Sacco v. Cranston Sch. Dep't

• Decision Date: 17 October 2012
• Docket Number: Nos. 2011–21–Appeal, 2011–22–Appeal.,s. 2011–21–Appeal, 2011–22–Appeal.
• Citation: 53 A.3d 147
• Parties: Craig SACCO v. CRANSTON SCHOOL DEPARTMENT. Charles Pearson v. Cranston School Department.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

53 A.3d 147

Craig SACCO

v.CRANSTON SCHOOL DEPARTMENT.

Charles Pearson

v.Cranston School Department.

Nos. 2011–21–Appeal, 2011–22–Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Oct. 17, 2012.

Kevin M. Daley, Esq., for Plaintiffs.

Andrew Henneous, Esq., Providence, for Defendant.

Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.

OPINION

Justice GOLDBERG, for the Court.

These consolidated cases came before the Supreme Court on September 25, 2012, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not summarily be decided. The plaintiffs, Craig Sacco (Sacco) and Charles Pearson (Pearson) (collectively, plaintiffs), brought suit against the defendant, the Cranston School Department (the school department or defendant), seeking grievance arbitration of adverse actions taken against them as to their respective coaching positions at Cranston West High School (Cranston West or school).¹ The plaintiffs, both of whom are teachers at Cranston West, separately filed grievances against the school department in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that was in place between the Cranston Teacher's Alliance (alliance) and the school department. The defendant responded that the CBA did not apply to the plaintiffs in their capacity as coaches, and it subsequently refused to submit to arbitration. The plaintiffs filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that they were entitled to binding arbitration, as guaranteed by the CBA. Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed by the parties. On September 30, 2010, the trial justice determined that the plaintiffs—in their capacity as coaches—were not entitled to avail themselves of the CBA's grievance procedures. The trial justice granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment in each case and denied the respective motions for summary judgment and declaratory judgment sought by the plaintiffs.

These appeals ensued. Having carefully reviewed the memoranda submitted by the parties and the arguments of counsel, we are satisfied that cause has not been shown and the appeals may be decided at this time. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

Facts and Travel

It is undisputed that both Sacco and Pearson are teachers at Cranston West; additionally, Sacco was head coach of the school's varsity boy's hockey team for nine years, and Pearson was head coach of the varsity girl's soccer team for seven years. According to school department policy, all coaches undergo annual evaluations at the end of each season by the school department athletic director, Michael Traficante (athletic director or Traficante).

In accordance with this policy, Pearson and Sacco were evaluated at the conclusion of the 2007–2008 season. Each received an unfavorable evaluation. As a result, Pearson was placed on probation for one year.² Sacco was removed from his coaching position based on his unsatisfactory evaluation.

Both plaintiffs disputed the substance of the charges levied against them in the evaluations and sought to file grievances under Article VI of the CBA, which was effective September 1, 2005 through August 31, 2008. Article VI A.1. details grievance procedures and defines a “grievance” as “a complaint by a teacher or the Alliance (1) that there has been as to him/her or to it, a violation or inequitable application of any of the provisions of this contract or (2) that he/she or it has been treated inequitably * * * contrary to established School Committee policy.”

The school department refused to submit to arbitration because it asserted that the coaches were not employed pursuant to the CBA, but instead were working under separate, one-year coaching contracts. The defendant pointed to Resolution No. 05–6–29, a policy that was adopted by the school department on June 20, 2005, as the operative document setting forth the applicable retention standards governing coaching positions. Resolution No. 05–6–29 establishes that all coaching vacancies must be posted in each building by the superintendent, and that in the absence of qualified candidates within the particular school, the positions will be advertised. The resolution further prescribes the annual evaluation process and specifies that a coach must receive an adequate or better rating on a majority of the five categories evaluated to be reappointed.³ Sacco and Pearson both failed to attain adequate ratings in more than two categories.

