Saddler v. State

• Decision Date: 30 April 2020
• Docket Number: NO. 2018-KA-01298-SCT,2018-KA-01298-SCT
• Citation: 297 So.3d 234
• Parties: Johnny Lee SADDLER a/k/a Johnny Saddler v. STATE of Mississippi
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

297 So.3d 234

Johnny Lee SADDLER a/k/a Johnny Saddler

v.STATE of Mississippi

NO. 2018-KA-01298-SCT

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

April 30, 2020

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER, BY: JUSTIN T. COOK, GEORGE T. HOLMES, Jackson

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, BY: ALICIA AINSWORTH, Jackson

EN BANC.

COLEMAN, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Johnny Lee Saddler argues on appeal that his constitutional and procedural rights were violated during trial court proceedings. Saddler argues that because he invoked his right to counsel and his right to silence, the trial court erred by denying the motion to suppress his confession. Saddler further argues that his trial counsel was constitutionally inadequate. Finally, Saddler argues that the trial court erred by allowing the State to present improper lay opinion evidence.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. Thirteen-year-old Amy¹ is Jessica Orr's aunt's daughter, but Amy has lived with Orr since her birth due to her mother's death. Amy is a special needs child and has ADHD. On September 2, 2016, Jessica Orr walked down the street to pick up her children, who had been playing in the neighbor's pool. As Orr approached the house, she claims that she saw Amy with Johnny Saddler. Orr stated, "Her pants were down. His pants were down. Her shirt was up. He was not patting, he was fondling her breast, and his other hands was inside her pants." The neighbor Tommy Shelton was present at the pool, but he did not witness the alleged incident. Orr brought her children back home and called the police.

¶3. The responding officer was told by Saddler's probation officer to arrest Saddler. After a few days, Saddler was interviewed by Investigator Mary Hudgins and Lieutenant Tony Cooper. Hudgins advised Saddler of his Miranda rights, and Saddler indicated that he understood them. See Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Hudgins then read the waiver-of-rights form to Saddler and asked if he was willing to talk to her. Saddler signed the waiver-of-rights form and agreed to speak with the investigators.

¶4. During the interview, Saddler first claimed that he never touched any of the children. Saddler claimed that Orr was yelling as she approached and that she called him a sex offender. However, Saddler eventually changed his story after further questioning. Saddler stated, "I'm gonna leave it right there and let the courts decide. I didn't but I did it. I gotta leave it, I gotta leave it at that." Saddler claims that his statement was an attempt to invoke his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. However, Saddler continued answering questions. When asked about his previous conviction for fondling, Saddler claimed that he had touched the victim in the previous case because "she was maturing and she was already, ah, she was flirty." When asked about the incident with Amy, Saddler admitted that after Amy rubbed his head, "I touched her. I pushed her away. I did touch her. And I touched her up here." Saddler continued, "Sure, I wanted to touch it ... You know? I wanted to touch her, so I pushed her away by touching her tits." Cooper asked, "Your intent was to feel her but make it look like you were pushing her," and Saddler answered, "yeah." Saddler later explained, "young girls are just, they amaze me ... when they begin to mature ... I have that desire to want to touch them, but not interact in any other kind of way. I don't want to have sex with them or nothing like that."

¶5. The only other adult present, Tommy Shelton, did not have a clear view of the alleged incident. Shelton testified that he did not believe the incident occurred. Shelton further testified that he was unaware that Saddler had confessed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶6. The standard of review for the admission of a confession is as follows: "[d]etermining whether a confession is admissible is a finding of fact which is not disturbed unless the trial judge applied an incorrect legal standard, committed manifest error, or the decision was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence." Hunt v. State , 687 So. 2d 1154, 1159 (Miss. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lee v. State , 631 So. 2d 824, 826 (Miss. 1994) ). "This Court will reverse a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress only if the ruling is manifest error or contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence." Barnes v. State , 30 So. 3d 313, 316 (¶ 8) (Miss. 2010) (citing Ruffin v. State , 992 So. 2d 1165, 1169 (¶ 8) (Miss. 2008) ). "Once a trial judge determines admissibility, the defendant/appellant faces a heavy burden in trying to reverse on appeal." Ruffin v. State , 992 So. 2d 1165, 1169 (¶ 8) (Miss. 2008) (citing Greenlee v. State , 725 So. 2d 816, 826 (¶ 26) (Miss. 1998) ).

