labels and conclusions," "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," or "naked assertion[s]" devoid of "further factual enhancement." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-57. Plausibility at the pleading stage is nonetheless distinct from probability, and "a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of [the claim] is improbable, and . . . recovery is very remote and unlikely." Id. at 556 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs, however, "must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F. 3d 471, 474 (2dCir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F. 3d 90, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2010) ().
The Court construes Mr. Sabir's complaint liberally to allege federal claims based on violation of his constitutional rights under the First and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution; FTCA claims alleging false advertising, fraud, and unjust enrichment; and CFAA claims for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1029 and 1030. Although he has not specified whether he sues Defendants in their official or individual capacities, the Court construes his Complaint as suing Defendants in their official and individual capacities because of his requests for injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and monetary damages.
Under Bivens, "the federal analog to suits brought against state officials under [Section 1983,]" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009), claims for damages against federal officials in their individual capacities for damages are permitted only where claimant's constitutional rights have been violated. See Dunn v. U.S. Federal Bureau of Prisons, No. 3:03-CV-1928 (JBA), 2006 WL...
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