The plaintiffs, however, maintained that, notwithstanding Resolution No. 05–6–29, the policies articulated in the CBA also apply, and define the rights of teachers who are functioning in coaching positions. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief to challenge the actions of the school department concerning the arbitration procedures outlined in the CBA.⁴ In granting summary judgment to defendants the trial justice determined that “the teachers here who function as coaches are not performing professional services within the contemplation of the collective bargaining agreement when they are functioning as coaches.” In so doing, the trial justice relied on Harbor Creek School District v. Harbor Creek Education Association, 536 Pa. 574, 640 A.2d 899, 902 (1994), as persuasive authority for the proposition that extracurricular work that traditionally is performed by teachers is not professional in nature and, consequently, is not arbitrable under the CBA.⁵ The plaintiffs urge this Court to reverse the judgment of the Superior Court and to hold that Sacco and Pearson, in their capacity as coaches, may avail themselves of the CBA's grievance procedures. We decline to do so.

Standard of Review

“It is well established that this Court reviews a grant of summary judgmentde novo.” Moore v. Rhode Island Board of Governors for Higher Education, 18 A.3d 541, 544 (R.I.2011) (citing Waterman v. Caprio, 983 A.2d 841, 844 (R.I.2009)). “We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and ‘if we conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[,]’ we will affirm the judgment.” Id. (quoting Berman v. Sitrin, 991 A.2d 1038, 1043 (R.I.2010)).

“Whether a particular collective bargaining agreement contains clear language creating a duty to arbitrate a particular dispute is a matter for judicial determination.” School Committee of North Kingstown v. Crouch, 808 A.2d 1074, 1078 (R.I.2002) (citing Local Union 1393 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL–CIO v. Utilities District of Western Indiana Rural Electric Membership Cooperative, 167 F.3d 1181, 1183 (7th Cir.1999)). “Because arbitrability is a question of law, we review such determinations de novo.” Crouch, 808 A.2d at 1078.

Analysis

“[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” Crouch, 808 A.2d at 1078 (quoting AT & T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 648, 106 S.Ct. 1415, 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986)). This Court has held that “[n]o one is under a duty to arbitrate unless with clear language he [or she] has agreed to do so.” Id. (quoting Stanley–Bostitch, Inc. v. Regenerative Environmental Equipment Co., 697 A.2d 323, 326 (R.I.1997)). In the absence of clear language in the CBA providing that plaintiffs—in their capacities as coaches—have a right to submit grievances to the arbitration and grievance procedures, no such right will be read into the contract. Therefore, it is our task to look to the CBA and the rights enunciated in it to determine whether there is an express agreement to arbitrate the rights of teachers who are working as sports-team coaches.

Article VI of the CBA sets forth the provisions concerning grievance resolution procedures. Article VI A.1. defines “grievance” and specifies that the term encapsulates complaints made by “a teacher or the Alliance.” Because the alliance is not a party to this suit, plaintiffs may avail themselves of Article VI only in their professional capacity as teachers. Article II of the CBA defines the term “teacher” as inclusive of “certified classroom teachers, teachers of the homebound, librarians, nurses, guidance counselors, reading consultants, department chairpersons, social workers and 10 month psychologists * * * excluding per diem teachers.” Importantly, while nurses, guidance counselors, and librarians are among those employees classified in the CBA as teachers, coaches are not. We deem the omission determinative. It is our opinion that if the school district or the union intended for coaches to enjoy the rights of teachers in their professional capacities, it would have included the term in the definitional section.

Additionally, our review of Resolution No. 05–6–29 discloses that although coaching vacancies initially are made available to those teachers assigned to a particular school, a coach may be hired from outside the school system and need not be a teacher nor a member of the collective bargaining unit. It follows that although some coaches also may be teachers, there is no concomitant requirement that a coach also hold a teaching position.

Furthermore, the CBA specifically refers to extracurricular positions in only two places. Article XXIV sets forth variousconsiderations that primarily apply to the hiring of teachers for extracurricular roles. Article...