DISCUSSION

I. The trial court did not err by denying Saddler's motion to suppress his confession based on an alleged violation of his Miranda rights.

¶7. Saddler argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statements based on the fact that he invoked his right to remain silent and his right to an attorney. Investigator Hudgins advised Saddler of his Miranda rights, and Saddler indicated that he understood them. During the interview, Saddler stated, "I'm gonna leave it right there and let the courts decide. I didn't but I did it. I gotta leave it, I gotta leave it." Saddler argues that the statement was a clear and unequivocal invocation of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel.

1. Saddler is procedurally barred from arguing that his right to counsel has been violated.

¶8. At trial, Saddler's motion to suppress was based on his right to remain silent, and the motion to suppress mentioned nothing of his right to counsel. "[A]sserting grounds for an objection on appeal that differ[ ] from the ground given for the objection at the trial level does not properly preserve the objection for appellate review." Roberts v. State , 234 So. 3d 1251, 1262 (¶ 29) (Miss. 2017) (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Woodham v. State , 779 So. 2d 158, 161 (¶ 12) (Miss. 2001) ). Saddler failed to argue at trial that his right to counsel had been violated, thus he is procedurally barred from raising the issue on appeal.

2. Saddler's Miranda right to remain silent was not violated.

¶9. Saddler further argues that his right to remain silent has been violated. Saddler claimed in his motion to suppress and here that his statement, "I'm gonna leave it right there and let the courts decide. I didn't but I did it. I gotta leave it, I gotta leave it," was an invocation of his right to remain silent. The statement, while possibly an ambiguous attempt to invoke his right to remain silent, was not an unequivocal and unambiguous assertion of his rights.

¶10. Saddler cites Berghuis v. Thompkins in his motion to suppress, which extends the Davis v. United States ambiguity analysis to the right to remain silent. See Berghuis v. Thompkins , 560 U.S. 370, 381, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) ; Davis v. United States , 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994). The United States Supreme Court in Davis held that invocation of the right to counsel "requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney." Davis , 512 U.S. at 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin , 501 U.S. 171, 178, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991) ). The United States Supreme Court in Berghuis held, "there is no principled reason to adopt different standards for determining when an accused has invoked the Miranda right to remain silent and the Miranda right to counsel at issue in Davis ." Berghuis , 560 U.S. at 381, 130 S.Ct. 2250. However, the Court continued,

There is good reason to require an accused who wants to invoke his or her right to remain silent to do so unambiguously. A requirement of an unambiguous invocation of Miranda rights results in an objective inquiry that "avoid[s] difficulties of proof and ... provide[s] guidance to officers" on how to proceed in the face of ambiguity.

Id. at 381, 130 S.Ct. 2250 (alterations in original) (quoting Davis v. United States , 512 U.S. 452, 458-59, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994) ).

¶11. Saddler argues that Holland v. State , 587 So. 2d 848 (Miss. 1991) should apply, arguing that it should apply to ambiguous references to the right to remain silent. "If a defendant makes equivocal or ambiguous utterances which could be interpreted as an invocation, then the trend is to require cessation of interrogation except for strictly-limited inquiry for clarification purposes." Holland , 587 So. 2d at 856 (emphasis omitted) (citing United States v. Gotay , 844 F.2d 971, 975 (2d Cir. 1988), abrogation recognized in Diaz v. Senkowski , 76 F.3d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1996) ). However, the statement was clarified in Chamberlin , when the Mississippi Supreme Court held,

This Court previously has held that if an officer understands only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, an officer must cease interrogation, except for inquiries made to clarify the defendant's request. Holland , 587 So. 2d at 856 (emphasis added). The United States Supreme Court declined to require such a procedure but noted in Davis that where the officers followed the same procedure as adopted by this Court, such a procedure is "good police practice for the interviewing officers." Davis , 512 U.S. at 461, 114 S.Ct. 2350.

Chamberlin v. State , 989 So. 2d 320, 333 (¶ 38) (Miss. 2008).

¶12. In Moore v. State , the Court held, "Mississippi law is well-established, in cases involving the invocation of the right to counsel, that an interviewing officer may clarify an ambiguous invocation. Today, we extend this same analysis to cases involving the invocation of the right to remain silent." Moore v. State , 287 So. 3d 905, 914 (¶ 33) ...